

TOWARD AN AFRICAN CHURCH IN MOZAMBIQUE

**KAMBA SIMANGO AND THE
PROTESTANT COMMUNITY
IN MANICA AND SOFALA,
1892-1945**

BY

LEON P. SPENCER



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Published by

Mzuni Press
P/Bag 201
Luwinga, Mzuzu 2
Malawi

ISBN 978-99960-27-06-2 (Mzuni Press)

Mzuni Press is represented outside Africa by:
African Books Collective Oxford (also for e-books)
(orders@africanbookscollective.com)

www.mzunipress.luviri.net
www.africanbookscollective.com

Printed in Malawi by Baptist Publications, P.O. Box 249, Lilongwe

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*in gratitude
for my African friends and colleagues,
who for nearly a half-century
have enriched my life
and deepened my faith*

PREFACE

In 1970 I joined the faculty of the historic African American school, Talladega College, in Alabama in the United States. I taught African history, among other things, but chief among my responsibilities was as archivist of a new programme seeking to contribute to the documentation of the black experience in the United States. If the neglect of and bias against African Americans in American history texts were to be confronted – very much an issue during those civil rights and Black Power years – who better than black colleges to acquire and preserve the resources for scholars to address these wrongs? Toward that end, a consortium of seven historically black colleges in Alabama undertook to place archivists at each of these institutions, and I was welcomed into the fine community of faculty, staff and students that comprised Talladega College.

Talladega was among a number of distinguished colleges for men and women freed from slavery after the American Civil War. It was founded by the American Missionary Association, an initiative of northern Congregationalists. Some of our graduates entered the African mission field, and after my initial work on the archives of the College itself, I turned to them and their families to see if they would donate their papers to Talladega. Notable among those acquisitions were the papers of the outstanding missionary, Henry C. McDowell, who served in Angola for many decades. As these collections expanded, I began to contact colleagues of our Talladega missionaries, to see if their papers might be added to complement those we now held. That is what brought me to a centuries-old house on the outskirts of the town of Royalston, Massachusetts, and to Edith Bunker Davis.

Edith Davis was the daughter of Fred R. Bunker. She had preserved her father's papers, and what a collection they were. I had recently finished my doctorate, writing about the church in colonial Kenya, and that research had taken me to many mission society archives in England and in East Africa. What dominated those records, not surprisingly, was correspondence among missionaries. If we learned about what Africans were thinking and doing, it was rarely through

their eyes. Instead these records told us what European missionaries were saying about them. But here, in these papers of Fred R. Bunker, was file after file of correspondence with *African* partners, covering decades, letters from Kamba Simango, largely, but also Tapera Nkomo and others. It was, and is, a fascinating collection. (The photos in this book, from the Bunker papers, are courtesy of the Talladega College Historical Collections.)

Edith Davis was also anxious that her father's story be told. As you will see in this book, Fred R. Bunker concluded that his lifelong effort to support African Christians in Mozambique was a failure. I argue that it was not. Instead, I felt he and Kamba Simango were genuine partners – in a strong theological sense – and the struggles they both faced simply revealed the humanity of the church, with all its messiness, sadness and joy. In any case, I came quickly to decide that I shared his daughter's wish: I wanted to tell the story.

In 1976 I secured a grant from the American Philosophical Society, which I acknowledge with gratitude here. It permitted me travel to various archival and manuscript collections in the United States, London, and Lausanne, Switzerland. There were some disappointments. The first year after Mozambique's independence was not the best of times to undertake research there, and my plans to consult the records of the Mozambique Company in Lisbon foundered when I discovered that – rightly – Portugal had shipped them to Maputo. I was told they were now, in 1976, at the docks in Maputo, not the best prognosis for access.

My deepest regret came over fifteen years after my research grant. I was in Mutare, on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, only miles from Mt. Silinda, the famous mission station that figures in this story. Shortly before I was scheduled to return to and then fly out from Harare, I learned that Bede Simango, an important Mozambican in this narrative, was living in Mt. Silinda. I knew he was quite elderly, but I reluctantly decided that I needed to stick to my plans. Perhaps, I thought, another trip. Several years later, I learned he had died. To this day I wish I had chosen differently, and had gone to talk with him. May his soul, and the souls of Kamba Simango, Fred R. Bunker, Tapera Nkomo, and all the departed, rest in peace.

The story I have chosen to tell may seem to some to be an odd mixture. I would like to think that readers will see it as a carefully-documented narrative about mission negotiations in the face of Portuguese colonial sensitivities, and about the emergence of an African Christian community. In that sense this might properly (with all of its footnotes!) be considered "scholarly."

But I also wrote this as a person of faith, and that has influenced its tone and perhaps its message, most glaringly revealed in my concluding paraphrase from 1 Corinthians. In the midst of today's tensions between African and Western Christianity, I have found this story of Kamba Simango and Fred R. Bunker to be one that reminds us that the church is a very human institution, and that God works through us in spite of it all.

My hope is that the religious insights I share in this story do not prevent its acceptance as a work of history. And for people of faith, the reverse, too.

Greensboro, North Carolina, U.S.A.
10 October 2012

BEIRA, 1892: AN INTRODUCTION

There was not much to Beira in the early 1890s. The town was long and rambling, but it consisted of only one street, a street lined on both sides with one-storied houses with corrugated iron roofs, some of them residences, some stores and bars. The town was built directly on the beach, and the street was of deep sand. In short order one enterprising European would lay narrow tracks along the street, and other whites would purchase rickshaw-style cars to go on them; then the Africans hired to push them would either have to cope with the unmanageable sand or balance adroitly on the tracks. Beira was not, historically, an African town — it was on the site of an old Arab settlement — and thus most of the Africans found there in the 1890s were there to cater to the needs of the small community of Europeans, only 352 in 1893. Beira looked like, and was, a back-water.¹

Of course Christian missionaries had been fond of “back-waters” for years; there often seemed to be a correlation between the obscurity of a place and its importance in the eyes of the evangelists. In any case Beira was, to the American Congregationalist missionaries who arrived there in July 1892, an avenue not to an obscure mission field but to the important Gaza kingdom of Gungunhana. Never mind that these plans went astray; this new effort was to be an expression of African, not European mission energies — though of course still led by whites — and the combination of Gungunhana’s kingdom and African evangelistic initiatives helps to remove Beira, potentially, from obscurity in religious history.

This is, however, only partly a study of the mission enterprise; if that were all, we might safely leave the story to

¹ Diary of Fred R. Bunker, 19 July 1892, FRB/Gen.5/2/3, the Fred R. Bunker Collection, Talladega College Historical Collections, Talladega, Alabama, USA; Companhia de Moçambique, *Memorandum to the Shareholders upon the Economic and Administrative Results of the Year 1940* (London, 1941).

summary treatment, for it becomes rather quickly a recitation not of mission activity but of inactivity. The justification for the first half of this book, which documents the mission failure, does rest partly on the issues touched en route to mission despair: the relation between the Portuguese concept of empire and Western religion; the dilemma of a chartered company dominated by foreign interests, pressured by the Portuguese government to be "Portuguese" and by Protestant missions to be tolerant; the mission crisis of idealism and pragmatism, typified by the conflict between the impulse to right colonial injustice and the desire to freely function in the colonies; mission tactics in relation to governments; the use of nationals as missionaries; and the broad question of language as an expression of identity. But the justification for exploring endless obstacles to Protestant evangelism in Manica and Sofala rests largely on the fact that it is in this context that we can deal with the intriguing result of failure: communities of African Christians left on their own to develop an African church in the lowlands of Mozambique.

Considerable attention has rightly been given to a study of African Christian independency, as well as to those few occasions when European missionaries aggressively sought to transfer administrative and theological initiatives to the emerging African church. The experience of African Protestants in Manica and Sofala shares the characteristics of independence, although they were not due to an African assertion, nor did European missionaries will it. But independence was there, and there was a simplicity to it, a search for an African Christianity without the complications of a constant missionary presence. Complications there were, but they were more in the context of the religious relationship to the secular — a recurring theme in Christian historiography. African evangelicals² in Manica and Sofala were left to deal with their relationship to one another, and to the evolving nature of their church. And there lies the importance of the study.

² In modern ecumenical parlance, the terms *evangelical* and *Protestant* are not synonyms; one might be the latter without being the former, and sometimes the reverse. However, in colonial Mozambique, especially in Manica and Sofala, the terms were interchangeable, and they are used in this way in this study.

An effort has been made, then, to divide this monograph into two sections, the one trying to contribute to an understanding of mission efforts to function in Manica and Sofala, the other, of African Protestant efforts to survive in a relatively hostile environment, largely on their own but with whatever support they could secure, and to respond to their own perception of the nature of the New Testament church. The former is largely Eurocentric; the latter, Afrocentric. Each becomes necessary to understand the other. Kamba Simango, in many ways the key figure, is testimony to that; where, really, does he belong? Of course many of the mission and African events occurred simultaneously, and individuals identified with the one often figured prominently in the other. But the division, while perhaps evidence merely of contemporary historiographical trends, is not purely arbitrary. Though it was an African church, after all, that was the common motivation, diplomatic negotiations over restrictions upon missionary access between the British Foreign Office and the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs were strikingly apart from the evangelistic tours of African leaders in kraals along the Buzi and Sabi rivers. There are two worlds here which, through the presence of missionaries, might have become one story, but they never quite managed to negotiate the merger.

It is impossible to declare as distinct alternatives that Christianity served as the religious arm of Western imperialism in Africa, or that it provided one of the means by which Africans coped with the colonial presence. Doubtless it did both, dependent upon the particular circumstance. But it is clear that the religious alternative of Christianity was not peripheral to the preoccupations of Africans confronted with colonial authority and injustice and with the concomitant decline if not disintegration of traditional societies. Christianity provided some sort of an answer – not necessarily a happy or just one – to the question of coping, whether Africans were told rigidly what to do with their new beliefs, or whether they chose their own directions. This is a narrative, for Manica and Sofala, of some of the choices, and some of the limits upon choice.

PART I: WHITE MISSIONARIES

Chapter One: On the Field, 1892-1917

The arrival of the Americans at Beira fulfilled their aspirations for a foreign mission work undertaken by Zulu Congregational churches. The American Congregationalists, through their American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (the American Board), had established work in Natal in 1835, and by the 1870s the missionaries felt it wise to cultivate a sense of missionary zeal among their new converts. What was to become Portuguese East Africa (P.E.A.) seemed the logical destination, where one presumably would find kindred peoples who spoke the same language and for whom Zulu literature could be supplied — a happy product of the *mfecane*.¹ Unfortunately for the Americans, the Gaza kingdom was not, by the time they got there, where it was supposed to be, both Cecil Rhodes and the Portuguese wanted to be where only one could be, and the Zulu language and literature proved not all that transferable after all.²

¹ The *mfecane*, also referred to as the *difaqane*, encompasses the rise of the Zulu nation under Dingiswayo and Shaka, and its impact throughout southern Africa from the 1820s into the 1840s. Military conflict led to the creation of several new states, such as the Ndebele in modern Zimbabwe; notable for our purposes is the movement of Shoshangane into Mozambique, establishing the Gaza kingdom. See from among an extensive literature J.D. Omer-Cooper, *The Zulu Aftermath* (Evanston, 1969). A significant challenge to traditional historiography of the *mfecane* is found in Julian Cobbing's "The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolombo," *Journal of African History*, 29 (1988), 487-519.

² It should be noted, as this narrative of American Congregationalist efforts begins, that other Protestant mission societies are not being ignored; in Manica and Sofala, the focus of this study, there were none. Indeed, Protestants had little influence in the central and northern parts of Mozambique until Portuguese colonial control was ending. To the south of this Mozambique Company territory, however, foreign Protestant missions had greater success, and their efforts do have some bearing upon the Protestant evangelisation of Manica and Sofala. The Swiss mission

It is not clear when the idea of the Gaza kingdom as a missionary enterprise began to grow upon the Zulu Mission in Natal. The concept of self-support had been institutionalised among Zulu Christians as early as 1860, and there is some evidence of an impulse toward mission work on the part of the Zulu themselves.³ The 1870 visit of the messen-

(Mission de l'Église Libre de la Suisse Romande) deserves special note. Initially a South African work, it expanded into Mozambique in 1887. Mainly based around Lourenço Marques – similar to the Congregationalists' vision, the Swiss work was led by Tsonga-speakers from the Transvaal – the Swiss too sought work in Gungunhana's kingdom. By the mid-1920s the mission had eleven central stations and seventy-two schools in southern Mozambique. The Wesleyan Methodists and Anglicans also worked in the area; in later years they established jointly-run schools and a cooperative missionary association, the Portuguese East Africa Evangelical Missionary Association.

Jose Julio Goncalves, *Protestantismo em África*, 2 (Lisbon, 1960), pp. 118-19; Teresa Cruz e Silva, *Protestant Churches and the Formation of Political Consciousness in Southern Mozambique (1930-1974)* (Basel, 2001), pp. 2-3, and David Hodge's introduction, p. xii; Thomas Jesse Jones, *Education in East Africa* (New York, 1925), pp. 308-9; J. du Plessis, *A History of Christian Missions in South Africa* (London, 1911), pp. 330-35; W.S. Malton, "The Bearing of Christian Missions on Citizenship in Portuguese East Africa," *Commonwealth and Empire Review*, (May 1925), 145-46; and Pierre Loze, "Why the Xenophobia of the Portuguese People ... in relation to Mission Work in the Portuguese East Africa Colonies?" 5 Sept. 1932, and Loze to A.L. Warnshuis, 17 April 1922, Box 1204, Records of the International Missionary Council, London (hereafter Edinburgh House). For more on developments south of the Sabi River, especially regarding the Swiss Mission, the Wesleyan Methodists, and the American Board in Inhambane, see Alf Helgesson, *Church, State and People in Mozambique: An Historical Study with Special Emphasis on Methodist Developments in the Inhambane Region* (Uppsala: Studia Missionalia Upsaliensia 54, 1994), and Helgesson, "Catholics and Protestants in a Clash of Interests in Southern Mozambique," in Carl Fredrik Hallencreutz and Mai Palmberg, ed., *Religion and Politics in Southern Africa* (Uppsala, 1991), pp. 194-206.

³ See C. Tsheloane Keto, "Race Relations, Land and the Changing Missionary Role in South Africa: a Case Study of the American Zulu Mission, 1850-1910," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 10 (1977), 610-12. Some Zulu Christians were clearly ready to start "foreign" mission work in Gaza in 1874. Helgesson, *Church, State and People in Mozambique*, p. 35. They were not alone. African Christians in Lesotho in the 1870s raised funds for mission work among the Shona. D.N. Beach, "The Initial Impact of Christianity on the Shona: the Protestants and the Southern Shona," in Anthony J. Dachs, ed., *Christianity South of the Zambezi*, (Gwelo, 1973), p. 28.

gers of the Gaza king, Mzila, to Natal, seeking trade, the settlement of disputes with the Swazi, and visits from British officials, would thus have been well-timed, and their return in 1878 would have been well-known to the missionaries as well. At least, the mission concluded, it deserved investigation, and in 1880 they sent an American to Mzila's capital in the highlands near the Sabi River. He died en route, but a second, E.H. Richards, reached the capital the next year. He spoke of his own national origins — complete with reference to American President James Garfield — and of the background of the American Board. Mzila in turn asked about Cetshwayo;⁴ he wanted to know if Richards could pull teeth, cure diseases, and make powder. And he concluded that the American Board should bring five missionaries with wives as quickly as possible. Richards was impressed. "An ordinary white man, to my mind, is inferior to him in unlettered discriminations and facial intelligence," he declared with those racial comparisons that posed as compliments in the nineteenth century.⁵

The chief explanation provided by the American Board for its failure to expand into Gaza was a lack of men and money — a common and sometimes accurate justification to be used again and again in the next fifty years. The fact that its energies were somehow diverted to Inhambane, on the Mozambique coast, does not make the excuse terribly convincing, but in any case the 1880s would have been a difficult time for missions to begin work inland. In 1885 Mzila died, to be succeeded by his son, Gungunhana. He was immediately confronted by the competing claims to his Gaza empire, which then included most of modern-day Mozambique south of the Zambezi, by the Portuguese and Cecil

⁴ King of the Zulu nation, 1872-79.

⁵ Philip R. Warhurst, *Anglo-Portuguese Relations in South-Central Africa, 1890-1900* (London, 1962), pp. 79-81; Bunker, "Fifty Years in Portuguese East Africa with the American Board," FRB/Pub.1/9, the Fred R. Bunker Collection, Talladega College Historical Collections, Talladega, Alabama (hereafter Bunker Papers, Talladega); J.D. Omer-Cooper, *The Zulu Aftermath*, pp. 58-63; and report of expedition, 4 Jan. 1882, ABC:15.4, v. 12, Records of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (hereafter American Board). For interactions between Mzila and Gungunhana and the Protestants, see also Helgesson, "Catholics and Protestants in a Clash of Interests in Southern Mozambique," pp. 198-200.

Rhodes. Two Africans claiming authority from Gungunhana promptly made a treaty with the Portuguese,⁶ and to give fact to the fiction of control the Portuguese sought to station an official at Manhlagazi, the capital. The king in turn attempted an alliance with the British as protection from the Portuguese, but was rejected. Meanwhile the two European competitors focused upon the Manica, led by Umtasa. This kept Gungunhana in the midst of things, for if Umtasa acknowledged vassalage to Gungunhana, and if the British accepted Portugal's claim over the Gaza kingdom, then Rhodes's British South Africa Company had no legally-convincing argument for the acquisition of Manica. With all of this going on, Gungunhana decided it might be best simply to get out of the way, and in 1889 some 60,000 of his people headed southward to a new capital slightly north of the Limpopo.⁷

Like those efforts of most African rulers in the 1880s and 1890s, this move toward survival failed. Between a British ultimatum to Portugal, Portugal's refusal to ratify its 1890 negotiations with Britain, and Rhodes's intent to occupy as much territory to the east of the new Rhodesia as possible, the Gaza kingdom did not stand much of a chance. Rhodes suggested to Gungunhana early in 1891 that he send two *indunas* to London to appeal to the British to save the Gaza kingdom from the Portuguese. The British government refused permission, but they went anyway, and they were well received, from Victoria on down. But it secured them (and Rhodes) nothing at all, so Rhodes, still with Rhodesian access to the coast in mind, made a last try: he sent an adventuresome employee, Will Longden, to the new Manhlagazi. It worked, for the moment; Longden and Gungunhana signed a document in November 1891 permitting the British South Africa Company to occupy "wastelands," mainly the northern regions Gungunhana had abandoned. The Company took this as title to the northern part of the Gaza kingdom, and given the fact that the Anglo-Portuguese agreement of

⁶ There was as well an earlier one, dating from 1861. Warhurst, *Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, p. 155.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 81-83, 92, 99-100; and Helgesson, *Church, State and People in Mozambique*, pp. 14-15. For details of Gungunhana and the Anglo-Portuguese activities, consult the entire section from Warhurst, *ibid.*, pp. 78-108, and Helgesson, *ibid.*, pp. 22-27ff.

1891 left the boundary between Rhodesian and Portuguese territories vague, Rhodes saw "effective occupation" as the remaining avenue to control. Even in the post-treaty period, therefore, treks of settlers and encouragement of missions mattered. For Gungunhana this meant that the region about his old capital, near Mt. Silinda, was being occupied. Gungunhana's options were narrowing.⁸

Longden remained at Manhlagazi until the middle of 1893. He was paying an annual subsidy to Gungunhana, a symbol of disloyalty to Portugal that the Portuguese could not ignore. Lacking support from the British government for his Gaza efforts, and with renewed Portuguese determination, Rhodes finally gave up. But Gungunhana did not. His envoys made another pilgrimage to Natal in 1895, seeking permission to resettle in British territory. Denied, they headed home. The Portuguese, in the interim, had moved against Gungunhana. He died in exile.⁹

When all of this was just beginning, the American Board had situated itself safely away on the Mozambique coast. It had gotten land in Inhambane, designated not for a mission but for a school for "servants" and later, for printing activities. Though the missionaries met no resistance from either the government or from the Catholic priest there, Inhambane had never really been a good idea, and by 1891 it in effect had been abandoned.¹⁰ This provided an opportunity for the Zulu Mission to reopen the Gaza question, and G.A. Wilder led the revival of enthusiasm for the region early in the year. He argued before his colleagues in Natal for a station among the Shona, suggesting naively that the 1891 Anglo-Portuguese treaty prevented Portuguese interference; that the British South Africa Company looked favourably upon the scheme; that it provided access for Zulu workers both to Ndebele and Gaza kingdoms; and that it met the

⁸ Ibid., pp. 15-17, 32-40, 43-44, 46, 69, 71, 99-103. Rhodes and European settlers found the northern area especially convenient because it was largely devoid of an African population who might resent occupation. Edmund H. Burrows, *The Moodies of Melsetter* (Cape Town, 1954), pp. 114-15, 154-55; and decision of Mr Duncan regarding site of mission station at Silinda, 14 Nov. 1893, ABC:15.4, v. 19, American Board.

⁹ Warhurst, *Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, pp. 106-7.

¹⁰ Helgesson, "Catholics and Protestants in a Clash of Interests in Southern Mozambique," p. 195.

climatic needs of whites. Moreover, it formed a chain of American Board mission stations from Benguela in Angola to Natal – a reflection of that charming preoccupation shared by endless missionaries with connecting lines upon a map. In any case, it provided a region “to develop the not overzealous missionary spirit among the Zulu mission churches,” and hopefully that was the persuasive point.¹¹

At least it was persuasive enough to lead the Zulu Mission to send two men – William Thompson and W.C. Wilcox – into the region in 1891 to investigate especially reports of the massive move southward of Gungunhana.¹² They sailed, conveniently, with Rhodes and the returning *indunas* of Gungunhana who had been to England, and they sought to learn “what favor Mr Rhodes would grant in his territory.”¹³ Rhodes’s biographers have reasonably argued that Rhodes recognised that religion and education provided avenues to power; he was therefore prepared to support both generously if it seemed productive to do so, and productivity in 1891 was gauged by the resultant extension of the British flag eastward. He thus received the missionaries cordially. He claimed full jurisdiction over Mzila’s old kraal, and he shrewdly advised against their consulting Gungunhana. Rhodes promptly granted permission for them to select a site of 3,000 acres. He even put it all in writing, and

¹¹ Wilder, argument for Mashonaland mission station, April 1891, ABC:15.4, v. 14, American Board.

¹² Helgesson, *Church, State and People in Mozambique*, pp. 71, 88. Prior to their Oct. 1891 departure they met a Mrs Pels, a white woman who claimed to be Gungunhana’s advisor and interpreter and to have authority to grant them permission to enter his territory for mission work. When Jameson travelled into the area around Manhlagazi in 1891 he met a Mr and Mrs Fells, whom he identified with the American Zulu mission. To complicate the mystery even more, Warhurst identifies a Mr and Mrs Pels as British visitors who knew Zulu. The Portuguese considered her to be Gungunhana’s mistress. Although she seems to have been at the capital intermittently from late-1888 until April 1892, Wilcox could find no one who knew of such a woman, and her authority thus remained untried. Thompson, report of expedition, 15 Dec. 1891, and Wilcox, corrections on report, ABC:15.4, v. 19, American Board; Warhurst, *Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, p. 82; Burrows, *The Moodies*, p. 114; and John Keith Rennie, *Christianity, Colonialism and the Origins of Nationalism among the Ndaus of Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935*, diss. Northwestern Univ. 1973, p.362, fn. 15.

¹³ Thompson, report on expedition, *ibid.*

provided them with two Martin Henry rifles and 100 rounds of ammunition. And so the journey to see Gungunhana was abandoned; instead they headed to the old capital on the new Mozambique-Rhodesia border – wherever that might be precisely – with the unfortunate aim to find a site in English territory. It was to be a costly act of pragmatism.¹⁴

In 1892 the Zulu Mission commissioned another expedition, to include not only Wilder and Thompson but also a young man whose zeal for P.E.A. was to exasperate the American Board for decades. Fred R. Bunker was born in Pennsylvania in 1859, the son of a lumberman who had moved westward from Maine. He grew up in the lumber camps of northern Michigan, and went to Olivet College in 1881. His wife, Belle Richards, came from a family of ministers and doctors in New England. Both were converted to the mission cause through the Student Volunteer Movement, he at Olivet and she at Kalamazoo College. They met through their work with the “Y”, and in 1891 the American Board appointed them to Inhambane. The two arrived, however, when Inhambane was being abandoned, largely for health reasons, and the Bunkers remained in Natal until the expedition.¹⁵

The three American missionaries, plus their Zulu colleagues Mjadu Shabane and Bangizwe Ndwandwe, arrived at Beira on July 19, 1892, an ironic twist, for the Mozambique Company, the foreign missionaries’ adversary for the next fifty years, on that day became the administrator, under charter, of Beira and the inland territory of Manica and Sofala¹⁶ – Portugal’s answer to colonial ambitions and bankruptcy. The Company had begun in 1888 simply as a mineral enterprise, with some £40,000 subscribed through the sale of £1 shares.¹⁷ Two years later it asked for permission to

¹⁴ Ibid.; and J.G. Lockhart and C.M. Woodhouse, *Rhodes* (London, 1963), p. 25.

¹⁵ Autobiographical sketch by Bunker and historical sketch by Edith Bunker Davis, FRB/Gen.1/2 and FRB/Gen.1/3, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

¹⁶ The Portuguese created the single district of Manica and Sofala in 1884; with Mozambican independence, the two were separated into the west central and east central provinces. Mario Azevedo, *Historical Dictionary of Mozambique* (London, 1991), pp. 84, 122.

¹⁷ Its origins can actually be traced back to 1878, when Paiva de Andrada obtained timber and mineral concessions, but his efforts to get money failed. Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Bloomington, 1995), pp.

administer Manica and Sofala, and it got it, through a royal charter from Portugal, in 1891. What they got was a 50 year charter, a tax holiday for 25 years, and exclusive control over mining and African taxation. In return, they granted the Portuguese 10% of company shares and 7.5% of the profits, such as they were. Gungunhana was not informed. The following year the Company – faced with the reality that it controlled virtually none of its territory – entered into an agreement with Gungunhana in which the king provided soldiers and officials; in return for his recognition of the Company's right to territory north of the Sabi, he got to keep a "hut tax." This deal actually worked for a couple of years, until the Company secured more control of its territory, and Gungunhana died.¹⁸

From the outset Portugal wanted it both ways. The charter required that the Company be considered "Portuguese for all purposes," and indeed, Portuguese directors of the Company were men of real prominence that included, over the years, ministers of foreign affairs and former governors of Mozambique as well as key business figures. But the Company's statutes acknowledged clearly the strong influence of foreign investors by providing for a London Committee with considerable say-so in company affairs, and that's where real power resided. In the early part of the century its key leaders were, first, Albert Ochs, a British subject who, despite his success with South African diamonds, had been rejected by Rhodes in his bid for influence on the British South Africa Company board, and later Libert Oury, a Belgian Jew, now also a British subject, who was convinced of the possibilities of the territory and was prepared to bring "initiative and dogged perseverance" to its economic development. They presided over major railway expansion (the line from Beira reached Umtali, now Mutare, in 1898), improved port facilities at Beira, bridge construction over the Zambezi to link Beira with Nyasaland, and the floating of

368-69.

¹⁸ *Handbook of the Mozambique Company: Province of Manica-Sofala* (London, 1893), pp. ix-xi; *Compagnie a Charte de Mozambique* (Paris, 1899), pp. 116-18; Helgesson, *Church, State and People in Mozambique*, pp. 78-79; and Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 370. For details of earlier company moves see Warhurst, *Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, pp. 22-24.

PRE-1942 COLONIAL MOZAMBIQUE



Names appear as in use during the colonial period.
Post-independence names appear in parentheses.

sub-concessions to stimulate agricultural and mineral production. By the end of 1925 over two million acres had been granted to better than one thousand concessionaires (59 of them Portuguese). Sugar became a major industry. There is some debate as to whether or not the territory was truly “developed” economically,¹⁹ but there certainly was economic activity; after all, profit was the Company’s purpose for being there.²⁰

What helped its economic position substantially was the location, providing the most convenient access to the new Rhodesias. Beira was blessed with an adequate harbour, and the Buzi and Pungwe rivers, which emptied into the Indian Ocean at Beira, allowed some movement into the interior lowlands. The completion, with mainly British money, of a railway from Umtali, on the Rhodesia-Mozambique border, to a point on the Pungwe some fifty miles from Beira, offered an important outlet for Rhodesian goods and cheaper imports to the Rhodesian colonists than the long overland route from the Cape allowed. Indeed, the Company’s most important asset eventually became revenues from its port of Beira and the transfer of goods by rail. In fact these British connections – through investment in the Company as well as through Rhodesian influences – began to give Portuguese Beira an English tone, with English currency, English banks, an English press, English civil servants, and the widespread use of the language itself. Cecil Rhodes had wanted access

¹⁹ See Leroy Vail, “Mozambique’s Chartered Companies: the Rule of the Feeble,” and Barry Neil-Tomlinson and Leroy Vail, “Discussion: the Mozambique Company,” *Journal of African History*, 17 (1976), 389-416, and 18 (1977), 283-86. Lacking financial resources themselves, the Portuguese ironically turned administration over to chartered companies, which also lacked financial resources. The net result was that they failed to develop large-scale agriculture or significant mining undertakings. Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982* (Boulder, 1983), p. 36.

²⁰ *Handbook of the Mozambique Company*, pp. 3-4, 23; Companhia de Moçambique, *Statutes* (London, 1924), pp. 9, 14-15, 28-31; Companhia de Moçambique, *Território de Manica e Sofala* (Lisbon, 1934), p. 10; “The Man behind the Mozambique Company,” *African World*, 10 Dec. 1932, pp. 256-60; Lindley to Pyke, 20 May 1930, F.O. 371/15015, Public Record Office, London (hereafter P.R.O.); *Boletim Geral das Colónias*, 17 (April 1941), 46-52.

to the Indian Ocean for his chartered company; with Beira, from appearances, one would have thought he got it.²¹

The Company was obligated, of course, to more than economic activity. It was to control and administer Manica and Sofala, and to do this it spoke happily of the "gradual transformation" of Africans to a "civilised" life, and for those who made it, treatment as Europeans. Its charter, in fact, committed the Company to provide instruction for Africans,²² but as late as 1940 only 6,575 Africans, of an African population of 425,000, were in any type of school. What was more important for the Company, burdened with an underpopulated region, was labour, and it set up special labour bureaus and hit Africans with a tax that, at the going wages in 1933, required better than five months' employment to pay off. It seemed unlikely, in 1892, that the Mozambique Company would keep its charter "unstained and unsullied."²³ But who was to say so?

The three American missionaries in Beira on that July Tuesday in 1892 would not have given much thought to the question of mission work in a region administered for a bankrupt Portugal by a commercial company dominated by foreign interests and preoccupied by financial considerations. They quickly left the town, filled with prospectors and

²¹ Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 370. For details regarding Rhodes' efforts to get access to the sea, see Warhurst, *Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, pp. 45-77. Arguably, there were advantages to Portugal in this arrangement, despite British dominance. For one thing, British shareholders in the Company helped to discourage Rhodes' and the British South African Company's desire to expand from Rhodesia into Mozambique. "For good and ill," Thomas H. Henriksen writes, "non-Portuguese elements stimulated systematic economic colonialism in Mozambique." Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History* (London, 1978), p. 106.

²² The Company was also obliged to settle 1,000 Portuguese families in their territory and maintain public order, none of which they really accomplished. Although their authority ceased in 1942, they had already transferred most of their administrative responsibilities during the 1930s. Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, pp. 104-5.

²³ *Território de Manica e Sofala*. p. 24; *Handbook of the Mozambique Company*, p. 23; *Companhia de Moçambique, Reports and Accounts for the Year 1943* (London, 1944), p. 21; "Survey of Mozambique," R & A Report no. 771, 30 July 1942, p. 19, Dept. of State records, National Archives, Washington; Hugh Ford to Secretary of State, 4 April 1933, F.O. 371/17412, P.R.O.; and "The Man behind the Mozambique Company," p. 259.

settlers bound for Rhodesia, and set out by boat up the Buzi River, then by carrier to Mt. Silinda. They spent a month exploring the highlands between the headwaters of the Sabi and Buzi rivers. On their return they pressed for immediate occupancy of the field, finding Mt. Silinda – close to the first Manhlagazi – both healthy and ideal for industrial work; the lowlands of Mozambique could be “evangelized from there”.²⁴ But for Mt. Silinda to function as a base for work in the Gaza kingdom depended upon two factors that could not realistically be counted on: free access across the border into Portuguese territory, and the gradual return of Gungunhana’s people northward to their homeland. Without the former, Rhodes’ “generosity” was purposeless, for they could not then get to their targeted population. And even if they opted out of their Mozambique commitment and chose to work around Mt. Silinda, they were still hemmed in within Rhodesia by other societies, and there just were not that many people there.²⁵ Without the latter, the American missionaries would be left to work among the Ndau, not the Gaza kingdom, in Mozambique.

The Ndau were a group of Shona-speaking peoples. They were bounded by the Indian Ocean to the east, by the Sabi River to the south, generally by the Pungwe River to the north, and by the Karanga group of the Shona in eastern Rhodesia to the west.²⁶ They were cattle-keepers, and though they considered cattle a sign of wealth, they also cultivated. They lived in small, scattered villages or kraals, led by hereditary village chiefs, sub-chiefs, and headmen.

²⁴ The Anglicans to the south followed a similar pattern to the Congregationalists. They established what was called the Amsterdam Farm, in the Transvaal, as a healthy retreat for missionaries from the Mozambican lowlands, mainly from around Lourenço Marques and Inhambane. W.H.C. Malton, *The Story of the Diocese of Lebombo* (London, 1912), pp. 23-24.

²⁵ See G.W.H. Knight-Bruce, *Memories of Mashonaland* (London, 1895), pp. 81-84.

²⁶ Henri-Ph. Junod, “Les VaNdau de l’Afrique Orientale Portugaise,” *Bulletin de la Société Neuchateloise de Géographie*, 44 (1935), 21. This is not entirely accurate. The coastal Ndau were also found both north of Beira and the Pungwe and south of the Sabi. And if the Teve are considered part of the Manyika group, then the northern boundary stretched along an east-west line somewhat north of a Melsetter-Beira axis. Junod, “A Contribution to the Study of Ndau Demography, Totemism, and History,” *Bantu Studies*, 8 (1934), 18-20.

Centuries before they had been a part of the Mwene Mutapa confederacy, but by the 1800s there was no political structure beyond the village. In the face of the Ngoni invasions the Ndau managed to hide their wealth in the ruins of the Sabi district, and in the face of the Portuguese they managed to hide a "passive resistance" behind "outward submissiveness,"²⁷ but they certainly succumbed to the influences of both. For a while the Zulu language almost seemed to replace Ndau among Ndau men, and the men remained bilingual and readily adopted Zulu vocabulary into Ndau structure. The Ndau even began to be known by the way they saluted Gungunhana. But the fact remained, for the American Board, that the Ndau were less than ideal recipients of Zulu language and literature, despite these Gaza influences and despite Zulu Mission optimism. And they were a far smaller population – perhaps 60,000 in the Board's region in 1928 – for the focus of major mission energies.²⁸

These issues notwithstanding, four American missionaries and the families of six Zulu evangelists and teachers arrived at Mt. Silinda in 1893.²⁹ The creation of a station at Mt. Silinda did not, however, assure that mission work would begin in the lowlands of Mozambique. The staff immediately fell into disagreement over strategy, and in the end opted for a decade to be spent establishing a strong industrial base before aggressively confronting the issue of evangelism in the lowlands. As a concession, they placed Bunker in charge

²⁷ "Survey of Mozambique," p. 12.

²⁸ Melville J. Herskovits, "Some Property Concepts and Marriage Customs of the Vandau," *American Anthropologist*, 25 n.s. (1923), 376-79; F.W.T. Posselt, *Fact and Fiction: a Short Account of the Natives of Southern Rhodesia* (Bulawayo, 1935), p. 34; A. Rita-Ferreira, *Povos de Moçambique: História e Cultura* (Oporto, 1975), map; E. Dora Earthy, "On Some Ritual Objects of the VaNdau in S. Chopiland Gaza, Portuguese East Africa," *Annals of the Transvaal Museum*, 11 (1925), 128; Clement M. Doke, *A Comparative Study in Shona Phonetics* (Johannesburg, 1931), pp. 6, 13; António Rita-Ferreira, *Agrupamento e Caracterização Étnica dos Indígenas de Moçambique* (Lisbon, 1958), pp. 45-46; and report of the pioneer party to Gazaland, 1892, ABC:15.4, v. 19, American Board.

²⁹ The Americans included the Wilders, Bunkers, and Thompsons, as well as Nancy Jones, the first single African-American woman appointed by the American Board. William E. Strong, *The Story of the American Board* (Boston, 1910), p. 343.

of the entire evangelistic programme of the lowlands and in 1895 transferred him to Beira. He and the Zulu evangelists did explore along the Buzi, choosing sites for out-station work, but the exercise was short-lived. The American Board



Fred R. Bunker

in Boston overruled the Mt. Silinda mission action, and Bunker remained in Natal until 1905, active in the creation of a day-school system but divorced from his ambitions for Portuguese East. A deputation from the United States visiting the Zulu Mission in 1904 recommended that a station be established at Beira, but the American Board still declined to approve on financial grounds. But when one of the members of the deputation persisted at the annual meeting, the American Board allowed him to solicit funds for a Beira station as a memorial to his wife, who had died aboard ship on their re-

turn. In July 1905 Bunker and his family moved to Beira.³⁰

Bunker's efforts at Beira did not begin all that badly. The governor of the Company granted him permission to begin work and provided passes for Africans, employees of Europeans, to attend his night school, and the students responded with some enthusiasm. But when Pinto Basto, some months later, assumed gubernatorial office, harassment began. Passes were withdrawn. Rumours circulated that Bunker was teaching sedition. Students began to move almost invisibly between the breakers and the shore in order

³⁰ Historical sketch by Edith Bunker Davis; and Bunker, "Fifty Years."

to arrive safely at Bunker's night school. In November 1905 a dozen of his students were arrested, imprisoned, and beaten on the hands with *palmatoria*. Police repeatedly visited the school. One of his teachers was jailed, and when others went to pay his fine, they too were imprisoned. As the situation became more and more untenable, Bunker asked for a show of hands of those who wanted to be sent to Mt. Silinda for further training. Eighteen did. To maintain his own stability Bunker consumed evenings playing the card game Flinch with his family. Finally, in November 1907, under nervous stress, Bunker returned to the United States.³¹

He had not, however, passively accepted these official obstacles. He had fumed first to the Portuguese government's representative in Company territory to ascertain his legal status, and was assured that both the Berlin Act of 1885 and, strangely, the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1891 – strangely, for it was purely an agreement between those two nations – protected his right to function as a missionary. Bunker also visited the governor, principally to ensure that he was meeting Company regulations governing education and religion, and was informed congenially that “[we] have only to rejoice at [his] praiseworthy efforts.”³² There were those who were, perhaps, a bit more honest. A British director of the Mozambique Company who sometimes resided in Beira made it quite clear to Bunker that mission work threatened the economic activities of the Company, and the British consul, for the traditional reasons, found education and Christianity for Africans to be dangerous. There were also those who tried to remove the obstacles. W. Stanley Hollis, the American consul in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo), arranged for the two of them to meet with the governor-general of the colony, who promptly instructed Pinto Basto, without effect, to give Bunker “more liberal treatment.” Hollis also attempted to discuss the problem with the Portuguese colonial minister Ayres d’Ornellas, who

³¹ Ibid.; interview with Edith Bunker Davis, in Royalston, Mass., 28 Feb. 1975; and Rennie interview with Tapera Nkomo, 1970, in Rennie, *Christianity...*, pp. 380-81, 347. Bunker was hospitalised for a time; the diagnosis was simply neurasthenia, or nervous exhaustion.

³² Quoted in Bunker, “Fifty Years.”

accompanied the prince, Dom Luis Filippe, to Mozambique in mid-1907, but the minister continually evaded him. Bunker had the same experience at Beira until, "with commendable enterprise," he booked return passage to Lourenzo Marques on the same steamer. Ayres, trapped, listened "sympathetically."³³

How much American officials actually assisted Bunker is unclear. Hollis claimed to have done "everything in my power," yet he suggested speciously that while missionaries might have the right to teach there was nothing to say that Africans "will have the free right to be taught;" and he forbade his consular agent in Beira from acting officially regarding Bunker's complaints about the treatment of his students.³⁴ In any case, the Beira agent tended to be ineffective; Bunker attributed it to his lack of social standing owing to his living openly with a barmaid after his wife's death. That bit of information brought the agent's dismissal, and Bunker, the only other available adult American male in Beira, began to act as consular agent at the beginning of 1907. Bunker speculated that his official position may well have protected him from arrest along with his students, but it was surely a mixed blessing. There was the real possibility of compromise in a region oriented toward profit, and he was certainly vulnerable to charges of self-interest when Bunker the consul defended Bunker the missionary. Whatever, it was not an appointment destined to last. The government in Lisbon asked the United States not to seek formal approval of Bunker so that, given objections from Mozambique, it would not be in the embarrassing predicament of rejecting the choice of a friendly nation. Hollis, in exasperation, proposed that the Beira agency be closed,³⁵

³³ Ibid.; Bunker, report on persecution of Christians, 1921, ABC:15.4, v. 35, American Board; and Hollis to Asst. Secretary of State, 6 Aug. 1907, M862, roll 609, numerical and minor files of the Dept. of State, National Archives.

³⁴ Hollis to Asst. Secretary of State, 24 Dec. 1906, M862, roll 320, numerical and minor files of the Dept. of State, National Archives; and Hollis to Bunker, 11 June 1907, Box 1, Fred R. Bunker Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge.

³⁵ Even though the Dept. of State had not granted him funds to visit Beira for over six years, and thus administration from Lourenzo Marques would be difficult at best. Hollis to Asst. Secretary of State, 24 Nov. 1906, 4 Dec. 1906, and 10 June 1907, Chas. Page Bryan to Elihu Root, 15 April

and in September it was. What was the point? Mozambique Company officials, Hollis observed, "do pretty much as they please" anyway.³⁶

But suggestions of whim, or mere hypocrisy, on the part of officials in their dealing with Bunker miss the mark. There was of course some pettiness. It is possible, for example, that Bunker and his students were used "as switches with which to beat" the unpopular American consular agent, and some Portuguese hostility may be explained by their horror that Bunker might seek to recruit Zulu volunteers, in 1906, from the cradleland of the "dangerous" separatist churches.³⁷ But in the Portuguese colonies there was a grave sense of insecurity; for years the conviction held that Portugal was like "a sick man with a half-a-dozen confidential physicians, each of whom has no remedy except to bleed the patient."³⁸ The colonies, during the bleeding, were especially vulnerable. Rhodes had had designs on Beira since the 1880s, and Germany and Britain agreed to divide up Mozambique in the late 1890s. The mandates system of the League of Nations was designed as much for the Portuguese colonies as for the German. And rumours persisted in the early 1920s that South Africa would annex Portuguese East. Within Company territory itself, control over Africans was not even secure until 1917, and foreigners seemed to control the European affairs of the territory, not the other way round. The Company was thus vulnerable from two directions; it faced charges that it was insensitive to the practical needs of the economic community, which was largely foreign, and to Portuguese aspirations for colonial territories preserving "the spiritual homogeneity and unity of the Portuguese Empire."³⁹ What better way to impart a sense of things Portuguese than through religion,

1907, and memorandum to Hollis, 20 July 1907, M862, roll 320, numerical and minor files of the Dept. of State, National Archives; and historical sketch by Edith Bunker Davis.

³⁶ Hollis to Asst. Secretary of State, 24 Dec. 1906.

³⁷ Ibid.; and Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 347.

³⁸ Minute to annual report for 1920 of the British ambassador to Portugal, 27 Feb. 1921, F.O. 371/7109, P.R.O.

³⁹ Vail, "Mozambique's Chartered Companies," pp. 402-3, 410-11; annual report, *ibid.*; and F. Ferreira Mendes, "Portugal and Her Colonial Empire," *Journal of the Royal African Society*, 39 (July 1940), 230.

education, and language – issues safely apart from economic practicalities. Faced with paranoia and pragmatism, Bunker had no chance.

Bunker and the Congregationalists were not, at this point, up against the traditional Protestant adversary, Catholicism. True, Roman Catholics had been in Mozambique since the sixteenth century, and they did extensive mission work in the seventeenth and eighteenth. But the Portuguese expelled the Jesuits in 1759, and anti-clerical feeling in Portugal in the 1830s “brought the Church to its knees.” All religious orders were prohibited in 1834, and by 1883, there were only eight priests in all of Mozambique. True, too, the Catholic situation began to improve as Protestants and Anglicans entered the colony (though this was not necessarily cause and effect). Jesuits were allowed back in, followed by other orders. In the half-century from 1883, they established 27 new parishes, and priestly numbers increased to 60,⁴⁰ this despite the fact that, with the coming of the Republic, church and state were separated,⁴¹ and Catholic missions suffered again from governmental anticlericalism. But when the Congregationalists were manoeuvring to get a foothold in Mozambique, genuine Catholic expansion, and official commitment to expansion, was hardly characteristic of these early years.⁴²

These ups and downs between the Catholic Church and Portugal are partly explained by the distinctive relationship between the two. Catholic missions in Portuguese colonies did not fall under Rome’s Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, as was the norm; they seemed as much under Portuguese as Catholic authority. The king of Portugal, for example, took responsibility for mission build-

⁴⁰ Numbers of Catholics increased, from less than 1,000 in the 1870s to 3,500 in 1905, 40,000 in 1936, and 85,333 in 1941. Azevedo, *Historical Dictionary of Mozambique*, pp. 43-44; and Helgesson, *Church, State and People in Mozambique*, p. 32. Some Catholic missions had been established in Manica and Sofala as early as 1890, and the Franciscans, in charge since 1898, expanded mission activity at a respectable rate.

⁴¹ The Law of Separation was applied to the colonies in late 1913.

⁴² *Provincia de Moçambique, Relatório do Secretário Geral* (Lourenço Marques, 1910), p. 320; Mimoso Moreira, “A Chapter of Portuguese Colonisation, 1892-1942,” in F.O. 371/31140, P.R.O.; Companhia de Moçambique, *Statutes*, p. 58; and Adrian Hastings, *Wiriyamu* (London, 1974), pp. 16, 25.

ings and paid mission salaries, and the Mozambique Company followed suit, committing itself to one-half of Catholic mission expenses. Bishops were not treated as "missionary bishops," as in much of the rest of Africa, and since they were generally Portuguese, government felt it could depend upon them to balance Portuguese with religious interests. The net result was that Catholic missions in Mozambique were perceived as *national* missions, and despite moments of hostility toward the Church, and legal sanctions against it, the Church was still, often, regarded as the *established* church.⁴³ The gist of it all was this: The Church saw Portugal as an "instrument for the propagation of the faith," and the Portuguese saw the Church as a means toward advancing its colonial interests. This dynamic of the relationship becomes especially clear during the Salazar years, as we shall see.⁴⁴ Catholics took advantage of this as best they could, even though they might complain from time to time that the Church suffered from "pernicious interference of the Portuguese Crown."⁴⁵

So for Bunker and the Congregationalists, it was not the Catholics so much as the fact that they were foreigners that left the Portuguese, and through them the Company, most sensitive. Foreign influences had battled back and forth for economic if not political dominance in Mozambique – the British, the French, the Germans, the South Africans, and the Rhodesians all were contestants at one time or another – and as noted, the apparent winner, the British, gave Company territory a clear British tone. If foreign dominance was the reality – and it was – then the response to Portuguese sensibilities as colonial prestige became an expression of growing nationalism posed a real dilemma for the Company: it had to appear Portuguese when, simply, it was

⁴³ Luis Benjamin Serapiao, "The Roman Catholic Church and the Principle of Self-Determination: A Case Study in Mozambique," *Journal of Church and State*, 23 (1981), 330-32. Serapiao argues that one of the effects of this special relationship was that Catholic missions in Mozambique were hostile toward African higher education and about training African clergy, because this might lead to an elite demanding self-determination. Elsewhere in Catholic missions, the emphasis was upon formation of African clergy.

⁴⁴ Helgesson, *Church, State and People in Mozambique*, p. 15.

⁴⁵ Richard Eubank, "Roman Catholic Missions," *The East and the West*, 3 (1905), 66.

not. The chartered company, designed to preserve Manica and Sofala as a Portuguese territory through capitalisation that Portugal itself could not provide thus contributed to the reverse, the "denationalization" of Portuguese territory.⁴⁶

Unfortunately for Portugal, it was not in a position to do very much of a substantive nature about it. It could make noise, and it did, through official pronouncements and press attacks upon the failings of the Mozambique Company. Its minister of colonies, Armindo Monteiro, could refuse to accept invitations from any British subjects during his tour of Beira in 1937. Libert Oury managed to smooth over these tensions enough to keep the charter alive, and the Company made gestures – it suspended the *Beira News* in 1926, for example, because it was in English and lacked a Portuguese director. And it responded to the ludicrous charge that it promoted foreign missionary activity.⁴⁷

To prove the falsity of that charge was not difficult to do. In 1905-07 the Company had not wanted officially to prohibit Bunker from operating a small school and conducting worship services; after all, its own charter obligated it to respect "all religious creeds."⁴⁸ Instead it sought to exercise its legitimate right to regulate education and religion; if in the process undesirable foreign influences were handicapped, then responsibility lay elsewhere. In 1907 the colony-wide legislation requiring permits for schools and "houses of religion" provided a marvellous vehicle. Operating on the rather convincing principle that language was an expression of sovereignty, the government required that Portuguese be used in schools and Portuguese or the vernacular in "houses of religion."⁴⁹ Bunker could not meet

⁴⁶ See Vail, "Mozambique's Chartered Companies."

⁴⁷ Ibid.; Kamba Simango to friend, 28 April 1924, Simango file, Hampton Institute, Hampton, Virginia; memorandum regarding conditions in Portuguese Africa, 1921, Box 298, Edinburgh House; and Adam to Simon, 6 Oct. 1932, F.O. 371/16492, and Fowler to Pyke, 30 Oct. 1926, F.O. 371/11935, P.R.O. See especially Loze, "Why the Xenophobia."

⁴⁸ Jones, *Education in East Africa*, p. 302.

⁴⁹ Legislation was revised the following year, allowing temporary use of the vernacular in schools. Law 730 of 4 Dec. 1907 and law 476 of 14 July 1908, trans. in ABC:14.2, v. 8, American Board. In Inhambane, the colonial administration closed all the mission schools except those that provided only religious instruction. Anglicans encouraged the British Foreign Office to become involved. Finally, in 1911, the Anglican Bishop of

those terms. Doubtless, as he argued later, he did study both Portuguese and Ndaou while at Beira, but he was hardly proficient. His denial that English and Zulu were never used in his school "as a basis for teaching" appears at best to be hedging. When officials visited the school, students did the translating; when official correspondence was required, a Portuguese interpreter was hired. Bunker often conversed with Kamba Simango, one of his students, in Zulu, and in his important meeting with the governor-general, the two spoke in English. Of course other issues existed during Bunker's Beira tenure, and accumulated over the years, but language was so symbolic that it was more than mere excuse. It was symbolic to the Company of the entire problem of Portuguese nationalism and foreign encroachment, and to the American Board of obstructionism which, as it grew in force and complexity over the years, propelled an unfortunate mission attitude of "superior indifference to the law."⁵⁰

Certainly Bunker had not set out to defy regulations but to survive Company obstructions. In the last of the American Board's metrical efforts of 1895, 1905, and 1915, the goal was the same. To do so this time, there was to be a more conscious effort to identify and respond to Portuguese sensitivities. This meant a year of language study in Lisbon for the Charles H. Maxwells, to whom Bunker, now back in Natal, had transferred his zeal for P.E.A. It also meant a preoccupation, in Beira, with diplomacy and social niceties. Maxwell wrote articles in the Beira papers to promote an understanding of what the mission effort was all about, and when he published a small Ndaou booklet he courteously

Lebombo along with Frank Weston, Bishop of Zanzibar – because he was responsible for British missionary efforts by the Universities Mission to Central Africa and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Mozambique – went to Lisbon and hammered out an agreement. Part of the terms even allowed teaching English to young men being prepared for the ordained ministry, on the grounds that the "Theology of the English Church" is for the most part in English. W.H.C. Malton, *The Story of the Diocese of Lebombo* (London, 1912), pp. 131-35.

⁵⁰ Bunker to Loze, 7 Nov. 1932, Box 43, 1, Portuguese East Africa series, Phelps-Stokes Fund Records, New York; Loze, "Beira, the Companhia de Moçambique, and the Gospel," 8 July 1932, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; Hollis to Asst. Secretary of State, 24 Dec. 1906; Hollis to Asst. Secretary of State, 8 Oct. 1907, Box 7:1, Bunker Papers, Houghton; and Riggs to Warnshuis, 12 Sept. 1927, ABC:14.2, vol. 8, American Board.

provided officials with copies. As a result the Maxwells spent two uneventful years on cordial social terms with Company officials until, in exasperation over the administration's refusal to provide him with permits to undertake school and church work, Maxwell wrote the governor. The Company, he charged, was "opposed to Christian missions...; the original possessors of the country [had] no voice, no friend, no spokesman, no guardian;" the laws and courts were "but a travesty;" and an African was permitted no "education which would enable [him] to take any initiative whatsoever on his own behalf."⁵¹ He abandoned Beira in 1917.⁵² While reporting on conditions in Mozambique to the American Board in South Africa, he suffered a malarial attack and died.

It was to be another fourteen years before a foreign missionary resided in Beira, and by then conditions and objectives would have changed substantially. In the interim local evangelical efforts would continue, but the principal arena for confronting the Mozambique Company situation would shift to Europe and America.

⁵¹ Quoted in Bunker, "Fifty Years." See also Eduardo Moreira, *Portuguese East Africa: a Study of Its Religious Needs* (London, 1936), p. 45.

⁵² Rennie suggests a link between the Maxwells' departure and the Makombe rising, but evidence for this is unclear. Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 352.

Chapter Two: Off the Field, 1918-1930

It was generally held by the more thoughtful missionary leadership — men such as J.H. Oldham of the International Missionary Council in London — that local mission problems should be solved locally. Recourse either to diplomatic and political protest in the metropole, or to public exposure stimulating a public outcry, was seen as a last resort, an alternative only after local efforts were demonstrably ineffective. Even then, publicity about colonial abuses was seen as a noisy and often counter-productive direction, less desirable than quiet European diplomacy. When had local remedies been exhausted and what new tactics were to be taken? These were the questions that dominated the 1920s.

Charles Maxwell, in 1917, was already convinced that he had the answer. Shortly before his death he proposed to the Zulu Mission that he approach the English and French directors of the Mozambique Company, and if no satisfaction was given, that he appeal to the European and American public on humanitarian grounds. In June 1921 the American Board discussed Portuguese restrictions in Boston, and in July the Gold Coast educator J.E. Kwegyir Aggrey, Thomas Jesse Jones of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, John T. Tucker, an Angolan missionary with the United Church of Canada, and Oldham and A.L. Warnshuis of the International Missionary Council went into the entire matter at Edinburgh House, the Council's London headquarters at Sloane Square. The American Board had concluded that an appeal to the U.S. Department of State was inappropriate for the moment, and the International Missionary Council reached a similar conclusion as far as Portugal's foreign office was concerned. Pierre Loze, the Swiss missionary in Lourenço Marques, continually urged mission sensitivity to Portugal's predicaments, the cultivation of congenial relations with local officials to facilitate local solutions, and language mastery, and that was the advice that was heard. Still, Maxwell's old idea, reiterated by American missionaries in the field, might be harmless enough, and an approach to an English director of the Company, with the supposed virtues of the English, might be

a means to circumvent Portuguese susceptibilities. Warnshuis did, in 1923, but the Jewish director was not prepared to act.¹ "Up to the present time," Warnshuis despaired in 1924, "nobody has succeeded in finding a way in which we can deal effectively with any of the evils.... Simply to start an agitation or to get a campaign of publicity promises to do more harm than good."²

And yet this is precisely what they did. The 1925 observations of the education commission sponsored by the Phelps-Stokes Fund were pointed enough: the commission found "no basis for hope of any essential improvements in colonial policy" in Portuguese Africa, and in Company territory found "forms of opposition [to mission work] that cannot be justified."³ Despite the adverse publicity, the Portuguese were not outraged by the findings; after all, the commission was well-respected internationally, and the investigation was undertaken with propriety. It was, instead, the report of E.A. Ross, the American sociologist, on forced labour in Portuguese Africa,⁴ that infuriated the Portuguese and, if Loze's predictions were not too exaggerated, damaged mission prospects indefinitely.

However moral, it was incredibly dangerous for missions to juxtapose the sensitive issue of the treatment of Africans with appeals for religious tolerance; to compound the problem with a patently dishonest handling of the Ross report merely confirmed, and justified, all of the old Portu-

¹ Minutes of the Prudential Committee of the American Board, 21 June 1921, United Church Board for World Ministries, Boston; notes on meeting at Edinburgh House re P.E.A. and Angola, 14 July 1921, Box 299, and Loze, "Why the Xenophobia of the Portuguese People... in relation to Mission Work in the Portuguese East Africa Colonies?" 5 Sept. 1932, Box 1204, Records of the International Missionary Council, London (hereafter Edinburgh House); Loze to Warnshuis, 17 April 1922, and Warnshuis to Riggs, 2 June 1922, ABC:14.2, vol. 8, and Dysart to Riggs, 23 Nov. 1922, ABC:15.4, vol. 36, Records of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (hereafter American Board); and Warnshuis to Riggs, 31 Aug. 1922, Box 7:4, Fred R. Bunker Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (hereafter Bunker Papers, Houghton).

² Warnshuis to Riggs, 17 Jan. 1924, ABC:14.2, v. 8, American Board.

³ Thomas Jesse Jones, *Education in East Africa* (New York, 1925), pp. 311, 314.

⁴ Edward Alsworth Ross, *Report on Employment of Native Labor in Portuguese Africa* (New York, 1925).

guese fears. Perhaps the long-standing mission concern for forced labour explains mission behaviour – a classic ends and means debate. Bunker and Maxwell had intimated that all was not well in Company territory during their respective Beira residences, and Bunker encouraged the Foreign Missions Conference of North America to act in 1919. He secured now-dated evidence from Simango: of some 800 to 1,000 women and children forced to gather salt between the mouth of the Sabi and the island of Chilokane; of some 1,000 women forced to work at the Chilinda coconut plantation; of men forced to work on sugar and cotton estates; of men and women forced to work on roads without compensation.⁵

Such evidence created, throughout the 1920s, a strong broadly-based sentiment among missionaries that drastic action was required to confront forced labour, especially in Angola but also in P.E.A. Even the cautious Loze was preparing an appeal to the Mozambique government. The American missions, however, became convinced that drastic action should be undertaken on some other than the mission level, and Warnshuis, now representing the International Missionary Council in New York, quietly secured financial pledges to support Ross's visit to the Portuguese colonies. His was to be an independent investigation, completely divorced from missions; even missionaries in the field were not to know of his coming. Thus Ross spent twenty-four days in Africa, with clandestine mission support (Arthur Orner, the Mt. Silinda missionary, travelled with Ross in Manica and Sofala), surreptitiously accumulating evidence through interpreters. Warnshuis then edited the report and sent it on to the Commission on Slavery of the League of Nations.⁶

⁵ The Conference did contact the Dept. of State, and Bunker hoped that the issue would be raised at the Paris Peace Conference. F.P. Turner to Wilbur J. Carr, 23 Dec. 1919, 853N.4016/1, decimal file of the Dept. of State, National Archives; and John Keith Rennie, *Christianity, Colonialism and the Origins of Nationalism among the Ndau of Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935*, diss. Northwestern Univ. 1973, p. 354.

⁶ Warnshuis to Oldham, 15 April 1924, and Loze to Warnshuis, 30 Oct. 1925, Box 298, and Warnshuis to Oldham, 13 May 1924 and 13 April 1925, Box 299, Edinburgh House; Orner to Ross, 19 Sept. 1925, ABC:14.2, v. 8, American Board; Rennie, *Christianity...*, pp. 354-55; and Délégation du Portugal á la VI Assemblée de la Société des Nations, *Quelques Observations au Rapport du Professeur Ross* (Geneva, 1925), p. 25.

Oldham's ambivalence about the actions of his more intemperate American colleagues reflected the dilemma of tactics and issues. "The abuses cannot be allowed to continue," he wrote in May 1925, "and even if the report leads to temporary friction between the missions and the Portuguese authorities this may be inevitable in the cleaning up of the mess which sooner or later cannot be avoided."⁷ But in December he remarked that "Ross has taken about the worst way to deal with [the] very bad" conditions.⁸

The Portuguese certainly could not think of anything worse. The timing, first of all, was incredibly bad. In these years before the rise of Antonio Salazar, Portugal was preoccupied with its domestic problems. Its prestige in its colonies was precarious at best; they, and even the districts within them, exercised an almost sovereign authority. Implementing uniform policy was but a naïve thought. Yes, Lisbon tried, but the result was failure.⁹ Within Mozambique, there was growing anxiety over economic ties with South Africa as the Mozambique Convention approached its date of termination. And within Company territory, there was serious discontent. A bad season and low world prices in 1923 led agriculturalists to protest the Company's compensatory tax increase. Meanwhile, the Banco da Beira depreciated its notes by 50%, and the notes were not even acceptable outside of the territory. The port facilities were proving inadequate for the growing Nyasaland and Rhodesian rail traffic, and there were serious doubts about the basic capacity of the Company to develop the region. As tensions continued into 1924, the Company topped it all off by using African troops to disperse a white demonstration. The natural scapegoats for the colony were the British, and foreign missions – "spies" who aroused Africans against Portuguese rule and denationalised the country.¹⁰

⁷ Oldham to Warnshuis, 28 May 1925, Box 299, Edinburgh House.

⁸ Oldham to T.R. Gilmour, 21 Dec. 1925, Box 298, Edinburgh House.

⁹ For example, they replaced the governor general with a high commissioner and tried to grant him greater authority, but nothing – until Salazar – worked to end Mozambique's political and economic crises of the 1920s. Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982* (Boulder, 1983), p. 38.

¹⁰ C.M.P. Cross to Secretary of State, 15 Jan. 1923, 853N.00/3, and 29 Sept. 1923, 853Q.00/8, and Cross, "Political Disturbances in Beira," 15

In this kind of environment, it seems difficult not to appreciate the Portuguese sense of injustice and indignation directed toward the Ross report. The press in Portugal was filled with excesses to match those alleged to be found in the document. The *Boletim Geral* ran a lengthy series of articles on African labour.¹¹ The government prepared its rebuttal to the League of Nations, attacking Ross's credentials and methods, implicating foreign missions, and suggesting, for a motive, the denigration of the Portuguese administration by those who would rather see her colonies run by their own governments.¹² The entire spectacle was, as Loze remarked, "most extraordinary."¹³

Despite the brouhaha, there remained the evidence of labour abuses. The British Foreign Office found the potential presence of forced labour in territory administered by a company which included British directors an affront to British honour,¹⁴ and Sir Alfred Sharpe, a former governor of Nyasaland and now chairman of the London Committee of the Mozambique Company, was invited to Whitehall to talk things over. He admitted that labour was compelled, but that the pay was good. He quoted Augusto Soares, a former minister of foreign affairs and now with the Company, to the effect that labour was protected by "the most modern legislation," and Sharpe himself suggested that the territory was "the best administered in Africa." So much for mission hopes for intervention by English directors. "The London Committee and the British shareholders," a Foreign Office minute read, "appear to be very much in the hands of the Portuguese authorities and officials."¹⁵

Oct. 1924, 853P.OO/6, decimal file of the Dept. of State.

¹¹ See, e.g., "Uma Campanha Difamatória," *Boletim Geral*, 1 (Aug. 1925), 123-42.

¹² After the Lisbon government challenged the Ross report at the League's 6th Assembly, diplomats in Geneva seemed to give the matter no further attention. Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Bloomington, 1995), pp. 118-19.

¹³ *Quelques Observations au Rapport*, pp. 25-28; and Loze, "Why the Xenophobia?"

¹⁴ Never mind, *inter alia*, the forced labor controversy in the British colony of Kenya only six years before. See my *Christian Missions and African Interests in Kenya, 1905-1924*, diss. Syracuse Univ., 1975, pp. 256-309.

¹⁵ Austen Chamberlain to Sir Alfred Sharpe, 2 Sept. 1926, Augusto

All of this was something of a disaster for the missions. The Ross report may have publicised genuine labour abuses, but there is no evidence to suggest it improved the situation. Indeed, there is some evidence to the contrary.¹⁶ Moreover, the Portuguese did not just surmise that missions were involved; the names Warnshuis and Ernest W. Riggs of the American Board in Boston were attached to the report. Bunker's own anonymous document, "The System of Forced Labor in Africa," published by the Federal Council of Churches the following year, hardly demonstrated regret.¹⁷ It was now clear, too, that the international nature of the company was of no value. Ironically, given their chronic instability, the Portuguese seemingly held all of the cards, as far as foreign missions were concerned, and they might well play them with that proven tactic, control through endless regulation.¹⁸ It was time for a gesture of reconciliation.

Henri Anet was based in Brussels, the liaison agent for the Bureau des Missions Protestantés du Congo Belge. In April and May 1926 he travelled to Portugal, under the auspices of the International Missionary Council, to study Portuguese attitudes toward Protestant missions in their colonies, to communicate these viewpoints to Edinburgh House, and to communicate to the Portuguese that foreign missions were not hostile to Portugal. He visited Oporto, Braga, Coimbra, and Lisbon, wrote friendly articles about his impressions in local newspapers, and was granted lengthy interviews with high-ranking officials. He had dinner with Freire d'Andrade¹⁹ and his family at his country house; met with Vasco Berges and Gonsalves Teixeira, the minister and general secretary of foreign affairs; and spoke with the new high commissioner for Angola, Vicente Ferreira. Andrade even arranged for Anet

Soares to Sharpe, 23 Sept. 1926, and minute of 28 Sept. 1926, F.O. 371/11136, Public Record Office, London (hereafter P.R.O.).

¹⁶ See, e.g., Warnshuis to Gibson, 12 March 1927, Box 1206, Edinburgh House. Labor discontent continued in Beira into the late 1920s, especially among port and rail workers, and there were strikes in 1932. Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 478.

¹⁷ (New York, 1925).

¹⁸ Warnshuis to George Foster Peabody, 28 Jan. 1926, ABC:14.2, v. 8, American Board.

¹⁹ The former minister of colonies and minister of foreign affairs, and Portugal's representative on the League of Nations Mandates Commission and Commission on Slavery.

to see the president of Portugal, Bernardino Machado (who compared Ross with Roger Casement and noted the latter's tragic end).²⁰ Anet tried to convince the officials that missions could work to Portugal's advantage; the International Missionary Council could protect them against "hypocritical and false" charges – if their colonies tried to right wrongs – and could be a channel for Portuguese complaints against missionaries and mission tactics. At the least, he made a good impression, and he may have done more than that; Andrade wrote Vicente Ferreira some months later asking that he try to discourage prejudices against Americans in Angola. And Andrade told Anet that modifications were being made in African legislation.²¹

However, the Mozambique legislation three years later, in 1929, did not represent the kind of changes the missions had in mind. By then António de Oliveira Salazar had secured power in Lisbon, with his commitment to "restore national pride" and his vision of "one state, one race, one faith, and one civilization" for the colonies. Diplomas 167 and 168 of August 1929 were an expression of this agenda, designed as the diplomas were to control religious missions and schools directed by them.²² Drafted by a Lourenço Marques official who was a close friend of a Bailundo administrator in Angola, they appear to be based upon Angola's experience with legislative diploma 77, which had stimulated widespread mission protest when enacted in 1921.²³ Norton de Matos, then the high commissioner for Angola, had declared that that act was the Magna Carta for foreign missions, for by regulating missions it extended to them a formal legal status that had not existed before. This was true of diplomas 167 and 168 as well, but there was no real point

²⁰ Casement was at the forefront of the "rubber atrocities" protest in the Belgian Congo in 1905; a decade later he was shot by a British firing squad for his role in the Easter Rising in Ireland.

²¹ Anet, report on journey to Portugal, and Andrade to Anet, 14 Sept. 1926, Box 298, Edinburgh House.

²² Teresa Cruz e Silva, *Protestant Churches and the Formation of Political Consciousness in Southern Mozambique (1930-1974)* (Basel, 2001), pp. 43-48, and David Hodges' introduction, p. xiii; and Isaacman, *Mozambique*, p. 39.

²³ For an English translation of the text of the diploma, see John T. Tucker, *Angola: the Land of the Blacksmith Prince* (London, 1933), pp. 174-77.

in recognition if in the process they could not function; that was the difficulty. Diploma 167 required a license for religious missions from the governor-general of the colony; the use of the Portuguese language except during a transition period in which the vernacular could be used orally only; and outstations led by Africans who had secured their diploma of primary education. Diploma 168 required a permit from the governor of a district to operate a school; construction of schools in stone or brick; an average of twenty-five pupils each day; the use of the Portuguese language; and the registration of trained teachers.²⁴

A Magna Carta, then, it was not. The missions' chief difficulty with the legislation centred about the use of the vernacular. Many Portuguese felt that "such missionary activity as preserves the native languages has a denationalizing effect,"²⁵ but in principle missionaries found the vernacular in worship and the circulation of the Bible in the vernacular inseparable from religious freedom. In practice it was simply essential to use a language a people could clearly understand in order to accurately convey something as basic as religious concepts; this was a widely-held precept in missionary thinking.²⁶ The creation of a system of outstations around a central mission station was also a crucial ingredient in most mission formulas for evangelisation, yet the requirement of an educational diploma for teachers eliminated virtually all of the local instructors. School construction standards also raised seemingly impossible hurdles. The new laws, then, were a problem in themselves, but the administration of them could potentially be incredibly petty and arbitrary – a "policy of pin-pricks" that might ultimately leave the religious and educational programmes of Mozambique in the hands of Portuguese nationals alone.²⁷

²⁴ Eduardo Moreira, *Portuguese East Africa: a Study of Its Religious Needs* (London, 1936), pp. 89-94.

²⁵ Eduardo Moreira, *The Significance of Portugal: a Survey of Evangelical Progress* (London, 1933), p. 11.

²⁶ See, e.g., J. Badertscher, "The Vernacular as a Medium," a paper presented at the P.E.A. Evangelical Missionary Association meetings at Contra Costa in Aug. 1931, in Box 1206, Edinburgh House. This should not be confused with the question of the use of English by missionaries who failed to master Portuguese; that reflected an attitude that was rejected by the Portuguese and the more thoughtful missionaries alike.

²⁷ Warnshuis to Oldham, 6 Feb. 1929, Box 299, Edinburgh House.

Well-founded or not, at least that was the fear, and under the circumstances missions did not choose simply to wait and see. In addition to the Angolan experience in the early 1920s, missions had also been the targets of Mozambique legislation in 1927; legislation had been drafted to govern village work, the distance between mission stations, and the number of African assistants.²⁸ This new effort at control, then, came as no surprise. How missions should respond tactically, however, was still undecided. Normally Oldham's approach – and his tactics concerning major issues generally prevailed in mission circles – operated on the premises that, in British colonial affairs, the Colonial Office was prepared to right wrongs when approached factually and reasonably; that protests should only be made when they confronted basic principles; that the success of mission representations rested upon efficiency, control, and intelligence; and that he, Oldham, represented a large Christian humanitarian constituency which could be unleashed upon a government if all else failed.

When these notions were translated into the Portuguese situation, though, there were problems. Presuming local failures, Oldham would normally have been prompted to talk privately with Lisbon officials. The government in Lisbon, however, seemingly had no control over the Mozambique administration; the latter had even refused to bring into operation Freire d'Andrade's metropole legislation designed to improve African conditions in Mozambique. The colony was "practically in revolt against Lisbon."²⁹ The alternative seemed to be the unpromising prospect of negotiations with the government of Mozambique; failing that, there were the official diplomatic channels, and a noisy agitation. Noise, however, had its drawbacks: there were barely 5,000 evangelicals within Portugal (of a population of eight million), so it would have to consist of the obloquious "outside agitators," and the response of the Portuguese to the Ross report (and to world criticism of her colonial policy forty years later) gave little ground for expectations of happy results.

²⁸ Outlined in translation of suggestions of French missionaries to the governor general re proposals to control foreign missions, 1927, Box 43, 2, P.E.A. series, Phelps-Stokes Fund Records, New York (hereafter Phelps-Stokes).

²⁹ Oldham to Warnshuis, 21 Sept. 1927, Box 299, Edinburgh House.

The initial 1929 efforts regarding diplomas 167 and 168 were made locally. On an August Saturday representatives of foreign missions in Lourenço Marques met with the governor-general and presented him with a memorandum. He agreed that the requirement for school certificates would close down much of the mission activities – that was, after all, what it was intended to do – and to frustrations over language regulations he merely shrugged his shoulders. W.J. Noble, the general secretary of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, met with the governor-general in December as a representative of the International Missionary Council, and there were certainly other local efforts.³⁰ But the initiative shifted, for the moment, away from Africa.

The British Foreign Office offered the greatest avenue for effective protest, for Britain possessed, in its treaty with Portugal in 1891, a guarantee of freedom and protection for British missionaries in Portuguese territories. No one else had that, and there were no viable alternatives. The obvious Berlin Act was of little help, for the Portuguese refused to admit that the northern part of Mozambique was within the scope of the treaty, and in any case, for American missions, the United States Senate had yet to ratify it. Nor did the principles espoused by the new mandates system of the League of Nations offer aid, for the very suggestion of a connection between mandates and Mozambique was anathema to the Portuguese. Lacking a treaty, the only state obligation to permit religious freedom to citizens of another state was through the diplomatic concept of "comity," and the Portuguese in the 1920s were ill-prepared to allow that concept to dominate their actions. Thus Warnshuis and the American missions might well meet with State Department officials, produce memoranda, and attempt to coordinate protests with the British. At the least the Portuguese government would learn of the official interest of the United States in the resolution of the issue. The Swiss, too, might explore ways for the three key nations to initiate simultaneous representations. And within Portugal Eduardo Moreira

³⁰ Memo of meeting of foreign missionaries with governor general, 17 Aug. 1929, Herbert S. Clarke to Noble, 20 Aug. 1929, Noble to Oldham, 24 Dec. 1929, and Noble, statement submitted to governor general, n.d., Box 1205, and Wm. C. Terrill, notes on present situation in P.E.A., 8 Jan. 1930, Box 1204, Edinburgh House.

and the *Aliança Evangélica Portuguesa* might remind the government of domestic concern.³¹ But none of them had a treaty; the British did.

Oldham formally contacted the Foreign Office in October 1929.³² "No doubt we shall hear from the missionaries" about the "outrageous" diplomas, one official had minuted as early as August, so Oldham had been expected. Sympathetic, the Foreign Office prepared to approach the Portuguese government alone through the British ambassador to Lisbon, Sir Francis Lindley. Justifying protest by the 1891 treaty, Lindley made it clear to the minister of foreign affairs informally in November and officially in December that Britain took "a very serious view of the probable effect of these decrees." At a New Year's party in Belem Palace, Lindley was quietly informed that these products of "excessive nationalistic zeal" were indefinitely suspended.³³

Suspension seems to suggest an unmitigated mission victory, which was not the case, though the Portuguese made considerable concessions. What actually happened was that Lisbon suspended the diplomas until the authorities and local missionaries could reach a direct settlement in Mozambique. Antonio Agosto, the inspector of schools in the colony,³⁴ met at length with missionaries late in January 1930. The legislation, he pointed out, was in fact to remain on the books; the Mozambique government merely sought to meet dissatisfaction through explanations. Interpretations

³¹ Memo sent to Dept. of State re P.E.A. legislation, Jan. 1930, I.M.C. file 9, Phelps-Stokes; Oldham to Warnshuis, 25 Sept. 1929, and Warnshuis to Oldham, 17 Dec. 1929, Box 299, Edinburgh House; and memo 152 from Fred Morris Dearing, in Lisbon, 30 Dec. 1929, 353Q.116/12, representation of Moreira to the minister of colonies, n.d., 353Q.116/15, Riggs to Herbert Hoover, 4 Jan. 1930, 550.48a/189, and statement by Dept. of State solicitor, 2 Oct. 1929, 353N.1163, decimal file of the Dept. of State.

³² There had been informal discussions in Sept. Oldham to Arthur Henderson, 16 Oct. 1929, Box 1205, Edinburgh House; and F.O. minute, 25 Sept. 1929, F.O. 371/14162, P.R.O.

³³ Leeper to Lindley, 4 Dec. 1929, F.O. 371/14163, and minute, 16 Aug. 1929, F.O. 371/14162, P.R.O.; and Dearing to Secretary of State, 2 Jan. 1930, 353Q.116, decimal file of the Dept. of State. The basic scheme for coordination was almost thwarted when the Americans broke rank. Warnshuis to Oldham, 17 Oct. 1929, and Oldham to Warnshuis, 30 Oct. 1929, Box 299, Edinburgh House.

³⁴ And a former priest now sympathetic to the efforts of foreign missions.

of the diplomas were released in February, with further revisions in March. Religious *teaching*, not worship, was to be the victim of prohibitions against written materials in the vernacular, but oral catechism in the vernacular was permissible, and those who already knew how to read in the vernacular could do so. Any written materials, moreover, were acceptable in worship. Previously-established outstations could continue, as could their leaders regardless of educational level. Delays in conversion to schools of brick were acceptable. And the minimum number of pupils was shifted from a daily average computed monthly to annually. Teaching Africans to read and write in the vernacular, however, remained "absolutely prohibited."³⁵ Oldham's aspirations in 1929 "to get this Portuguese question settled once for all"³⁶ were thus only partially met; interpretation was defined as delay.

The International Missionary Council tended to separate the vernacular from the other encumbrances to mission work. The Portuguese policy, Oldham asserted early in 1930, "goes in the teeth of practically all instructed opinion."³⁷ He hoped for a Portuguese appointee to the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures, for he would discover that Catholics and Protestants were both committed to its use. In the interim, Oldham continued to work with a cooperative Foreign Office, and in fact the Foreign Office dispatched a "very firm" document regarding the vernacular to its ambassador in Lisbon in March. But missionaries in Mozambique were not convinced of the wisdom of persistence, and eventually even the International Missionary Council itself had to accept informal approaches to keep the issue alive.³⁸

Instead, what drew the attention of the mission establishment in 1930 was the necessity for appraisal of the

³⁵ C. Howard Smith to Oldham, 21 Jan. 1930, Box 1205, report of interview with António Agosto, 30 Jan. 1930, Box 299, and instructions for carrying into effect provisions of diplomas 167 and 168, n.d., Box 299, Edinburgh House.

³⁶ Oldham to Warnshuis, 23 Sept. 1929, Box 299, Edinburgh House.

³⁷ Oldham to Smith, 22 Jan. 1930, Box 1205, Edinburgh House.

³⁸ Notes on interview at F.O., 24 March 1930, Box 1205, minutes of exec. committee of P.E.A. Evangelical Missionary Association, 31 Jan. 1930, Box 1204, and Smith to Oldham, 19 Sept. 1930, Box 299, Edinburgh House.

impact of the new Colonial Act upon missions. Subject to public order and Portuguese interests, the act provided for "liberty of conscience and the free exercise of the various religions." It also declared that "religious missions overseas, being instruments of civilization and national influence... shall possess a juridical character and shall be protected and assisted by the State as instruments of learning."³⁹ Edinburgh House saw it – the Foreign Office had conveniently sent them a draft – as a means by which the government could support Portuguese missions while admitting foreign missions only when they did not threaten Portugal's interests. This differentiation between Portuguese and foreign missions was muted in later drafts, but it was still apparent that the act encouraged private Portuguese institutions.⁴⁰ Pierre Loze was not the only one to grasp the possibilities.⁴¹

Missions ultimately chose to leave the Colonial Act alone, waiting for events to show its true meaning. And of course the measure of all of these Portuguese efforts to control foreign missions was their application locally. The American consular agent had once remarked that "it is customary for the Portuguese to pass the most radical legislation and to allow it to fall into desuetude,"⁴² and that was the hope. But the Mozambique Company provided a curious variation to the theme of control, for it was controlling a mission presence that had yet to be more than tenuously established. The 1920s was for the American Board the last major effort to cope directly with Company restrictions. As early as 1915 the Board had agreed to establish a mission at Gogoi, some 35 miles across the border from Mt. Silinda. The following year J.P. Dysart reached agreement with the Company to rent land at Gogoi as a farm, and early in 1917 his colleague, W.T. Lawrence, settled on the land. In order to meet development requirements, they kept cattle, and

³⁹ Art.23 and 24, Colonial Act, from decree no. 18570 of 8 July 1930, in Box 299, Edinburgh House.

⁴⁰ Article 16 set out this general principle that was to govern any efforts "in favor of the rights of the natives." Loze translation of Colonial Act, in Box 1204, and Smith to Oldham, 26 June 1930 and 19 Sept. 1930, Box 299, Edinburgh House.

⁴¹ Loze to Gibson, 19 March 1931, Box 1204, Edinburgh House.

⁴² Moffitt to Warnshuis, 4 Oct. 1929, 353N.1163, decimal file of the Dept. of State.

having thus “proved” their farming claim, they secured title – in Dysart’s name only – in June 1920.

Feeling more secure, Dysart immediately sought permits to operate a school and hold worship. Without the services of a friendly *comandante* at the nearby government post of Espungabera, this presumptuousness would doubtless have been curbed. Even with his support, the missionaries could not overcome the hurdles of Company regulations governing language and education.⁴³ It was the Board’s own fault that a Portuguese teacher they had located in 1925 was not appointed, but Minnie Clarke, who studied in Portugal, obtained a diploma from Coimbra University, and knew the Portuguese language well, was denied certification to teach at Gogoi. It was not until 1927, when Bede Simango, an Ndau who had studied at Mt. Silinda and with the Swiss at Lourenzo Marques, secured his teaching license, that a school was permitted. Still, Gogoi was not the answer to the evangelisation of the territory. It was some distance from the lowlands, it was not recognised as a mission, and its links with Mt. Silinda were readily apparent. Mission leaders repeatedly reminded one another that the location of the central mission station in Rhodesia and the area it was to serve across the border in P.E.A. was a handicap, yet the American Board’s response to Portuguese sensitivities, by separating the Lowlands administratively from Mt. Silinda in 1935, was dreadfully late.⁴⁴

Other efforts also produced mixed results. Riggs, from the Board’s headquarters in Boston, and Tucker, from the Angola mission, met with officials in Lourenzo Marques in 1924 and secured the governor-general’s authorisation to establish a “religious mission within the territories of the Mozambique Company.”⁴⁵ Dysart and Lawrence surveyed the

⁴³ See a review of the Lanne-Dysart correspondence in Dysart’s Gogoi station report, June 1921, ABC:15.4, v. 35, American Board. Lawrence, annual report for Gogoyo, 1918, ABC:15.4, v. 32, and 1919/20, ABC:15.4, v. 35, and trans. of rental contract, 16 Nov. 1916, ABC:15.4, v. 32, American Board.

⁴⁴ Clarke, Gogoi station report, 1924/25, and Dysart, Gogoi annual report, 1928, ABC:15.4, v. 35, American Board; Riggs to Oldham, 16 Aug. 1929, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and Moreira, P.E.A., p. 48.

⁴⁵ Warnshuis circular on P.E.A. missions, n.d., ABC:14.2, v. 8, American Board.

MOZAMBIQUE COMPANY TERRITORY (MANICA AND SOFALA)



'Mozambique Company territory' and 'Manica and Sofala' were used interchangeably during the pre-1942 colonial period, and the region was generally defined as south of the Zambezi (with the line leaving the Zambezi south of Tete and heading westward to the Rhodesia border) and north of the Sabi River. But the Sena Sugar Concession included some area south of the Zambezi, and the southern line was marked along the 22nd parallel.

lowlands in 1926, and got so far as to negotiate for a bankrupt concession at Mashanga. The Boston offices authorised the Mashanga purchase in May 1927, and six months later agreed to buy a farm, Machemeje, on the Buzi River some sixty miles from Beira. There was real enthusiasm for the 2,500 acres secured at Machemeje: Bunker and Mjadu Shabane had recognised its potential as early as 1892; contemporary missionaries argued "for occupying the station as soon as possible in spite of everything, if we cannot do more than be a friend to the people;" and the Rhodesian mission even assigned five families to the Machemeje staff in 1928.⁴⁶ But the local *comandante* argued, on Dysart's arrival, that his very presence was evidence of mission work, for which he had no permission. Moreover, the Company itself was prepared to defy instructions from Lourenzo Marques, and the timing of this move to open stations in Manica and Sofala was little short of disastrous. Loze understated the predicament:

Unhappily this demand arrived at the time the Portuguese Government was making an enquiry about the Ross Report, and they did notice that the name of Mr Riggs was, at the same time, on the demand of opening those stations and at the bottom of the Ross Report. This did not please them.⁴⁷

What was becoming so apparent to the American Board, over and over again, was that "without a legal personality their existence is and will always be precarious."⁴⁸ Machemeje remained, officially, merely another farm.

The Board's own financial standing was as precarious as its legal status. For years its expenditures had exceeded its receipts, and it was difficult to assign revenues to an unestablished field with serious official obstacles when functioning missions – such as Ceylon and South China – were

⁴⁶ Bunker to friends, mimeo., Aug. 1928, FRB/Corr.3/1, Fuller, at Chikore, to Bunker, 27 Nov. 1928, FRB/Corr.4, and extracts from minutes of East Central Africa mission, 1928, FRB/Corr.2, Bunker Papers, Talladega; report of committee on survey of P.E.A., 1926, ABC:15.4, v. 35, and Dysart to Riggs, 7 Oct. 1928, ABC:15.4, v. 36, American Board; and minutes. 10 May 1927, of the Prudential Committee of the American Board, Boston.

⁴⁷ Loze to Gibson, 9 Nov. 1931, Box 1204, Edinburgh House.

⁴⁸ Report of Alberto Graca, 14 Nov. 1930, appended to memo re registration of the American Board, 1930, Box 299, Edinburgh House.

already faced with retrenchment. For this reason the Boston offices rejected requests to create new stations in Manica and Sofala in 1920, in 1923, and again in 1925. It seriously considered transferring its Rhodesian work to the Dutch Reformed missionary society, and may well have done so if the South African society had not wanted all of the Board's P.E.A. territory as well. The Board clung to Manica and Sofala not because it could support the work itself, but because Bunker had inspired the Fairfield Association, a group of Congregational churches in Fairfield County, Connecticut, to commit itself to Portuguese East Africa. It was the Fairfield Association that pressed for the 1926 survey, poured over \$10,000 into Machemeje, and pledged its support to Kamba Simango. It was Bunker who kept interest alive among such diverse contributors as Hampton Institute students and New York bankers, and who even returned to Mozambique himself in 1930 to promote his latest scheme: a holding company to purchase land; freehold sales to African Christians; and legal advisors to Mozambicans. That, he believed, would result in security for African Protestants. As the decade ended Bunker's vision of American support for a distinctively African enterprise, without the accoutrements of major mission efforts, seemed about to be realised, in spite of the Portuguese, and in spite of the American Board.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ C.H. Patton to Merrill Clarke, 21 Aug. 1926, and Riggs to Clarke, 4 May 1927, ABC:14.2, v. 2, and Riggs to Thompson, 28 April 1927, ABC:15.4, v. 37, American Board; Bunker to Whitehead, of the Fairfield Association, 16 March 1925, and summary statement of Machemeje expenses to 31 Oct. 1931, FRB/Corr.8/1, and Fuller to Bunker, FRB/Corr.3/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega; minutes, 13 Jan. 1925, 12 Jan. 1926, and 23 Nov. 1920, of the Prudential Committee of the American Board, Boston; and Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 357.

Chapter Three: Kamba Simango, to 1932

It was to Kamba Simango that the American Board, the Fairfield Association, and other American enthusiasts for successful mission work in Portuguese East Africa looked. As a "national," he was potentially acceptable to the Portuguese. As a religious leader, he was well-trained. Of equal importance, he had an American constituency prepared to offer tangible support to his ministry. With supporters, training, acceptance, and prestige, he seemed to represent *the* alternative to traditional mission work. With the additional element of human tragedy, he but complicated the already difficult Protestant prospects for Manica and Sofala.

Kamba Simango was born at Mashanga, at the mouth of the Sabi River, around 1890. An Ndaú, he bore the name of the most important *mutopo* (totem) on the coast. His grandfather and uncle were diviners, and he became thoroughly informed of the religious precepts of Ndaú society.¹ Probably in 1903 Simango left Mashanga to work for Europeans. During the next several years he cooked and served as a "boy" in a hotel in Beira, worked as a "laundry boy" for a French conductor on the new railway, looked after the children of a European woman, and was a servant to an Italian employed by the rail company. In the process he was physically mistreated, denied pay, and forced literally to escape from employers. During those years he became attracted to the prospect of a Western education. When he first saw written words he would imitate "this magic by pricking all kinds of meaningless designs on the leaves," then pretend to read it to other young persons, "and make them believe I was in on some great secret. Since then my life has been a constant search for the key to education."² On his return to Beira to be a servant for a Welshman and

¹ His central role in providing Natalie Curtis with information about Ndaú traditions is testimony to the depth of his knowledge. See Curtis, *Songs and Tales from the Dark Continent, recorded from the Singing and the Sayings of C. Kamba Simango and Madikane Cele* (New York, 1920), pp. 2-7.

² "Kamba Simango's Romance," *World Magazine*, 8 Jan. 1922, p. 6.

then to be a "car boy" – pushing those small cars on tracks in the sand streets – Simango, in 1905, heard of Bunker's new school.³

Simango did not join at once. Bunker had managed to gather perhaps fifty young men at his classes. Most had come to Beira from the interior to work in European houses and shops, or on the docks and railway, and so of necessity classes were held at night, from eight or nine o'clock until eleven. After four or five months official harassment began. In November 1905 a dozen students were arrested. Others were beaten. Only in June 1906 did one of the students invite Simango to attend, but he hesitated, partly because of his work schedule and partly because of his fear of Portuguese officials. In time he began to witness the visits of the local magistrate. "We found him fierce as a lion," Simango recalled, "boiling as the waves of the sea in a great storm and speaking at the top of his voice. He told us that we were fools why should we stay in school learning and he said some threatening words which made us afraid."⁴ Under this kind of stress, Bunker finally gave up. Some of his students sought alternatives, and eventually eighteen, including Simango, travelled westward to continue their studies at Mt. Silinda.⁵

Simango spent nearly six years there. While at the mission school he impressed a Miss Julia Winter, a former Hampton Institute teacher, and she became convinced that he should study in the United States. How tangible her support was is not clear, for instead Simango spent a year at the prominent Scottish mission, Lovedale, in South Africa,

³ Curtis, *Songs and Tales*, pp. 2-4. These varied work experiences are consistent with Simango's own perceptions of recent Ndau practices. He informed Melville Herskovits that young men were expected to leave home to secure work. On their return they were to hand over all of their earnings to their fathers, who provided for their immediate needs, accepted some as a gift, and returned the rest in trust. It is clear that Simango returned home periodically. Melville J. Herskovits, "Some Property Concepts and Marriage Customs of the Vandau," *American Anthropologist*, 25 n.s. (1923), 385.

⁴ Simango to friend, 3 Nov. 1914, Simango file, Hampton Institute, Hampton, Virginia (hereafter Hampton).

⁵ Curtis, *Songs and Tales*, p. 5; Bunker to Murray, 24 Dec. 1920, FRB/Corr.3/1, Fred R. Bunker Collection, Talladega College Historical Collections, Talladega, Alabama (hereafter Bunker Papers, Talladega).

and from there tried on his own to enter Hampton. Madikane Cele, a Hampton graduate who began an industrial school in South Africa, came to his aid.⁶ Through whatever process, Simango reached Hampton, Virginia, on August 3, 1914.⁷



Kamba Simango

Simango's educational career in the United States was impressive. At Hampton he was elected president of his senior class and of the then-important Y.M.C.A. He was in charge of the Religious Work Committee, sang in the choir, and was a first lieutenant in the Battalion, Hampton's traditional answer to the teaching of discipline. Despite the view of one missionary that "his voice is so poor," he twice won speaking contests – on "Regius to the Carthaginians" – and gave one of three student addresses at graduation in 1919. He was Hampton's delegate to a student volunteer conference at Washington and Lee College, and he was widely used by Hampton in its own promotional efforts, much to the dismay of some missionaries, who saw the risk that "character [might be] sacrificed for cause." Still,

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⁶ Cele to Maj. Moton, 18 June 1914, Simango file, Hampton. He referred to Simango as Columbus Simango Nkhlakama. The name "Columbus" Simango apparently took from C. Fuller, the principal at Mt. Silinda. Remembering his obligations to Cele, Simango spoke of Cele's school at Ohlange at a chapel service at Hampton in 1917 and took up a collection. *Southern Workman*, June 1917, in Simango file, Hampton. Simango was not the first Ndau from Mozambique to go to the United States to study. In 1910 Simbini Nkomo, under the influence of an American Board missionary, attended the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago. He died there, of tuberculosis, in 1918. John Keith Rennie, *Christianity, Colonialism and the Origins of Nationalism among the Ndau of Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935*, diss. Northwestern Univ. 1973, pp. 384-85.

⁷ Hampton Institute was founded by Congregationalists to serve freedmen after the American Civil War.

Simango seemed to manage to hold up remarkably well despite all of the attention, and in the process he gained contacts far beyond Hampton itself. Max Yergan, the African American who sought Y.M.C.A. opportunities for work in East Africa, is but one example of Simango's acquaintances who confronted issues — in this case the role of black Americans and Africans in missionary service in Africa — of concern to Simango. Simango had abandoned the normal course early in his Hampton career in favour of the carpentry course in the trade school. In 1919 he graduated, holding a state teachers certificate as well.⁸

Simango immediately entered Teachers College at Columbia University. His Hampton courses in sociology and psychology were considered of college quality, and were thus transferrable, but he studied until 1923 before earning his B.Sc. and a diploma in rural education. To support himself Simango for a time read psychology to a blind Norwegian student, then waited on tables at Columbia's faculty club. He also assisted a missionary on furlough with the Chindau language and a black American musician who wanted to know some African languages so that she could sing African songs. More importantly, Simango taught Chindau in the anthropology department (for \$12 or \$13). He studied under Mabel Carney, whose courses on rural education the Phelps-Stokes Fund recommended to numbers of African students and missionaries. She and Thomas Jesse Jones, of the Fund, developed a lasting interest in him.⁹

During his American years Simango also assembled impressive scholarly credentials. While at Hampton he corrected a manuscript of an Ndau dictionary for mission

⁸ *Southern Workman* clippings, Feb. 1917, Feb. 1919, and April 1923, *Hampton Student* clippings, 15 Jan. and 15 May 1918, graduation program, 2 May 1919, and Minnie Clarke to Frissell, 16 April 1916, in Simango file, Hampton; and Lawrence to Bell, 15 Feb. 1921, ABC:15.4, v. 37, Records of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (hereafter American Board).

⁹ Simango to Gregg, 14 Oct. 1923, Secretary for appointments to F.H. Hagemeyer, 13 Dec. 1921, and Simango to Sherman, 1 Jan. 1920 and 14 March 1921, Simango file, Hampton; Bunker to Murray, 24 Dec. 1920, FRB/Corr.3/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Curtis, *Songs and Tales*, pp. 10-11; and Bunker, "Hampton in Africa - Shall It Be?" *Southern Workman*, 56 (May 1927), 213-23.

publication. He spent the summer of 1915 with Natalie Curtis [Burlin] of the Hampton faculty in the preparation of a study of Ndaou songs, proverbs, and tales.¹⁰ When *Songs and Tales from the Dark Continent* was published late in 1920, no less than George Foster Peabody, the New York banker with philanthropic interests in black education, and Franz Boas, the prominent folklorist and anthropologist, came to the rescue of Simango and Curtis when a reviewer expressed doubts about the traditional authenticity of his songs and folktales.¹¹ They, in any case, had a stake in his credibility, for with Peabody's financial backing Simango collaborated with Boas, then the editor of the *Journal of American Folk-lore*, in the publication of more Ndaou proverbs and tales at Columbia,¹² as well as with linguistic study. Boas continued to encourage Simango in that direction, urging him to describe local customs and record traditional tales in 1927.¹³ Simango also provided Melville Herskovits with details of Ndaou traditions concerning property and marriage. Later he assisted Dora Earchy in some of her Ndaou research. Henri A. Junod, the missionary scholar, considered Simango to be one of the "most developed" Africans he had met, who provided information that formed the basis for "the best ethnological study we have" on the Ndaou. As late as 1975 Simango was

¹⁰ See especially Curtis, *Songs and Tales*, pp. xi-xxv, 1-53. Madikane Cele also contributed to the volume.

¹¹ Clippings from the *New York Tribune*, Jan. 1921, in Simango file, Hampton.

¹² Boas and Simango, "Tales and Proverbs of the Vandau of Portuguese South Africa," *Journal of American Folk-lore*, 35 (1922), 151-204. Boas also relied upon Simango for three other articles on the Ndaou: "Der Seelenglaube der Vandau," *Zeitschrift fur Ethnologie*, 52 (1920-21), 1-5 (on religion); "The Avunculate among the Vandau," *American Anthropologist*, 24 (1922), 94-97; and "Ethnographische Bemerkungen uber die Vandau," *Zeitschrift fur Ethnologie*, 55 (1923), 6-31 (on daily life). The Rennie study (pp. 618, 643) brought the German works to my attention. The use of African students by Western scholars as sources of ethnographic and linguistic information was not a practice restricted to Simango. Daniel Jones, at University College, London, met Simbini Nkomo (see fn. 6 above) aboard ship in 1910; Jones' *Pronunciation and Orthography of the Ndaou Language* (London, 1911) was the result. Rennie, *Christianity...*, pp. 384-85.

¹³ Simango to Boas, 30 July 1920, and Boas to Simango, 21 Nov. 1927, Franz Boas Papers, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia (hereafter Boas Papers).

still being cited as a key figure in anthropological literature on the Ndaus.¹⁴

At Columbia Simango met Kathleen Easmon, from Sierra Leone, a niece of Adelaide Casely Hayford. She had been travelling with her aunt on a fund-raising effort for a girls' school in Sierra Leone. She had lived in England for some years with her aunt and cousins, and she had studied at the Royal College of Art in South Kensington. Her family had a close friendship with Samuel Coleridge-Taylor, and it was her teenage poetry that the black composer turned into the five *Fairy Ballads*, "one of the most charming works of his later life."¹⁵ Easmon was a talented dancer; she performed African dances for British audiences, and an Indian taught her "oriental" dances. For the latter she secured an audience with Queen Alexandra. She also danced with the Russian opera in London. Mrs Casely Hayford and Kathleen Easmon visited Hampton early in 1921, the first African women ever to do so, and Easmon joined with Simango in recitals and presentations at southern churches and with northern Hampton campaigns. In New York they took part in a concert given for the Washington Conservatory of Music, and later that year, at an "All-Negro Pageant" at Symphony Hall in Boston, Easmon contributed an interpretive dance similar to her earlier performance before the queen. In June 1922 Mrs Casely Hayford announced Easmon's and Simango's engagement.¹⁶

¹⁴ Herskovits, "Some Property Concepts," pp. 376-86; E. Dora Earthy, "Note on the 'Totemism' of the VaNdau," *Bantu Studies*, 5 (1931), 77-79; A. Rita-Ferreira, *Povos de Moçambique: História e Cultura* (Oporto, 1975), pp. 130-31; Junod, "Un Voyage d'Études dans la Compagnie de Mozambique," 1933, file 3001, Département Missionnaire des Églises Protestantes de Suisse Romande Records, Lausanne, Switzerland. Simango was also indirectly responsible for other studies. K.G. Mkanganwi, in his "The Relationships of Coastal Ndaus to the Shona Dialects of the Interior," relied heavily upon Boas' 1922 work, which contained little more than Simango's material. *African Studies*, 31 (1972), 111-37.

¹⁵ W.C. Berwick Sayers, *Samuel Coleridge-Taylor, Musician: His Life and Letters* (London, 1915), pp. 270, 321. The best-known were "Sweet Baby Butterfly" and "Big Lady Moon."

¹⁶ Secretary of records to Simango, 1 Nov. 1934, excerpt from Simango letter, 15 Nov. 1921, *Southern Workman* clippings, June and July 1923, and excerpt from *Crisis*, June 1921, in Simango file, Hampton; and Hurlbut to Ladies Missionary Society, 28 Aug. 1924, MWH/Corr.1/2, Mary W. Hurlbut Papers, Talladega College Historical Collections (hereafter Hurlbut

Simango's first ties with the American Board were, of course, at Beira and Mt. Silinda, and although these links were strengthened in the United States, it was not immediately clear what his future would be. For a time at Hampton, in fact, he prepared himself for examinations for a government post in South Africa,¹⁷ and in the early 1920s he was offered a job as a social worker among miners and their families in Johannesburg.¹⁸ But he maintained contact with Bunker, now a pastor in Connecticut, and the Rhodesia Mission elected him delegate to the International Council of Congregational Churches in Boston in 1920. By 1922 Simango had decided upon a vocational role in the evangelisation of P.E.A. He and Easmon toured Connecticut churches, under Bunker's auspices, and interest grew both in Simango and Mozambique. Bunker married them at his church, and afterwards the Fairfield Association proposed to support them as its missionaries at Mashanga, Simango's birthplace.¹⁹



Kamba and Kathleen Simango, 1922

The precise status of the Simango's, however, remained undefined. On the one hand was the issue of missionary

Papers).

¹⁷ Curtis, *Songs and Tales*, p. 11. In fact this may have been for an official position in Rhodesia.

¹⁸ Simango to Peabody, 20 Feb. 1922, Simango file, Hampton.

¹⁹ Bunker to Murray, 24 Dec. 1920, FRB/Corr.3/1, and Bunker to Paul A. Cullens, 10 Sept. 1934, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

status and salary; on the other was the matter of agreement about where and when to begin. Behind all of the discussions was the American Board's recognition that the Simangos were no ordinary figures, and its fear that if dissatisfied they might establish an independent work. Thomas Jesse Jones realised that they had "so thoroughly imbibed the European and American standards of life as to make it impossible for them to occupy the status of an African native who has not had the European and American opportunities."²⁰ With their talents and a potentially unhappy relationship with the American Board, Bunker warned, they might be to Rhodesia and Mozambique what John Dube was to Natal, and "the Simangos know it."²¹

The difficulty with missionary status was simply that it was against American Board policy to designate nationals as missionaries. The role of Simango, the Board argued, would remain the same as that of regularly appointed missionaries. But there were differences, not only in terms of salary but in terms of control. Technically Simango would be considered an employee of the Rhodesia Mission and under its authority, and as such would have no direct connection with the Board in Boston. These appearances of lower standing led the Fairfield Association to urge full missionary status, and some members suggested racial discrimination was a governing factor in the Board's refusal. Simango's own role in the affair is unclear, although he attended the annual conference of the African Student Union at Tuskegee Institute when these very issues were raised. In May 1923 Simango was ordained, and he and Kathleen were both commissioned as missionaries of the Fairfield Association, not of the American Board. The commissioning, however, came with the blessings of the Board, for their principle, of "full missionary appointment to foreign born citizens only,"

²⁰ Thomas Jesse Jones to Riggs, 20 March 1923, ABC:14.2, v. 4, American Board.

²¹ Bunker to Riggs, 16 Dec. 1922, ABC:14.2, v. 2, American Board. Dube was a product of the Congregationalists' Zulu Mission who travelled with W.C. Wilcox to the United States to study at Oberlin College. Eventually ordained as a Congregational minister, he returned to South Africa, established the industrial school at Ohlange, became for a time alienated from missionaries, and was chosen as the first president of the African National Congress.

seemed to have prevailed. In fact the Rhodesian mission was to give Simango practical standing as a missionary; he attended mission meetings with all but voting privileges, for example, until the Boston offices insisted again that he be treated as an employee, not a missionary. Still, in practice, the issue seemed to be resolved.²²

Salary, in some ways, was the more critical question, for the criterion was not based upon roles but upon formal status. Although the American Board insisted that the Fairfield Association shoulder the entire support for the Simangos, it retained the right to define their salaries consistent with established patterns. At first the Board offered \$350 per year, the wage of Zulu assistants, then \$733, two-thirds of the wages of missionaries. Initiative in the extensive negotiations rested not so much with Simango²³ as with the Fairfield Association, which was charged, not for the last time, with "interference" in the affairs of the American Board. In the end he accepted \$900, but in Portugal and in Angola he received the full missionary salary, and when he finally arrived at Mt. Silinda the mission there set his salary at \$1,088. The Board sought to cut it, but he seems to have ended up with a salary equal to that of missionaries. Furlough privileges remained in abeyance until 1931, when the Board insisted upon local leave only. "It seems clear to us," Simango wrote heatedly, "that the Board has not yet reached a stage when it really is ready to manifest that spirit of Christian brotherhood which is the basis of the missionary motive."²⁴

But in 1923 the matters appeared resolved, at least temporarily, and there only remained the question of

²² Patton to H.H. Proctor, 8 Aug. 1922, ABC:4.1, v. 37, Simango to Riggs, 24 Aug. 1925, ABC:15.4, vol. 49a, and Riggs to Bunker, 23 Feb. 1927, and Patton to Riggs, 5 April 1923, ABC:14.2, v. 2 and v. 6, American Board; Bunker draft, 1933, and Bunker to Cullens, 10 Sept. 1934, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and minutes of the Prudential Committee of the American Board, 25 Nov. 1930, United Church Board for World Ministries, Boston.

²³ Although in the 1930s he showed great concern about the adequacy of his support to meet standards, a fact that suggests he may have been more active in the early 1920s than the evidence implies.

²⁴ Quoted in Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 397. Bunker to Cullens, 10 Sept. 1934, and Bunker draft, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Patton to Riggs, 5 April 1923, ABC:14.2, v. 6, American Board.

preparation and arrangements. The plan, at the time of commissioning, was for the Simangos to spend six months in language study in Portugal and then to proceed directly to Mashanga. But when they reached London en route for Portugal later in 1923, Oldham and Warnshuis advised them not to go to Portugal at all, for the uncertainty of mission work in Portuguese possessions seemingly made the effort futile; the International Missionary Council leaders produced a list of Dutch Reformed stations closed since 1918 to prove their point. Strikingly, they were convinced that Simango would face even greater difficulty because he was an African and a Portuguese subject – conditions that proved in later years to be such an advantage. They, finally, reaffirmed their misgivings about any arrangement that required a mission field to be worked from another territory. Simango met with representatives of the American Board, recently arrived from Boston, Pierre Loze and Abel de Meuron of the Swiss mission, and Warnshuis in Oxford, and they all concluded that they would be better off with a white man in Mozambique – why, after Bunker's and Maxwell's experience, is hard to say – supported by African assistants trained in Lourenzo Marques. Simango should go straight to Mt. Silinda, there to train teachers, leaving lesser educated Africans to do the work in P.E.A. But when a returning missionary passed through London he persuaded Simango of the importance of Portuguese training, and so, with this wasted exercise over, Simango headed for Lisbon.²⁵

In Portugal the Simangos undertook language study. Together with Kathleen Simango's mother they resided for most of this period with other missionaries, especially Mary Hurlbut, bound for Angola with the American Board. It was a relaxed, compatible group, with private language study interspersed with Whist and beach trips. But in July 1924, back in London to examine African exhibits at Wembley, Kathleen Simango died of peritonitis. Uncertainty once again prevailed; 'I seem to be quite at sea,' Simango wrote Franz

²⁵ Extract from Riggs to Bunker, 13 Aug. 1923, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Simango to Riggs, 24 Aug. 1925, ABC:15.4, v. 49a, and Kathleen and Kamba Simango to Bunker, 16 July 1923, and extract from letter from member of Rhodesia Mission, 12 Nov. 1923, ABC:14.2, v. 2, American Board; and Fuller to friends, 15 Oct. 1926, Simango file, Hampton.

Boas. "I do not know what to do or what to say.... All the hopes and plans are gone.... Maybe someday we will understand the meaning of death. But in the meantime it seems to leave us powerless."²⁶ There was talk of a return to the United States to raise funds as a memorial, and of Mrs Easmon's accompanying Simango to Mozambique as a surrogate for her daughter. Instead, in England in September 1925, Simango married Christine Coussey, partly at the encouragement of the American Board, which was always uneasy about single black men on the mission field.²⁷



Kamba and Christine Simango with son Louis

Coussey was born into an elite Gold Coast commercial family in Axim, some 150 miles west of Accra. She attended a Wesleyan school at Cape Coast and then travelled to England with her sister and aunt. There she studied home economics (in Kent), secretarial skills (in London), and dressmaking before returning to West Africa to become involved in a business venture. She became the assistant


²⁶ Simango to Boas, 21 Oct. 1924, Boas Papers.

²⁷ Hurlbut to her family, 17 Aug. and 31 Aug. 1924, 24 May and 29 Nov. 1925, and 17 Jan. 1926, MWH/Corr.I, Hurlbut Papers.

secretary of the Gold Coast Agricultural Society, a new multi-racial effort, until her father needed to go to England for his health. Back in London her home was regularly open to African visitors from throughout Africa and the diaspora, and her family was in contact with the Union of Students of African Descent meeting at Russell Square. It was during this time that she met Kathleen and Kamba Simango, and became a close friend of Kathleen's. Thomas Jesse Jones was favourably impressed with Coussey when he met her after Kathleen Simango's death; she was very much like Easmon, he wrote, but "intellectually more capable."²⁸ Together Christine and Kamba Simango left for Africa late in 1925.

Despite unnecessary delays and the tragedy of Kathleen Simango's death, these two years were not altogether a waste. Simango managed to do what he intended to do in Lisbon: master the language, gain some understanding of Portuguese customs, pass the 2° Grau examination, and secure acceptance of his Columbia degree by Portuguese education officials. Both Kathleen and Kamba Simango took missionary preparation courses

at King's College, London, and she arranged one of the scenes of an African pageant at the London Philharmonic



Kamba and Christine Simango
with sons

²⁸ Rennie, *Christianity...*, pp. 389-92; and Jones to Riggs, n.d., file 4, American Board series, Phelps-Stokes Fund Records, New York (hereafter Phelps-Stokes).

Hall. She also participated in a girls' camp in Ireland for a fortnight and taught a Y.W.C.A. crafts class in Lisbon. Before sailing for Portugal she became the first African to broadcast over the "wireless," speaking on the children of West Africa on a youth programme early in 1924. Simango, meanwhile, was called upon to review the Phelps-Stokes Commission's report on education in Africa "from the African point of view."²⁹

It is intriguing to speculate about Simango's political orientation as he left for Africa. His white supporters, including those at the Phelps-Stokes Fund and at Hampton, considered Tuskegee-Hampton ideals³⁰ to be engrained in him, and in a 1923 interview he declared that "what Hampton Institute stands for in the United States we mean to make Mt. Silinda school stand for in Africa."³¹ But in 1915 he had observed:

When we try to learn and rise a little, even those white people who want to be just and kind still like us to feel the weight of their hand upon our head. They wish us to know that we may not rise higher than they allow.³²

Christine Simango would thus have struck a responsive chord in her husband when, some years later, she was prepared to acknowledge the "excellent and self-sacrificing work" of "our European friends" yet to argue that

Africa will really be won by her own sons and daughters in so far as they are willing to throw in their lot with their less advantaged brothers and sisters and help them by their sympathy, understanding and love so that gradually in their turn they too may catch something of the vision of service for their country.³³

²⁹ Fuller to friends, 15 Oct. 1926, and Kathleen Simango to friend, 28 April 1924, Simango file, Hampton; Hurlbut to her family, 14 Dec. 1924, MWH/Corr.1/3, Hurlbut Papers; and *West Africa*, 8 (26 Jan. 1924), 18.

³⁰ Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, in the United States, was founded in 1881 and was most famously associated with Booker T. Washington, its first president, whose vision was for industrial education for freedmen, preparing students to function in the realities of the post-Civil War American South. Hampton Institute shared that vision.

³¹ *Negro World*, 17 March 1923, p. 6.

³² Curtis, *Songs and Tales*, p. 8.

³³ Quoted in Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 392.

Simango's marriage to both Coussey and Easmon broadened his awareness of his race,³⁴ his culture, and his responsibility. His experience in Portugal broadened his sense of oppression beyond race. He had remarked pointedly in 1921 that "in old times black men were owned by individuals. Now they are owned by governments and corporations."³⁵ Now, in Portugal, he found official corruption rampant and the economy exploited by "foreign capitalists." "When one sees," he added, "the increased taxation, the lowering of Portuguese currency, and the exploitation of the masses here in Lisbon, one cannot help feeling that we must look for worse things yet in the colonies." The Ross report reminded him of what he might find, and he declared that "we should act to free these people."³⁶ Simango attended the third Pan-African Congress in 1923, and Paul Robeson, whom he had known at Columbia and who was in London performing in "Emperor Jones" in 1925, attended Simango's second wedding. Little is known about his relationship with Robeson or his views on the Pan-African Congress – he did speak on "Portuguese Angola," and he gave W.E.B. DuBois a walking cane – but consistent with these impressions of African self-assertion is evidence of his continuing respect for African traditional life and his disinclination, at government-sponsored meetings of Africans in Southern Rhodesia, to extol the virtues of American blacks at the expense of Africans. He felt pride and exasperation with both. In a final appeal to Hampton for support of "a Race enterprise through and through" in the late 1930s, Simango asserted: "No matter how much we are able to put together things taken from the past history of our supposed glory, we are still considered that we are still asleep and have not even started to wake up from their sleep." He enumerated failure after failure of blacks to respond to his appeals, and then concluded: "We are proud in the race in theory and not in practice."³⁷

³⁴ The reality of race, even when limited to biological considerations, has been open to debate in recent decades. However, its reality was accepted and the term was used widely during the period of this study.

³⁵ Curtis, "From Kraal to College," 1921 clipping, Simango file, Hampton.

³⁶ Simango to friend, 28 April 1924, *ibid.*; Simango to Riggs, 24 Aug. 1925, ABC:15.4, v. 49a, American Board.

³⁷ Simango to Mabel Camey. 29 Sept. 1925, Simango file B-3, Phelps-

In December 1925 Christine and Kamba Simango headed not for Mozambique but for Angola. The American Board placed them, "for experience," at their mission at Chisamba, despite strong protests from the Fairfield Association, which after all was still supporting them. They clearly made a good impression. Simango had met Henry C. McDowell, one of the towering missionary figures of the period who founded the African American station at Galangue, in Portugal in 1924, and they were in contact again in Angola. McDowell found him a congenial colleague, and they shared common friends. Still, Angola was a delaying phenomenon. The Simangos finally arrived at Beira in September 1926, over three years after leaving the United States.³⁸

Even then, he was never given an opportunity to undertake the work in the lowlands for which he was being supported. Partly this is explained by his talents. Pierre Loze, whose animosity toward Simango had no bounds in the 1930s, first found him "a splendid worker," and Simango was in frequent demand at official occasions in Southern Rhodesia.³⁹ The Rhodesia Mission simply found him of greater value elsewhere than in the lowlands. Partly this is explained by racism; if he were placed in charge of the lowlands work, it would be awkward to place a white missionary under him. Partly it is explained by Portuguese official attitudes; the presence of American Board missionaries, with the added complication of Simango's return, disturbed both the government in Beira and the local *comandante* at Espungabera, near Gogoi. The administration

Stokes; Curtis, *Songs and Tales*, p. 6; Kenneth James King, *Pan-Africanism and Education* (Oxford, 1971), p. 226; DuBois to Simango, 10 July 1924, and program, Pan-African Congress, 1923, W.E.B. DuBois Papers, Univ. of Massachusetts, Amherst; Fuller to Bunker, 27 Nov. 1926, FRB/Corr.3/3, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Simango to White, 28 Jan. 1939, Simango file, Hampton.

³⁸ Minutes, 26 May 1925, of the Prudential Committee of the American Board, Boston; James E. Lloyd, in Angola, to Riggs, n.d., FRB/Corr.3/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Hurlbut to her family, 9 April 1924, Hurlbut Papers; and interview with Henry C. McDowell, at Kings Mountain, North Carolina, 12-13 June 1975, HCM/Gen. 5/1/3, Henry C. McDowell Papers, Talladega College Historical Collections.

³⁹ See, e.g., the *Rhodesia Herald*, 4 Nov. 1932, p. 20; Fuller to Bunker, 27 Nov. 1926, FRB/Corr.3/3, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Loze to Jones, 11 July 1932, Box 43, 1, P.E.A. series, Phelps-Stokes.

remained especially concerned with his American connections. And partly it is explained by the mission abandonment of land schemes that were fundamental to the entire Simango-Fairfield Association plan. The Simangos were to have worked at Mashanga, his home, yet the mission withdrew its purchase option at Mashanga and invested instead in 2,500 acres at Machemeje, on the middle reaches of the Buzi River. Simango, though, they placed at neither. Rather he was stationed at Gogoi, 200 miles from the original commitment at Mashanga and 150 from the new Fairfield Association purchase at Machemeje. Deciding that he was indispensable at Gogoi, the mission resisted Fairfield Association appeals to relocate Simango. Only in 1932 was there real promise of a transfer to Machemeje, and in anticipation he moved from Gogoi to Mt. Silinda.⁴⁰

There, in October 1932, Kamba Simango was charged with the rape of a white missionary.

⁴⁰ Lloyd to Riggs, n.d., FRB/Corr.3/2, Fuller to Bunker, 27 Nov. 1926, FRB/Corr.3/3, and Bunker draft, n.d., FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Loze to Gibson, 16 July 1932, Box 1204, Edinburgh House.

Chapter Four: Abdication, 1930-1945

Bunker began the decade of the 1930s with real enthusiasm that the American Board was now committed to carrying out its responsibilities in P.E.A.; he ended the decade in despair, remarking that "I have worked for forty-eight years to get them [the American Board] to do something and have failed."¹ From the standpoint of active mission work, Bunker's shift from hope to depression characterised the entire period from the 1930s through the mid-1940s. Missions continued to try to cope with Portuguese obstruction and sensitivities, but their schemes and protests were to come to nothing. "To continue as though 1940 were 1925," one of Bunker's sons wrote, "is folly."² No one did. Simango's "fall," the end of Company rule, and the rise of a more aggressive Catholicism saw to that.

Efforts in Europe and the United States were, at the outset, merely variations on the old theme of pressures placed upon the Lisbon government. The American Federal Council of Churches and the International Missionary Council met at length during 1931, and at the request of the Federal Council, Thomas Jesse Jones travelled to London, Lisbon, and Geneva in 1933 to seek access by foreign missions to Portuguese African territories. The following year missionaries in southern Africa pressed the International Missionary Council for continuing attention to the "practically impossible" situation in Manica and Sofala. Warnshuis saw the Portuguese ambassador to the United States informally that same year, but it was an act that merely appeared to create more difficulties for missions in Mozambique.³

¹ Bunker to Riggs, 21 April 1932, FRB/Corr.7, and Bunker to Simango, 6 May 1939, FRB/Corr.8/2, Fred R. Bunker Collection, Talladega College Historical Collections, Talladega, Alabama (hereafter Bunker Papers, Talladega).

² Wilfrid Bunker to Kenneth Bunker, 12 Nov. 1940, FRB/Corr.8/1, *ibid.*

³ Bunker to Kenneth Bunker, 1 May 1931, FRB/Corr.7, and Bunker to friends, 18 May 1933, and extract from *South African Outlook* (Lovedale), 1 Aug. 1934, in FRB/Corr.8/1, *ibid.*; and Oldham to de Meuron, 20 Dec. 1934, Box 1206, and de Meuron to Warnshuis, 3 June 1935, Box 299, Records of the International Missionary Council, London (hereafter

The only new notion to emerge was a 1935 scheme to register recognised mission societies, thus securing both Portuguese control *of* and legal standing *for* missions. It was an important direction to take. A mission society unrecognised in Lisbon could not, for example, hold property; this was the explanation for Gogoi and Machemeje being held in the names of individual missionaries. Registration was a system already successfully at work in Britain, but its applicability to the Portuguese situation was very much in doubt. The system worked well in an Anglican and Protestant Britain with a strong missionary conference. How well it would work in a Catholic Portugal with a negligible Protestant presence was questionable. Moreover, Portuguese Protestants lacked unity and tended to be fundamentalist in beliefs; they might well recognise the South African General Mission and other faith missions while excluding the Universities Mission to Central Africa and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.⁴ In any case, the 1929 diplomas had resulted in a kind of recognition and registration of all mission societies working in Mozambique, but the situation had hardly improved. Eduardo Moreira, the evangelical leader of Portugal, went so far as to draft a letter to Salazar proposing registration, but the scheme went no further.⁵

One of the reasons for these failures was the commitment of the *Estado Novo* – as the Salazar's authoritarian regime called itself – to nationalisation, both at home and in the colonies. Paradoxically, the uneasy status of the Mozambique Company in the 1930s left it more determined than ever to counter its foreign reputation through limitations upon foreign Protestant missions, while at the same time left it, with the expiration of its charter scheduled for 1942, more and more vulnerable to criticism of "denationalization." Salazar was reasserting control over the colonies, and in 1929 the charter of the *Companhia de Nyassa*, to the north in Mozambique, came to an end, ending with it decades of abuse and maladministration. Oury and the Mozambique

Edinburgh House).

⁴ Warnshuis to Gibson, 6 June 1935, and Gibson to Warnshuis, 9 Jan. 1940, Box 299, Edinburgh House.

⁵ De Meuron to Warnshuis, 3 June 1935, and draft of letter to Salazar, approved by the Liga but never sent, Oct. 1938, Box 299, Edinburgh House.

Company were somewhat wiser, accommodating themselves to the government's desire for administrative control while salvaging their profitable sub-concessions. But they were, in the 1930s, constantly the prey for nationalistic rhetoric. When in 1933 a prominent Portuguese journalist began to wage vigorous attacks on the Mozambique Company in a Lisbon paper, the natural response by Company officials in Beira was to de-emphasise "the apparent extent of foreign influence" and to avoid "any move which can be labelled (or libelled) as 'anti-national.'"⁶ This was not a time for foreign mission occupation.

The declining position of the Company was paralleled by the reviving influence of Catholicism in Portugal, and the latter redirected Protestant mission concerns. Catholic missions had suffered during the first decade after the coming of the Republic, but by the early 1920s Catholic missionaries began, more aggressively, to warn again of denationalisation "without religious missions to oppose and do away with the dangerous influence of foreign missions."⁷ In 1926 the Portuguese government seemed to listen, with a decree that offered a new legal status, and money, to Catholic missions in the colonies. But there were some misgivings as to the real advantage of Catholic "bondage" for "Portugalization," and in any case the stiffening attitude toward religious liberty came more intensely into evidence both in Portugal and the colonies only after the rise of Salazar. The main role of the Church in the colonies, he declared, was "to complement the task of political occupation with the sanction of spiritual possession conferred by the Holy See, and with the nationalisation of missionary work, now definitively integrated into Portuguese colonial

⁶ António Eça de Queiroy began to attack the Companhia in the *Diário do Comércio e das Colónias*. E.J. Joint memo re company territory, 13 March 1933, and Joint to consul-general, Lourenço Marques, 7 June 1933, F.O. 371/17412, Public Record Office, London (hereafter P.R.O.). See also Leroy Vail, "Mozambique's Chartered Companies: the Rule of the Feeble," *Journal of African History*, 17 (1976), esp. p. 415, and Barry Neil-Tomlinson, "The Nyassa Chartered Company: 1891-1929," *Journal of African History*, 18 (1977), 109-28.

⁷ American minister in Portugal to secretary of state, 27 Jan. 1922, quoting interview with Rafael da Assunção, Bishop of Mozambique, by the *Diário de Notícias*, 853Q.404/-, decimal file of the Dept. of State, National Archives, Washington.

action.”⁸ Salazar’s efforts to diminish foreign influence in the colonies and to end colonial autonomy certainly had its corollary in the revival of the Catholic Church. The Colonial Act of 1930 said as much.

And one could see it. The Bishop of Mozambique was now in evidence at all public functions. Potential African teachers at Protestant outstations could not now be trained for the necessary educational certification by African government teachers (and there were few alternatives). The “friendly cooperation” that characterised the relations between some local officials and missionaries disappeared as the 1930s progressed. In Company territory Bede Simango’s school was closed for a brief period because of his refusal to denounce Dysart, the Board’s resident at Gogoi. There was stronger talk of the need for Catholics to defend the colonies against evangelical propaganda, and that talk found practical expression. When Henri Philippe Junod⁹ visited Mambone in 1933 one African stood and declared: “We are dying. We are not able to pray. That is forbidden us.... I heard your message in Johannesburg. I have been converted. Here, I am dying.”¹⁰ The Anglican Bishop of Lebombo became convinced that these intensifying difficulties were a part of a very definite Lisbon policy.¹¹

⁸ Awkwardly phrased, but the point was clear. Quoted in Teresa Cruz e Silva, *Protestant Churches and the Formation of Political Consciousness in Southern Mozambique (1930-1974)*, (Basel, 2001), p. 66. See also Mario Azevedo, “The Role of the Roman Catholic Church in the Politics of the Colonial and Post-Colonial State in Mozambique,” in Austin Metumara Ahanotu, ed., *Religion, State and Society in Contemporary Africa* (New York, 1992), p. 191.

⁹ A Swiss missionary and the son of Henri Alexandre Junod, the missionary scholar and author of the anthropological classic, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, 2 vols. (London, 1912-13).

¹⁰ Junod, “Un Voyage d’Études dans la Compagnie de Mozambique,” 1933, file 3001, Département Missionnaire des Églises Protestantés de Suisse Romande Records, Lausanne, Switzerland.

¹¹ Memo to Austen Chamberlain, 18 Nov. 1926, F.O. 371/11928, and consul-general, Lourenço Marques, to secretary of state, 4 Sept. 1934, and F.O. minute, 22 Nov. 1934, F.O. 371/18588, P.R.O.; Adrian Hastings, *Wiriyaumu* (London, 1974), p. 19; Adriano Moreira, *The Present-Day Significance of Missions* (Lisbon, 1960), p. 12; report on the third Congresso Missionário de Propagação da Fé, and Fr. António Ribeiro, “Vocação Missionário de Portugal,” *Boletim Geral das Colónias*, 12 (Jan. 1936), 128-32, and 12 (April 1936), 55-67; Alan K. Smith, “António

The *Concordata* and the Missionary Agreement of 1940, then, merely gave official credence to a trend in evidence for some time. The *Concordata* reinstituted church-state ties, and the Missionary Agreement gave effect to the spirit of the *Concordata* in overseas territories.¹² The education of Africans, for example, was placed entirely in the hands of the Catholic Church, complete with government subsidies. New dioceses were created, and although the war delayed action, in 1944 the first Bishop of Beira was appointed.¹³ Salazar, at the time, put the *Concordata* in the context of the evolution of Portugal itself, restoring it to "its rightful course." As for the colonies, the "nationalization of missionary endeavor" should put an end, he thought, to "activities alien to our traditions."¹⁴ Britain's minister in Lisbon, Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, saw it that way. "I am of the opinion," he wrote Anthony Eden, "that it is the intention of the Portuguese Government to oust Protestant missions from the Colonies or to reduce them to insignificance, but I do not believe that they will for the moment use so crude a method as direct attack. The plan seems to be to increase the authority and prestige of the Roman Church in the Colonies until it completely eclipses all other religious organizations."¹⁵

These were developments that could not easily be ignored. William Paton, who had replaced Oldham as secretary of the International Missionary Council, immediately sought from the Foreign Office the meaning for Protestant missions of the new formal relationship between Portugal

Salazar and the Reversal of Portuguese Colonial Policy," *Journal of African History*, 15 (1974), 653-67; and Bishop of Lebombo to Oldham, 13 June 1935, Box 299, and conf. report by Eduardo Moreira, Feb. 1935, in A/T.10/1, Edinburgh House.

¹² Mario Azevedo, "The Role of the Roman Catholic Church in the Politics of the Colonial and Post-Colonial State in Mozambique," pp. 191-92.

¹³ Mozambique was divided into thirds, including the archdiocese of Lourenço Marques and the dioceses of Beira and Nampula. The Beira diocese consisted of Manica and Sofala, Tete, and Zambezia. A. de Silva Rego, *Lições de Missionologia* (Lisbon, 1961), pp. 242-43; and Eduardo dos Santos, *O Estado Português e o Problema Missionário* (Lisbon, 1964), pp. 142-46.

¹⁴ Speech of Salazar at the National Assembly, 25 May 1940, rpt. in Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional, *Portugal: Bulletin of Political, Economic and Cultural Information*, no. 26 (Lisbon, 1940), pp. 3-6.

¹⁵ Campbell to Eden, 11 June 1941, F.O. 371/26832, P.R.O.

and Rome. The Missionary Agreement had spoken of foreign missionaries as acceptable only when part of a Portuguese missionary organisation, and foreign missions as acceptable only if sufficient numbers of Portuguese personnel were included, and even then, the reference was only to Catholic congregations. Did silence mean exclusion? Sir Walford Selby, the British ambassador in Lisbon, thought not; he was, in any case, a High Church Anglican with a favourable opinion of Catholicism, and with serious doubts that Protestants in Portuguese colonies were faced with difficulties, or that the *Concordata* was a threat.¹⁶ This was not the Foreign Office that had pursued the 1929 diplomas with such zeal.

It took Sir Stephen Gaselee to prove that. Gaselee, the keeper of the records at the Foreign Office who also served on the General Council of the Universities Mission to Central Africa, suggested late in 1941 that the Foreign Office might try to improve the situation facing non-Catholic missions in Portuguese colonies if British missions could set forth a strong case. Paton promptly tried to do so. He asked for no immediate action, but explained the difficulties and expressed concern for post-war developments. What followed was a baffling exchange of letters. Gaselee observed that Protestant missionaries were not doing so badly and that British missionaries should learn Portuguese. When Paton tried to clarify matters, Gaselee spoke of "a threat of a kind of religious blackmail." Paton, in exasperation, finally remarked that he had "rarely conducted a correspondence with anybody who seemed so determined to misunderstand."¹⁷

Even the cardinal patriarch in Lisbon seemed more willing to listen. In Portugal in 1942, Paton met with John Balfour, the British minister, and Joseph Crowley, an English Catholic priest resident in Lisbon. Crowley arranged for an enterprising Paton to do what he had wanted to do for some time: establish direct contact with Catholic leadership in Portugal.

¹⁶ Paton to under secretary of state, 11 June 1940, Makins to Paton, 13 July 1940, notes on conversations between Gibson, Paton, and Selby, 5 March 1941, trans. of missionary statute, decree no. 31,207, 1941, Box 299, Edinburgh House.

¹⁷ Canon G.W. Broomfield to Paton, 4 Nov. 1941, Paton to Gaselee, 26 Nov. 1941, Gaselee to Paton, 9 Dec. 1941 and 8 Jan. 1942, and Paton to Broomfield, n.d., Box 298, Edinburgh House.

After his meeting with the cardinal patriarch, Paton drafted a memorandum outlining Protestant difficulties. He discussed the vernacular issue; grants to Catholics only; the "foreigners" designation when so many Catholic priests were German-speaking Alsatians, Dutch, or French; training obstacles for teachers; and permits for new stations and new missionaries.¹⁸ The patriarch did see Dr. F.J. Vieira Machado, the minister of colonies, but there were no direct positive results. In fact, after the war relations between Portugal and Universities Mission to Central Africa missions remained at a very critical level; the problem of securing visas typified the general climate of distrust.¹⁹

All of these efforts were aimed at changing Portuguese attitudes and Portuguese policy. The alternative was to live with the attitudes and to attempt to meet the regulations that implemented an unfortunate policy. Since so many of the difficulties arose through a failure to understand Portuguese sensibilities and the Portuguese language, then some of the obstacles might be overcome by residency in Portugal and by liaison work with Portuguese Protestants. Warnshuis had in fact suggested a residency house as early as 1925, but most societies were unwilling to provide funds. Henri Anet, on his pacification visit the following year, found the Portuguese pleased to learn of foreign missionaries in their midst to learn their language and customs – the practice was a regular but ad hoc arrangement – and he concluded that residency remained essential. Appropriate liaison with Portuguese Protestants would enhance mission efforts all the more. It was increasingly apparent that "the only means to do away with the idea that missionary work is political in its aim" was to put Portuguese Protestants at the centre – hence the 1930 proposal to place a liaison agent in Lisbon

¹⁸ Paton to Broomfield, 8 May 1942, and Paton's memo to the cardinal patriarch, 1942, Box 299, Edinburgh House. In fact a direct result of the Concordata was an increase in the number of foreign Catholic missionaries, but under the Missionary Agreement bishops and ecclesiastical superiors were to remain Portuguese. Hastings, *Wiriya*, pp. 19, 25.

¹⁹ Crowley to Paton, 10 July 1943, Box 298, Edinburgh House; and minutes, 25-26 Oct. 1945, of the Prudential Committee of the American Board, United Church Board for World Ministries, Boston.

and to create an institution in Portugal to educate both the Portuguese and foreign missionaries about one another.²⁰

To explore the feasibility of this proposal was, in fact, one of Thomas Jesse Jones's mandates for his 1933 trip to Lisbon – much to the relief of British missionary leaders, one might add, who feared that the Americans backing the tour really only wanted to promote "sensational and public attacks on Portugal."²¹ Jones returned to London convinced that what Loze had been stressing all along — cooperation with and the confidence of the Portuguese — was essential to success. He recommended that a liaison agent be appointed to handle missionary and educational problems in the Portuguese colonies and that a Portuguese commission be established to support and advise the agent. Eduardo Moreira should be that agent; J.P. da Conceição, a prominent Oporto merchant and leading Methodist, should be treasurer; and Alfredo da Silva, who often represented Portugal at international church conferences, should serve on the commission. Moreira, in anticipation, should visit the colonies. On an experimental basis, the mission establishment in London unanimously agreed.²²

²⁰ Warnshuis to Riggs, mimeo., 10 April 1925, ABC:14.2, v. 8, Records of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (hereafter American Board); Anet, report on journey to Portugal, 1926, Box 298, Alfredo da Silva to Warnshuis, 18 Nov. 1926, Box 1201, report of Alberto Graca, 14 Nov. 1930, appended to memo re registration of the American Board, 1930, Box 299, and memo by Loze re Riggs proposal, 21 Feb. 1931, Box 1204, Edinburgh House. The alternative of a liaison agent located in Lourenço Marques did not, for various reasons, get very far. Interestingly, Loze, the Swiss missionary, was originally seen as the man for the job, either in Lourenço Marques or in Lisbon. De Meuron to Oldham, 4 Dec. 1930, Box 1204, Edinburgh House.

²¹ The Committee on African Welfare of the Federal Council of Churches, which initiated Thomas Jesse Jones' visit, sought to confront two continuing issues that were incompatible: improving the position of Protestant missions and reforming colonial abuses. Its efforts were variously seen as forthright and aggressive, and unreliable and counter-productive. Bunker was on the committee. Warnshuis to Oldham, 5 May 1933, Box 1200, Edinburgh House; and Thomas S. Donohugh to Jones, 7 Aug. 1933, Box 40, 15, Moreira files, Phelps-Stokes Fund Records, New York.

²² K.G. Grubb of the World Dominion Survey and John T. Tucker accompanied Jones and shared in the recommendations. Report of negotiations to establish liaison agent in Lisbon, 1933, Box 299, and memo re conference at Bible House, 7 July 1933, Box 1200, Edinburgh House.

Moreira was clearly Portugal's most prominent evangelical. An author and poet of real distinction, he had been vice-president of the town council of Lisbon and private secretary to the minister of home affairs. A pastor, he was president of the *Aliança Evangélica Portuguesa*. Though somewhat rigid theologically, and as a result rather hesitant to cooperate fully with foreign missionaries who held broader views, Moreira now became general secretary of the new *Liga Evangélica de Accao Missionaria e Educacional* (the Evangelical League of Missionary and Educational Activity). He assumed responsibility to promote Portuguese evangelical sympathy for foreign missions and interest in the vocation themselves, to defend foreign missions before the Portuguese public, to assist missionaries studying in Portugal, to establish good relations with the Portuguese government, and to prepare literature for use in the colonies. Late in 1935 he formed the Centre for Christian Cooperation, in Lisbon, to provide a base for foreign mission-Portuguese evangelical efforts. Supported by nineteen organisations, it operated on a budget of only £450 a year. It began as a three-year experiment.²³

Moreira undertook a major tour of the African colonies in 1934, meeting with large numbers of missionaries in Angola and Mozambique. He also visited missions in Nyasaland who shared Mozambique interests, and spoke with Portuguese officials, including the governor-general of Mozambique and the governor of Mozambique Company territory.²⁴ On his return to Lisbon he published a report of his travels, embodying a series of recommendations for more successful foreign mission work.²⁵ But he also provided a service that was not clearly enunciated in the proposals for a liaison agent: he brought realism to the expectations for Portuguese Protestant support for foreign missions. In 1933 he surveyed the Portuguese situation in a widely-circulated book (in English) published by the World Dominion Press,

²³ Eduardo Moreira, *The Significance of Portugal: a Survey of Evangelical Progress* (London, 1933), preface; memo on missionary agency in Portugal, Oct. 1935, A/T.10/1, brochure by Moreira, n.d., Box 1206, and Oldham to Warnshuis, 22 May 1933, Box 1200, Edinburgh House.

²⁴ *Nyasaland Times*. 21 Aug. 1934, p. 2.

²⁵ *General Report of the Rev. Eduardo Moreira's Journey in the Portuguese African Colonies*, 20 Jan. to 23 Nov. 1934 (London, 1935).

and he continued to harp on the theme of the weakness of Portuguese evangelicals during his years as secretary of the *Liga*. Numbers were small, he wrote; only 3,316 communicants at 153 "centres of evangelization." There were only 100 evangelists – and some of them part-time — in a Portugal of six million people; by contrast, there were 250 foreign missionaries among four million Angolans. Ministers were not well-prepared, nor were they adequately supported. Better than half of the communicants were members of "aggressively evangelistic groups, radical in their methods and conservative in their theology," but even the more traditional groups were very simple in their worship patterns. None experienced rapid growth, and the evangelical community as a whole had little influence in Portuguese society, certainly not as the Catholic Church became more clearly a "highly privileged" church and clergy during the early Salazar years. With the missionary talk of "national" work in Company territory, all of this mattered. These conditions in Portugal largely explain why Moreira wanted to strengthen relations with the several thousand Portuguese evangelicals in the United States, and why others spoke of ties with Brazilian evangelicals, and why they all stressed the "principle of indigenous development" in Africa.²⁶

The American Board began to give more thought to "indigenous development" when its own American options seemed fewer and fewer. With the financial assistance of the Fairfield Association, it had begun the decade of the 1930s with some reason for optimism. Simango was on the threshold of a new work in Manica and Sofala, and the Swiss Mission and the American Board had agreed to share the salary of Pierre Loze, the retired Swiss missionary who had spent decades at Lourenço Marques and who was now to serve as an adviser to African evangelicals in Beira. Even Bunker, who made a last visit to P.E.A. in 1930, could be optimistic enough to suggest that he would "drop out of the picture... now that the American Board is committed to carry on that work." Simango's "fall," however, played havoc with the Board's plans, and the depression, with its already precarious finances. In 1932 it could only pay Loze's salary with Fairfield Association money, and the future financial role

²⁶ Moreira, *The Significance of Portugal*, pp. 13, 33, 42-47, 54-55.

of the Board seemed dangerously dependent upon such things as the mere sale of its Beira property. In 1934 it cut costs by closing Gogoi. Its rental of Machemeje to Simango that same year was testimony that it did not intend to occupy the field at all. The Board further decided, in 1935, to sever the P.E.A. lowlands administratively from its Rhodesia field, finally destroying completely the *raison d'être* for Mt. Silinda. When, in 1936, the Fairfield Association voted to discontinue its support, American Board options were at an end. It immediately began negotiations to transfer its Manica and Sofala responsibilities to the Swiss; on July 1, 1937, American Board authority – that non-existent authority – ceased.²⁷

It is, however, unfair to suggest that there was no more to American Board considerations in the 1930s than account books. The persistent excuse, after all, was a dual one: the absence of both money and men. Bunker's son, Kenneth, newly appointed to Natal, was seriously considered for Beira, but inexperience seemed the ultimate count against him. A scheme for Dysart, at Gogoi in the 1920s, to be stationed at Beira never materialised; nor did Thomas Jesse Jones's encouragement for the transfer of a new Canadian Angola appointee. Even if a satisfactory missionary could be found, what would one do with him? Loze's successes in Beira were unique results of his own personality; there was certainly no assurance that the Americans would be similarly accepted. The American Board thus set upon a new scheme — the creation of a holding company of an entirely secular character, with the initial aim of managing Machemeje for the material well-being of its Christian residents. The religious and educational aspects would somehow be carried out by the Rhodesia Mission on the side. The holding company,

²⁷ Amid protests from Africans, who were left out of the negotiations altogether. "The Board should have told us," Tapera Nkomo wrote, "as this is not fair at all. It is my work which you left undone many years ago." It was, he suggested, presumptuous for the work to be shifted to another mission without the participation of the only ones engaged in the work! Nkomo to Bunker, 29 Nov. 1937, FRB/Corr.3/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega. Bunker to Riggs, 21 April 1932, and Riggs to Bunker, 24 Aug. 1932, FRB/Corr.7, and Bunker memo, 17 Jan. 1934, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Emerson to Gibson, 3 Aug. 1936, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and minutes, 14 June 1932, 8 May 1934, 24-25 Oct. 1935, and 8 June 1937, of Prudential Committee of the American Board, Boston.

incorporated in Massachusetts and consisting of American Board and Fairfield Association directors, was a transparent and rather dubious proposition, and the transfer of field responsibility to the Swiss put an end to it anyway. What remained for the Americans to do was to extend their arrangement with Loze from time to time, contribute to itinerant expenses of African leaders, and support random visits into Mozambique by missionaries from Mt. Silinda.²⁸

Bunker had invested too much in the P.E.A. cause to be able to accept this abdication. In 1933 he offered a last plan to the Board: the Rhodesia Mission should reinstate Simango, he should be put in charge of Machemeje "on a strictly 'nationalist' basis," and Bunker would try to salvage the declining support of the Fairfield Association. But as Bunker witnessed what he considered to be the "uncharitable and unforgiving and vindictive" manner in which the American Board treated Simango, he concluded – as did others, including Mabel Carney – that Simango should be supported independently at Mashanga, which was, after all, the original concept of the 1920s. "I shall join with his friends," Bunker wrote, "in saving him for the work of his people, and supporting him in doing that work. And I believe no Mission Board or Mission has any right, earned or otherwise, to say him Nay on any ground whatsoever."²⁹

At first it almost seemed that Bunker and Simango would pull it off, for Simango managed to rent the Machemeje farm from 1934 to 1936. His efforts, however, were threatened by the absence of official standing, mission cooperation, and good health, and in 1936 he departed with his family for the Gold Coast.³⁰ Without him, Bunker's schemes lacked realism, so most of Bunker's efforts in the late 1930s were directed

²⁸ Bunker to friends, 18 May 1933, Bunker to Cullens, 21 Sept. 1934, and notes from Loram's letter to Emerson, n.d., FRB/Corr.8/1, excerpt from Gaskins to Potter, 23 Dec. 1937, FRB/Corr.8/2, and Jones to Jesse Arnap, 3 May 1939, FRB/Corr.3/5, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and minutes, 14 Feb. 1933 and 8 July 1947, of the Prudential Committee of the American Board, Boston.

²⁹ Bunker draft, n.d., Bunker to Fairfield, 16 Sept. 1933, Bunker to East Africa Mission, 16 Sept. 1933, and Bunker to Kenneth Bunker, 18 Sept. 1933, FRB/Corr.8/1, and Bunker to Wilfrid Bunker, 6 May 1939, FRB/Corr.3/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

³⁰ Eric Morier-Genoud has a forthcoming study of Simango's years in Ghana.

toward Simango's return. He proposed a combination of non-traditional ways for "new work in P.E.A.," all pointing to the leadership problem and, by implication, to Simango. But he met stiff opposition from the American Board. "We wish," they wrote him, "that you could be an enthusiastic advocate of evangelistic work in P.E.A. without concentrating your interest on a man whom we have with great regret had to consider as an unworthy representative of the Gospel of Jesus Christ."³¹ Bunker was also aging and depressed, and



Fred R.
Bunker in
his later
years

despite glimmers of hope – it looked as if Thomas Jesse Jones was renewing his interest in Manica and Sofala in 1938, and Bunker's sons attempted to revive support in 1939³² – there was no one with both his knowledge and zeal

³¹ Goodsell to Bunker, 6 Jan. 1937, FRB/Corr.5/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

³² He called Jones "a Gallant Gentleman, coming to the defense of a Lost Cause." Bunker to Jones, 22 Dec. 1938, and Bunker to Simango, 6 May

to carry on. "If the time ever comes," he told Tapera Nkomo, the most important African evangelist, "when I can do much more for the People in Mozambique, I certainly will do it, and will let you all know that I can. But you must not depend upon this as a promise. For I cannot promise."³³ In one of his last letters to Simango Bunker wrote of the necessity for ending his active involvement. And in 1939 Simango ended their years of correspondence.

It is easy to understand Bunker's sense of personal failure, although it was not really a personal one, nor is it clear that it was, in the broader sense, a failure. He was hardly responsible for school closures throughout the colony, or "ultramontanism" in the Portuguese territories, or the hostility directed toward the Mozambique Company as a British enterprise, or the surprisingly unfavourable implications of the 1942 end of Company rule,³⁴ or the extreme nationalism of Portugal itself, or the weakness of the Portuguese evangelical community, or the decline of Moreira's Centre for Christian Cooperation.³⁵ It is true that Bunker never mastered "polite procrastination, specious argument, gentle flattery and the other arts to which the Portuguese official hierarchy is amenable,"³⁶ but it is not clear that it would have made much difference, and besides, there is something to be said for moral indignation and depth of feeling toward injustice, even if in the short run it may be seen as counter-productive. Moreover, the mission "failure" was just that – a failure in the traditional mission sense, not in the sense of

1939, FRB/Corr.8/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

³³ Bunker to Nkomo, 21 Jan. 1938, FRB/Corr.3/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

³⁴ There had been real optimism that the return of Manica and Sofala to the colonial administration would improve conditions for foreign missions, despite the climate of the times and despite the opposite effect in 1930 when Nyassa Company rule ended. See correspondence in F.O. 371/15019, P.R.O.

³⁵ De Meuron to Warnshuis, 9 July 1941, Box 1206, and Fatton to McLeish, recd 15 Nov. 1939, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and F. Adam to Leeper, 30 June 1933, F.O. 371/17412, P.R.O. Box 1201 at Edinburgh House extensively documents the decline of the Centre.

³⁶ Said in reference to Libert Oury, the leading director of the Mozambique Company's London Committee. Memo on customs duties, 28 Jan. 1933, F.O. 371/17412, P.R.O.

African evangelisation by Africans on African terms. The Company, and the government of Portugal, and to some extent Catholic influence had helped engineer the mission failure; they also provided the African opportunity. It is well worth knowing that missions tried from 1892 to 1945, but it is crucial to understand that the truly important events were not to be found in Lisbon, or London, or Boston, but in Beira and Gogoi, Mashanga and Machemeje, and up and down the Buzi and Sabi rivers.

PART II: AFRICAN CHRISTIANS

Chapter Five: The Emerging Evangelical Community, 1892-1931

A mandatory self-sufficiency was imposed upon African evangelicals in Manica and Sofala. Missionary residency in the territory had always either been so fleeting as to belie references to established mission work, or so controlled as to be fictitious. While the mission leadership bustled about Europe and the United States seeking access to the Portuguese mission fields, evangelicals in the territory of the Mozambique Company proceeded with a kind of plodding persistency, increasing their numbers through personal evangelism, coping with official obstructions, and supporting one another in efforts to appreciate what it was all about. The real irony of the entire affair of the Protestant evangelisation of Manica and Sofala is that missions were so incredibly active to be, in a final sense, so terribly insignificant. It was from outside the borders of the territory, on the periphery of the growth of the African church, that missions provided early conversions, education for the few, and some money. It was from within that real growth occurred, and that was in the hands of Africans.

At the beginning, of course, someone had to do the converting, and he or she was usually an American or European. Admittedly some missionaries had doubts about the process. As Bunker, during his brief stay in Beira in 1895, travelled about the Buzi River with his Zulu evangelists, he discovered his failure to, and his evangelists' success at, "speaking to their condition." He concluded that he should teach African evangelists and teachers and "send them to interpret Christ in the language and life of Africa. I do not believe," he wrote then, "in putting a force of white missionaries here. I cannot do the work, and I do not believe that

others can."¹ Even so, missionaries visited numerous places on the Buzi and at the mouth of the Sabi in the 1890s, and Bunker did make an impression at his Beira school between 1905 and 1907. That corps of eighteen that he managed to get safely to Mt. Silinda consisted in a very real sense of his "products." Similarly, Swiss missionaries converted Africans who found themselves in Lourenço Marques, and South African General Mission missionaries, Africans who crossed into Rhodesia and made it to Rusitu. Missionaries on the Rand added an intriguing element to this phenomenon, for so many of the small Protestant communities in Manica and Sofala, especially around the mouth of the Buzi, traced their origins back to conversion of one of their number while working in the vicinity of Johannesburg.²

What set Company territory apart from regions which were the recipients of extensive missionary apparatus³ was that, at this very early point, new converts assumed central functions in the growth of the church. On his return to his home a labour migrant tended to set about the task of explaining his new faith to his family and perhaps to his neighbours. In years to come leaders like Tapera Nkomo

¹ Quoted in historical sketch by Edith Bunker Davis, FRB/Gen.1/3, the Fred R. Bunker Collection, Talladega College Historical Collections, Talladega, Alabama (hereafter Bunker Papers, Talladega). Of course the notion from the outset was to avoid that "force of white missionaries" by relying upon Zulu evangelists, but the scheme never worked very well. Neither the Zulu church nor the Americans ever came up with enough money; the Zulu language proved less than ideal; and the Zulu evangelists were less effective, predictably, than their Ndau counterparts, and they were not permitted to do what they might have done well, "opening up" remote areas in Manica and Sofala. Zulu evangelism, therefore, was never of real significance in Mozambique. See John Keith Rennie, *Christianity, Colonialism and the Origins of Nationalism among the Ndau of Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935*, diss. Northwestern Univ. 1973, pp. 507-14.

² It was intriguing because Africans from Manica and Sofala were prohibited from entering the South African labour market, yet there was a continuous pattern to this labour migration. *Das Anliegen von Beira* (Zurich, 1937), p. 9; and Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 429. The former is clearly a Swiss mission publication, and much if not all of the text would have been written by Pierre Loze.

³ By 1930 there were 794 Protestant mission stations in Mozambique, overwhelmingly (783) in the districts of Inhambane and Lourenço Marques. Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Bloomington, 1995), p. 436.

continued to find a kraal tucked away here and there whose residents professed some kind of blend of Protestant thought, and where wives and children sought a belated baptism, the labourer having grasped clearly that he was somehow not authorised to do it himself.

These "secondary" conversions combined family and personal ties with broader efforts by African leaders. Mt. Silinda's earliest converts came from among porters the missionaries had hired at Mangundi, on the Buzi some 100 miles east of the station. Zulu evangelists were sent in 1896, and there was an effort in 1904 to establish an outstation, but the significant number of Protestants there remained principally products of conversions by Mangundi relatives and friends. They were certainly in control of their own affairs. It was Ndau evangelists who began a similar process in the Sabi valley, with a dozen tours in 1908.⁴ And at Chitikinya, near Nova Lusitania on the lower Buzi, seven local men sought in the 1920s to organise and sustain local evangelical communities. They had been converted in Johannesburg by the South African Compounds and Interior Mission, and on their return to the Buzi they began their work with real enthusiasm. But they shortly came into conflict with government officials – quoting Peter that man should obey the word of God over that of man⁵ hardly helped – and eventually they were arrested for possession of Zulu and English books. The Portuguese solution was to draft them into the military, and they spent four years at Lourenço Marques. There they took instruction at the Swiss mission, and with their families they established their own small village within the military camp. They learned Portuguese, and some were licensed to teach. On their return to the Buzi they re-established themselves and began evangelistic work among their neighbours. Service in the military meant that they were no longer subject to the *corvée*, but

⁴ Rennie, *Christianity...*, pp. 450-51, 521; and John S. Marsh memo on growth of church, n.d., ABC:15.4, v. 35, Records of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (hereafter American Board).

⁵ Probably a reference to Peter and John's reply to Jewish leaders who had instructed them to refrain from teaching and speaking. "Is it right in God's eyes for us to obey you rather than God?" Acts 4:19. *Das Anliegen von Beira*, p. 9.

they were less free than they at first assumed. A visit from Dysart and Simango supported Portuguese suspicions of foreign connections, and their school and worship services were closed. The expansion of the Buzi Sugar Company finally led to their eviction – at, however, a convenient time, for in 1927 they fitted smoothly into the Machemeje scheme of the Fairfield Association. They formed the basis of the new Christian community at Machemeje, and despite separatism and an anti-witchcraft movement, they remained at the centre of efforts there for several decades.⁶

Similarly on the coast at Chiloane and Mashanga young men assumed leadership among a community of evangelicals; their numbers far exceeded the more established Gogoi. Jim Ngwenya, a Mashanga man who studied at Lourenzo Marques and who was put in charge of Beira by Nkomo in 1924, led “secret” prayer meetings for some 200 Christians at Beira. And at Lourenzo Marques, Nkomo organised workers from Beira. He invited them to his room:

When they came I gave them nuts, bananas, tea and bread. I had deliberately given them something to eat first, because I knew that this would make it easier for me to gain their confidence and convert them to my church.⁷

By 1928 he reported sixty-two baptised members and forty-six catechumens, and their influence multiplied tangentially as they travelled back and forth between Beira and Lourenzo Marques. And so the process went: Nkomo converted Abel Tivane, who returned to his home at Chiloane and converted Jose Ngwenya, who converted Elijah Musanga, who lived in the lower Buzi River region and who converted Alberto Simango from the same area. By the early 1930s there were

⁶ De Meuron, “Développement de l’oeuvre missionnaire à Beira et environs,” *Bulletin de la Mission Suisse dans l’Afrique du Sud*, 42 (July-Aug. 1937), 266; Clarke, Gogoi station report, 1924/25, and memo on mission situation, n.d., ABC:15.4, v. 35, American Board; Loze memo on Beira and Company territory, 8 July 1932, Box 1204, Records of the International Missionary Council, London (hereafter Edinburgh House); and Rennie, *Christianity...*, pp. 473-74.

⁷ Rennie interview with Tapera Nkomo, 1970, quoted in Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 447.

in Musanga's and Alberto Simango's villages some fifty evangelicals.⁸

The role of Gogoi in all of this, despite its status as a mere farm and despite its distance from the lowlands, was far from insignificant. An American missionary, after all, was usually resident there, as was Bede Simango, and that gave Gogoi some status and some claim to an authority that poorly-educated and uncertified leaders elsewhere could not assert. Africans there had, moreover, organised their own church – the First Church of Christ at Gogoyo – in 1923. The church, led by Ngangeni Dhlakama, was an amalgamation of several groups – they must have been small, for the new church began with only fourteen members – which had been meeting in separate places for several years. They built a shed in the bush a short distance from the Gogoi "station," and they met there three days each week for worship and for Bible and enquirers classes. In 1924 they also appointed a member to be "the feet of the church," and he was paid ten shillings for every thirty days' visitations to evangelicals living in the region. He managed to make 300 visits from November 1924 until February 1925, when he was forced into the labour market. Minnie Clarke also spent her Gogoi time, with an African woman, visiting kraals. Some of the Gogoi men travelled to Machemeje to hold prayer meetings in the late 1920s, and by ones and twos left Machemeje to hold smaller meetings with evangelicals located up and down the Buzi. And in addition to this continuing pattern of sending out evangelists each week from Gogoi, evangelicals from these isolated kraals began, after 1927, to come to Gogoi, for it was then that Bede Simango started the Gogoi school. Gogoi thus began to be seen not only as a source of guidance and literature but as a source of training for potential leaders as well.⁹

Those sent to Gogoi were to provide the local leadership. If, as in the case of the ex-soldiers at Machemeje, they could

⁸ Simango to Riggs, 1 Dec. 1928, ABC:15.4, v. 49a, and Dysart, annual report for Gogoi, 1927, ABC:15.4, v. 35, American Board; and Fuller to Bunker, 27 Nov. 1926, FRB/Corr.3/3, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

⁹ Gogoi station and annual reports for 1923, 1924/25, 1927, and 1929, and Clarke, report on evangelistic work, 1923/24, ABC:15.4, v. 35, American Board; and Fuller to Bunker, 27 Nov. 1928, FRB/Corr.4, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

acquire certification to teach, all the better, but the central thrust of these training excursions to Gogoi was to master the rudiments of Western education and the basic tenets of the faith. With these skills they could guide local groups in day-to-day matters, while the sacraments and the resolution of major issues could await the periodic visits of more prominent leaders. There were only a handful of the latter. Kamba Simango, of course, was the towering figure.

Tapera Nkomo was a second. Born in Mashanga about 1890 – his father was from the Sofala area – Nkomo was early orphaned and raised by an aunt and uncle. As a teenager he sought work in Beira, and he first met Bunker while waiting tables at the Savoy Hotel. Nkomo began to attend Bunker's school, but he did not understand much of what was going on, partly because of the Zulu being used and partly because such scripture as "he who finds his life will lose it"¹⁰ left confused impressions. He returned to Mashanga in 1907, but in the face of compulsory labour and pressure to marry, he left for Beira again. Now he accepted Bunker's faith and, later, rail fare to Rhodesia. He studied at Mt. Silinda from 1908 until 1913, then travelled to Lourenço Marques to learn Portuguese under the Swiss. By 1917 he had secured his 2^o Grau certificate, and he went on to acquire teacher certification. Nkomo was slated to go to Beira with Maxwell when the American died, and the American Board was unprepared to let Nkomo go it alone. Thus sidetracked, he spent the next four years as headwaiter at the Club Hotel. In 1922, though, Nkomo turned to Loze, declaring that he wanted to preach to Africans from Manica and Sofala working in the hotels and on the docks at Lourenço Marques. He developed quite a constituency. And in 1926, when the theological school at Lourenço Marques was opened, Nkomo was one of the first to be invited to attend. He completed the three-year course late in 1928.¹¹

¹⁰ Matthew 10:39.

¹¹ Memo on mission situation, n.d., ABC:15.4, v. 35, American Board; Simango to Bunker, 5 Mar. 1930, FRB/Corr.3/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Loze to Gibson, 9 Nov. 1931, and Loze memo on Beira and Company territory, 8 July 1932, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; "Guilherme Tapera Nkomo: 1'autobiographie d'un Chrétien de la région de Beira," *Bulletin de la Mission Suisse dans l'Afrique du Sud*, 39 (March-April 1931), 44-52; and *Das Anliegen von Beira*, pp. 11-17.

The mission at Mt. Silinda had tried, in the early 1920s, to place Nkomo at Gogoi, but he had refused. Before that matter could be put to rest a friction between Nkomo and Kamba Simango that was to grow over the years was first revealed. Finally, in 1931, the Americans ordained Nkomo, and they placed him at Machejeje, much to the chagrin of Loze, who saw in the Buzi site a wasteland with few people and no legal standing, and the alternative, with Loze at Beira, so promising. The following year Loze got his way, and Nkomo and his wife of three years came to Beira to stay. He brought with him a training that far exceeded anyone's except Simango's, but he also gave an impression of possessing a simple, rather charming, faith, which seemed to sustain him well when a child died, or when his wife was sexually assaulted by Portuguese soldiers aboard a ship between Lourenço Marques and Beira, but which seemed not quite enough to permit him to cope intelligently and decisively with the practical dilemmas that the administration of a scattered evangelical community presented. Loze – fond of Biblical comparisons – likened him to Peter.¹²

Bede Simango was the third major figure in this first generation of African evangelical leaders. He was born at Mambone around 1898. When he was twelve his uncle, Bede Tunzene, returned as a Christian from Southern Rhodesia. Simango chose to learn to read and write from his uncle rather than learn the skill of rain-making that had made his father so prominent in the area. In 1911 Tunzene arranged for him to go to Mt. Silinda, where under the special tutelage of Minnie Clarke, with whom he was to work in the 1920s, he remained until 1917. Simango taught school for several years and then began to sense a responsibility for work in Manica and Sofala. He travelled to Lourenço Marques, where

¹² The 1937 suggestion that Nkomo attend the international mission conference at Hangchow is tangible support for this point. It was vetoed, both by Nkomo and others, on the grounds that Nkomo lacked the depth to deal thoughtfully with the issues scheduled for discussion. Loze to de Meuron, 14 June 1937, file 3009, Département Missionnaire des Églises Protestantes de Suisse Romande Records, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter Swiss Mission). Simango to Bunker, 5 March 1930, and Loze to Bunker, 20 Jan. 1930, FRB/Corr.3/2, and Bunker to friends, 18 May 1933, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Loze to Gibson, 9 Nov. 1931, and de Meuron to Riggs, 7 March 1931, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and Loze to de Meuron, 9 April 1943, file 3015, Swiss Mission.

like Nkomo he studied Portuguese at the Swiss mission. Unlike Nkomo, he was skilled in languages – English as well as Portuguese – and proved an excellent interpreter. Simango began his long tenure at Gogoi in 1926; it was he in fact who, holding a 2^o Grau certificate, was responsible for the permit to establish the school. In 1928 he married Notisa, a woman from Mt. Silinda, and with a missionary resident at Gogoi and frequent contact with the mission across the border, he seemed destined for a productive future there. But with Kamba Simango's "downfall" and the American Board's withdrawal from Gogoi, Bede Simango's isolation got to him. He became more and more authoritarian, a difficult colleague – when there was anyone working with him – and a man of narrowing vision and responsibility at a time when the need was for the opposite.¹³

Europeans, Americans, and African evangelicals loyal to the Americans were not, however, alone as initiators of evangelisation. The history of African church separatism in South Africa was closely linked to the American Congregationalists, and exposure to the one by a Mozambique worker would almost certainly have entailed exposure to the other. The first separatist movement in Portuguese East Africa occurred in 1921 when Africans left the Swiss mission to form the *Igreja Luso Africana* (the African Portuguese Church), and since the Swiss in Lourenço Marques were the second key point of contact between European missionaries and Africans from Company territory, the latter would have been aware of this act of separatism as well. Southern Rhodesia was the third link, and there Ndau formed a branch of the Zion Apostolic Church of South Africa in 1922 and created the Zion Christian Church in 1923. Congregations gradually spread across the border into Mozambique. Although normally oppression and a settler presence stimulated large-scale independent movements in Africa, separatist churches never gained major prominence in Mozambique; true, by the late 1930s there were some 380 such

¹³ "Autobiographie de M. Bede J. Simango," *Bulletin de la Mission Suisse dans l'Afrique du Sud*, 45 (May-June 1942), 56-59; Dorothy Marsh, "A Missionary Journey," typescript, FRB/Corr.3/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; report of evangelistic trip of N. Freire, Aug. 1945, file 3002, Swiss Mission; and Bunker to friends, 21 Nov. 1927, Simango file, Hampton Institute, Hampton, Virginia.

churches, but by the 1960s there were still no more than 5,000 Ndaou followers of independent churches, and perhaps there were far less. Even so, separatist leaders were at the least a matter of concern, not only for Europeans like Pierre Loze but for Kamba Simango, Tapera Nkomo, and other key African figures.¹⁴

Muti Munene Sikobele, the prominent *Igreja Luso Africana* bishop, spent most of his time at Lourenço Marques in the 1920s, but in 1925 he proposed that all of the Protestants in the lowlands be placed under his care. He developed a special interest in the area around Machemeje, largely as a result of a split among the ex-soldiers and their followers shortly after their arrival in 1927. Two discontented evangelicals there turned to a "half-caste" named Vitor de Souza – his father was Indian – who was then a leader of Sikobele's church. With authorisation from Souza and Sikobele they began an active and aggressive secession, and they remained associated with Souza into the early 1930s after he founded his own church, the *Igreja Etioiana Mocambicana*. The Americans responded with a scheme to guarantee a well-trained leadership: Samuel Paya was packed off to the Chikore Bible School, and Nkomo was placed at Machemeje in 1931. But it was not enough.¹⁵

It was not enough because there was an alternative both to Souza and to thoughtful supervision by Africans affiliated with American missionaries. From among many who at the time claimed to be possessed by the Holy Spirit one man, Chaviari, illiterate and unbaptised, convinced others that he spoke with religious authority. He told of a vision in which he was appointed by God as a second Moses, to finish the jour-

¹⁴ David B. Barrett, *Schism and Renewal in Africa* (Nairobi, 1968), pp. 30, 96, 297, 309; Teresa Cruz e Silva, *Protestant Churches and the Formation of Political Consciousness in Southern Mozambique (1930-1974)*, (Basel, 2001), pp. 37-38; Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982* (Boulder, 1983), p. 72; Fuller to Patton, 15 April 1925, Box 7:1, Fred R. Bunker Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (hereafter Bunker Papers, Cambridge); and Fuller to Bunker, 27 Nov. 1926, FRB/Corr.3/3, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

¹⁵ Loze to Bunker, 1 Aug. 1932, FRB/Corr.10/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Loze to de Meuron, 15 Aug. 1932, file 3029, Swiss Mission; Eduardo Moreira, *Portuguese East Africa: a Study of Its Religious Needs* (London, 1936), pp. 31-32; and Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 474.

ney to the Promised Land that the first Moses never managed to complete. In short order some 500 had made pilgrimages to Mukonja, his Christian village on the Mache-meje land. There were confessions, prayers, arbitrary selections from the Bible by Chaviari as messages, and promises of miraculous powers after sorcery was eradicated. Some of his followers travelled about preaching, including areas as far away as Chikore. Only when the Portuguese jailed Chaviari in Beira did the movement decline. Meanwhile, indiscretions by Souza during his 1932 visit led his movement into decline as well. It was Kamba Simango's lot, in 1934, to try, finally, to "cement the splits."¹⁶

Separatist movements of various types thus did have an appeal to labour migrants, to new Christians, and to those with some Western contacts. Such movements gained influence not only at Mache-meje but at Gogoi, Chibabava, and Mangundi. But despite this activity, the independence of Protestants in Manica and Sofala was to come not from separatism but from isolation. There remained a talented leadership and numerous followers loyal to the Americans, however distant they might be. "We know that the lowlands are full of believers," wrote one American missionary in a burst of good mission enthusiasm in 1925.¹⁷ Besides Beira and the distant hills along the Rhodesian border there were the evangelical communities along the coast south of Beira, at Sofala and on the island of Chiloane; at the mouth of the Sabi, at Mashanga and Mambone; and along the middle and lower reaches of the Buzi, at places like Nhanguvo, Mache-meje, and Chibabava. Here was "a great movement, without missionaries," led, if at all, almost acephalously. It was time, some felt as the 1930s began, for there to be a plan – ideally a feasible workable organisation of these African Protestants, led by themselves, a "national" movement with direct ties to the Portuguese.¹⁸

¹⁶ Rennie, *Christianity...*, pp. 475-78.

¹⁷ Fuller to Patton, 15 April 1925, Box 7:1, Bunker Papers, Cambridge.

¹⁸ See appendix, p. 163, for statistical data, by location, of this "great movement." Report of committee on surveys of P.E.A. field, 1926, ABC:15.4, v. 35, American Board; excerpts from Loze correspondence, 1932, FRB/Corr.10/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 485.

Chapter Six: Toward Organisation, 1931-1935

It did not matter, in October 1932, that the charge of rape placed against Kamba Simango immediately proved false. An angry husband promptly arranged for Simango to be brought before a British magistrate who, without trial and without permitting Simango to make a statement, ordered Simango out of Southern Rhodesia within twenty-four hours.¹ The mission suspended him and further prohibited him from residence at the Gogoi or Machemeje lands in P.E.A. When it was learned that neither rape nor adultery had been committed, but that the two had engaged in "inappropriate behaviour," the American missionaries were ordered home; otherwise neither the colonial administration nor the mission recanted.² Moreover, despite appeals from some of their own missionaries, such as Lillian Marsh at Chikore near Mt. Silinda, Mabel Carney, and Bunker, Simango was forced to spend the months after this 1932 disaster without his wife – she was expecting and was therefore allowed to remain at Mt. Silinda – first in Beira,

¹ This firm, if unjust, action would have been predictable. The "Black Peril," as Europeans then called it – sex relations between races – had long been a preoccupation of white Rhodesians. The Immorality Suppression Ordinance (1903) prohibited a white woman and an African man from sexual relations, and in 1916 an act made it illegal for a white woman and an African man to make "indecent suggestions" to one another. The expulsion of Simango without trial may be explained by the considerable emotion previous Umtali trials had unleashed, but it also needs to be seen in the context of prior mission experience. At Inhambane, the American Board had suspended a married missionary for sexual relations with his Zulu associate, and another Zulu woman, Selina Mdimba, faced the sexual overtures of a missionary at Mt. Silinda. (The controversy arising from the protests of Nancy Jones, the single black missionary for whom Mdimba worked, was partly responsible for Jones' resignation.) See Philip Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma* (London, 1958), pp. 238-51; and John Keith Rennie, *Christianity, Colonialism and the Origins of Nationalism among the Ndau of Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935*, Diss. Northwestern Univ. 1973, pp. 296-97.

² Files regarding the case of Kamba Simango and Carol Kincheloe appear in the Southern Rhodesia series 85.1.4, Records of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge.

where he unsuccessfully tried to support his family as a carpenter and operator of a tea room, and then as a kind of vagabond wandering about the P.E.A. border near Mt. Silinda. Meanwhile, the American Board strongly discouraged the Fairfield Association from taking any further steps to support Simango in Portuguese East Africa.³

It was at this very moment – when the situation seemed so desperate, when the American Board for all practical purposes abandoned P.E.A. because of men, money, and Portuguese opposition, and when the Rhodesia Mission clearly abandoned Simango – that an opportunity emerged for constructive American support of an indigenous church in Mozambique. Admittedly, it could be seen as the only remaining alternative, and even then some of Simango's supporters expressed "anxiety as to the management of independent institutions."⁴ But Bunker was firmly committed to the evangelicals in the lowlands, was convinced that Simango had been treated shabbily, and was reconciled to the prospect that the American Board would not act decisively in this geographical sphere allotted to it. Bunker was responding to the felt need in a region "utterly untouched and unoccupied" by missionaries and one in which Africans were subjected to "oppression and injustice by their white overlords."⁵ When the Rhodesia Mission permitted Simango to rent the farm at Machemeje, Bunker hoped for Simango's eventual reinstatement, but as it became clear how impossible that would be to obtain, Bunker found no difficulty in reorienting his own thinking and

³ No doubt the American Board intended that Simango's suspension be a permanent dismissal, but the situation was complicated by Fairfield Association support of Simango. As will be seen, Bunker later pressed for Simango's reinstatement, so his perception was clearly that it was a suspension.

Bunker draft, n.d., and Lillian Marsh to Carney, 26 July 1933, FRB/Corr.8/1, Fred R. Bunker Collection, Talladega College Historical Collections, Talladega, Alabama (hereafter Bunker Papers, Talladega); and Carney to Emerson, 16 June 1933, in Box 7:1, Fred R. Bunker Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (hereafter Bunker Papers, Cambridge).

⁴ Jones to Loram, 6 Feb. 1934, in Box 7:1, Bunker Papers, Cambridge.

⁵ Extract of Bunker to Riggs, 19 Sept. 1923, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

the support of the Fairfield Association toward an "independent" work.⁶

It was, in fact, feasible to support what the Portuguese preferred to call a "national" effort without dependence upon Simango, for Pierre Loze and Tapera Nkomo were already in Beira. Loze, retired from the Swiss mission in Lourenço Marques, had secured joint support from the Swiss and the American Board to go to Beira for five years, there to serve as advisor to African evangelicals. He arrived in July 1931. Nkomo, after the delay at Machemeje, joined him in 1932. By then Beira was a cosmopolitan community of nearly 16,000 Africans, of which 8,000 came from elsewhere in Mozambique. Here was a "shifting proletariat" residing in ethnic patterns. Predictably the backgrounds of Protestants, both from within and without the colony, varied considerably, and Loze first sought to coordinate their activities. He found some 200 Mozambicans working there meeting on their own in the unlit, unventilated barracks of the railway compound; elsewhere in that compound some 300 Africans from Nyasaland, converted by the Scottish Presbyterians in Blantyre and now led by Gardnier Ngusaye and Gilbert Macall, met regularly as well. Others met in small numbers in the backyards of their European employers. In addition to the Presbyterians from Blantyre, Loze met men from the Livingstonia, Likoma (Universities Mission to Central Africa), Zambezi Industrial, Nyasaland Industrial, South Africa General, Dutch Reformed, and American Board missions, as well as from the Salvation Army.⁷ Nkomo's "Beira boys," baptised by Loze in Lourenço Marques, were there. Given this diversity, leadership was ill-defined, and in any case leaders had little training, usually no more than evening school in Lourenço Marques or Johannesburg. Meetings were basic – prayer, songs, and Bible readings – and usually conducted in "kitchen Portuguese," the *lingua franca* of Beira for both Europeans and Africans.⁸

⁶ Letter fragment from Bunker, n.d., FRB/Corr.2, and H.W. Saxe to Fairfield, 28 Aug. 1933, FRB/Corr.9/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

⁷ None of which, with the possible exception of the American Board, ever operated in Manica and Sofala.

⁸ Loze to Oldham, 26 Oct. 1931, and 10 Oct. 1932, Loze to Gibson, 8 Jan. 1932, and Loze memo on Beira and Company territory, 8 July 1932, Box 1204, Records of the International Missionary Council, London

Loze was viewed here with suspicion, for not only had these African evangelicals had no role in the decision to bring him to Beira, they had not even been told of his coming. At the core of the Protestant community were men loyal to the American Board, even if they had secured some training from the Swiss and even if they had had no personal contact with the Americans at all. As a result, Loze's early weeks were strained. He was challenged by men at the railway compound, and unemployed men who had come by his house to assist him in language study withdrew. Moreover, rumours abounded that Gogoi – the tenuous single link with the Americans – had advised the Beira men not to accept Loze's assistance. Loze's relations with evangelicals in Manica and Sofala, in fact, were never to be entirely smooth. Nkomo, his key associate, was even driven to write Bunker in 1933 that "you must not think he is standing by you in the work. That is not the case at all." And he turned to a story of two companions, one blanket, and a predictable outcome.⁹ But tensions did not dominate Beira developments. Loze was soon holding regular meetings in English with Nyasaland Africans, and small numbers came to Loze's office each Sunday, leading, in a six month period in 1932, to 170 conversions. In March 1933 he secured permission to hold meetings at his house on Sunday afternoons and one evening each week. He filled his veranda with benches built by a Chinese carpenter, and from 120 to 150 men gathered there regularly.¹⁰

But there was more to Loze's presence in Beira than coordination and routine ministry. He had had an interest in Beira since 1924, when Thomas Jesse Jones, during his education commission travels, asked if Loze would go to Beira with Phelps-Stokes support.¹¹ And when, finally, the joint American-Swiss effort materialised in 1931, Loze was not without a plan. He was convinced, in principle, that the best

(hereafter Edinburgh House); and Rennie, *Christianity...*, pp. 345, 445.

⁹ Nkomo to Bunker, 30 Nov. 1933, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

¹⁰ Loze to Gibson, 8 July 1932, and Loze memo on Beira and Company territory, 8 July 1932, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and *Das Anliegen von Beira* (Zurich, 1937), p. 28.

¹¹ His answer was "yes" if replaced at Lourenço Marques, which was not done. Loze memo, *ibid.*

way to evangelise was through a "national" work led by Africans in affiliation with Portuguese churches financed when necessary by foreign money. In practice he found it wise to locate a missionary (himself) at Beira to advise African leaders among workers there, in nearby locations, and at Mashanga and Machemeje. But he knew that the Portuguese had fluctuated in their attitude toward African separatist churches, largely because they were not tainted by foreigners. He believed that the "40,000 adult African Christians" in Lourenço Marques and Inhambane districts should be pressed to undertake the evangelisation of Manica and Sofala. In particular he was impressed by the new *Instituto Negrófilo* promoted by educated Africans in Lourenço Marques and approved by the colonial government in March 1932; its status in government eyes as a charitable organisation seemed to offer real security. Loze felt that a branch of that association, or a similar organisation, would be appropriate to meet Beira's needs. Simango or Nkomo would head it.¹²

Loze had a very definite tactical perspective as well. Throughout his years in Lourenço Marques he had been convinced that the key to mission success lay in harmonious relations with the Portuguese administrators. For nearly fifteen years he had served as secretary and chairman of the Portuguese East Africa Evangelical Missionary Association, an alliance of missions in Mozambique, and in that capacity he had made frequent representations to the colonial government. He respected Portuguese customs. The difficulties of the American Board remained proof to him that impatience and aggressiveness were counter-productive, and even when men from the Buzi circumspection were arrested for holding services in Zulu and for using English-language books (they had been converted and taught in Johannesburg), Loze retained some sympathy for Portuguese policy. It was these attitudes that he brought to Beira.¹³

Three days after his arrival Loze put them into practice. He met with the secretary-general, Jaime Teixeira, whom he

¹² Ibid.; de Meuron to Gibson, 27 Oct. 1932, Loze to Oldham, 7 July 1933, de Meuron to Oldham, 4 Dec. 1930, and memo by Loze re Riggs proposal, 21 Feb. 1931, Box 1204, Edinburgh House.

¹³ Loze memo on Beira and Company territory, *ibid*.

had known as secretary of native affairs in Lourenço Marques in the mid-1920s, and whom he considered a "Negrophile." Loze's approach was that, as a retired missionary, he simply wished to remain in P.E.A. and work with the men of the region whom he had baptised at Lourenço Marques. All he sought initially was permission to hold religious meetings. Teixeira introduced Loze to the governor, Carlos de Almeida Perreira, as a "friend of Portugal," offering as evidence of friendship Loze's criticism of the Ross report during the furore in 1925. When, in April 1932, Loze and Nkomo met again with Teixeira to discuss the proposed "national" association, the secretary-general reacted favourably. Nkomo "could form a society of mutual help with the boys you have here in Beira," he told them, and "no one would interfere if they have their religion."¹⁴

Simango at this stage was part of the plan, if not of the negotiations. In earlier years he had sought means by which Africans alone might be in charge of an American holding, such as Gogoi, Machemeje, or Mashanga. Now, in June 1932, he asked the governor for permission to open a private Portuguese school at Machemeje in his own name, and with gubernatorial encouragement the application was formally submitted. This seemed to solve personnel issues nicely, for his presence at Machemeje would release Nkomo from what Loze called his "semi-prison" there, tending American Board buildings, with no authority to hold meetings, while the American missionary-"farmer" was on furlough. But Simango's "fall" changed all of that. To Nkomo and Loze, Simango was now a loss difficult to ignore, yet hardly deserving of continued acceptance. Although Loze went ahead and showed a draft of their proposal for a "national" association to the governor late in 1933, Loze and Nkomo consumed a good deal of time sorting out the meaning of the Simango fiasco. Finally they concluded that the scheme remained attractive regardless of Simango – especially with its potential link to the Portuguese evangelicals – and when Eduardo Moreira, the key

¹⁴ Loze to Oldham, 26 Oct. 1931 and 4 April 1932, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and Loze to friends, 29 May 1933, Box 43, 1, P.E.A. series, Phelps-Stokes Fund Records, New York (hereafter Phelps-Stokes).

Portuguese evangelical minister, visited Beira in 1934, they felt it was time to act.¹⁵

Moreira arrived early in August. He met with Loze, and the two took the petition signed by Nkomo and three others, and the proposed statutes, to the governor, Luiz António de Magalhães Corrêa. After Moreira's departure Loze spent the next several months successfully trying to prevent referral of the petition to Lisbon for approval, and for delay. On January 14th, 1935, the charter of the *Associação Crista Evangélica Portuguesa de Culto, Ensino e Beneficência nos Território de Manica e Sofala* (the Christian Evangelical Portuguese Association for Worship, Instruction, and Benefit) was approved and published in the official *Boletim*. Abel Tivane, Obadias Sengwayo, Tomas Tivane, Filemone Gundane, Tapera Nkomo, and Simone Machava were its directors, and Nkomo became the association's first president. Its statutes called for an association headquartered in Beira with the possibility of branches in the territory, consisting of Africans native to or residing in the territory, who recognised Christ, had been baptised, had accepted evangelical beliefs, and behaved themselves. Members agreed to resist temptation in the city and "heathen" customs outside, to help one another when confronted with disease, family problems, and funeral expenses, and to study Portuguese.¹⁶ "Its purposes," Nkomo and the others wrote publicly to the governor, "are to love each other as Christ taught and also to show love for the Portuguese homeland. The undersigned claim as their own the motto of the Evangelical Portuguese youth, which is: 'For Christ and for Portugal.'"¹⁷

¹⁵ Rennie, *Christianity...*, pp. 405-8; Loze memo on Beira and Company territory, 8 July 1932, Loze to Gibson, 16 Dec. 1933, and Loze to McLeish, 7 Dec. 1936, Box 1204, Edinburgh House.

¹⁶ *Boletim do Governo do Território da Companhia de Moçambique*, 16 March 1935, pp. 142-43; listing of directors, file 3007, Departement Missionnaire des Églises Protestantés de Suisse Romande Records, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter Swiss Mission); and Loze to Oldham, 4 Aug. 1934 and 12 Jan. 1935, Box 1204, Edinburgh House. English translations of the statutes are contained in Box 1204.

¹⁷ *Was geht in Beira vor?*, p. 868. This is apparently published by the Swiss Mission in a series called, "Die 'Bunte Reihe.'" *Was geht in Beira vor?* was surely written by Loze; the reprinting of some of his correspondence suggests a date in the late 1930s.

Patience, then, seemed to have paid off. In May 1933 the Company administration had approved public services in Loze's house. In August the Evangelical Methodist Portuguese Church at Oporto had designated Nkomo as its minister in Mozambique, with the legal advantages that status implied. The secretary for native affairs had provided Nkomo with a letter of recognition in May 1934 to assist him in his evangelical tours south of Beira. And in early 1935 the *Associação* was established. There were, expectedly, periodic tensions between the administration and African evangelicals. But the problem rested not so much with the colonial government as with Kamba Simango and, perhaps in a related development, with the formation of a second association.¹⁸

Despite what must have been agonising months alone in Mozambique after October 1932, Simango had developed a programme of his own. He was aware of his advocates in Rhodesia and in the United States, advocates that made both his proposals feasible and splits inevitable. Bunker's attacks on the mission and the American Board as perpetrators of "the rankest injustice" ensured the former; Loze's conviction that the mission must sever all ties with Simango ensured the latter. But Simango's proposal in April 1933 for an American-financed "national" work, developing worship and "social services" programmes for employees in Beira but emphasising Machemeje as the centre for regional work, was not in this setting an impossible scheme. His application for a school at Machemeje was still pending, and the mission at Mt. Silinda did secure the Rhodesian magistrate's agreement to withhold information from the Mozambique Company about Simango's situation. And perhaps it was the mission conscience that led to their approval of Simango's application to rent the farm at Machemeje.¹⁹

¹⁸ Loze to Oldham, 26 Oct. 1931, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; Loze to Jones, 19 May 1934, and to friends, 29 May 1933, Box 43, 1, Phelps-Stokes; and declaration of Alfredo da Silva, 25 Aug. 1933, file 3019, Swiss Mission.

¹⁹ Loze to Bunker, 5 Nov. 1932, FRB/Corr.10/1, and Bunker to Saxe, 27 April 1933, FRB/Corr.7, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Simango program for work in P.E.A., April 1933, Box 7:5, Bunker Papers, Cambridge; Simango to Jones, 14 Jan. 1939, file B-3, Phelps-Stokes; and Loze to de Meuron, 3 April 1933, file 3030, Swiss Mission.

It is true that when he and his family arrived there in August 1934 they were still technically only occupying a farm. But they were welcomed, and accepted, by evangelical communities in the area as leaders, and Simango's standing with officials was also favourable. Thus Machemeje, despite its status, developed the accoutrements of a traditional mission station – services, some schooling, medical work, and farming. Simango regularly visited with evangelicals in the area, held Sunday services for about forty, and sought ways to ensure that local leadership continued to direct these Christian groups rather than yielding the leadership to him. He taught several young men Portuguese, and he drew upon his carpentry skills both at the farm and with such supportive projects as roofing houses of members of the Christian community. Simango immediately set to work, apparently successfully, to unite the different groups – remnants of the Chaviari movement and Souza's church as well as loyalists to the American links – that had split prior to 1934, hoping that they might "come together and start anew." Significantly, he argued that "we cannot afford to have two groups always at loggerheads."²⁰ Further, Simango ranged widely from Machemeje. He was a regular visitor to Beira, and he sought to maintain close contact with Nkomo, despite the fact that they never had real rapport. He of course had ties with Mashanga by birth, and with Gogoi through his earlier employment. In the process Simango gained a considerable following.²¹

What he did with this following is not at all clear. The initiation and perpetuation of "two groups always at loggerheads" were precisely the charges levelled against Simango by Loze and Nkomo, yet the actual origins of the second association, the *Grémio Negrófilo*, are difficult to disentangle. The *Grémio Negrófilo de Manica e Sofala* (the Negrophile Society of Manica and Sofala) seems to have been patterned after the *Institute Negrófilo* in Lourenço Marques; its goals were not merely religious but political and social as well,

²⁰ Simango to Bunker, 17 Aug. 1934, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

²¹ Simango to Bunker, 10 April 1936, FRB/Corr.3/2, and Bunker to friends, 17 Jan. 1935, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Simango to Jones, 13 March 1935, Box 43, 1, P.E.A. series, Phelps-Stokes.

much as the Institute spoke of education and health as well as morality.²² This elite movement was led by Sixpence Simango, a convert of Maxwell's during his 1915-17 tenure at Beira. Sixpence Simango gained a following in Beira, Mashanga, and Lourenço Marques. Kamba Simango recognised his growing importance, and Sixpence Simango joined him, as a student, at Gogoi in 1929. He then came to Beira and was in charge of the Christian work at the rail compound in the early 1930s. His key associates in the *Grémio* were Maque Ngwenya, Nyumba Ngwenya, and Simon Moyane; all had studied for some four years at Gogoi, and all were now in Beira.²³

Kamba Simango provided the key account of the emergence of the *Grémio*. Nkomo, apparently attracted by the prospects of a work divorced from Loze's authority, and perhaps doubtful that the *Associação* would be approved, accepted an invitation from Sixpence Simango and two or three other men to form the *Grémio*. When both were suddenly approved he found himself in an awkward position, and he opted for the *Associação*. (Its members, however, were annoyed at his double-dealing, and briefly rejected his leadership.) Loze's accounts do not provide a great deal about the creation of the *Grémio*, but he predictably charged that the initiative lay with Kamba Simango, and that Sixpence Simango's appeal to Nkomo to lead the *Grémio* was firmly rejected. But Loze acknowledged that Nkomo began to question the security of his position to such an extent that Loze compelled him to go and see the authorisation for the *Associação* on file at the government offices. In addition to these accounts there is evidence that, as early as 1934, a group had been formed paying two shillings per month to Kamba Simango; Loze would have believed it to be a not-yet-official counter organisation to his and Nkomo's plans. There was also the strange suggestion by Loze that Moreira assisted Simango's followers to obtain their associa-

²² Improvement associations in the Rhodesias may have had an impact upon the *Grémio* too.

²³ Rennie, *Christianity...*, pp. 415-18; Simango to Bunker, 10 April 1936, FRB/Corr.3/2, and Simango to Bunker, 5 Dec. 1937, FRB/Corr.3/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and *General Report of the Rev. Eduardo Moreira's Journey in the Portuguese African Colonies*, 20 Jan. to 23 Nov. 1934 (London, 1935), pp. 28-29.

tion. All that is really clear is that the *Grémio* was officially approved on February 22nd, 1935, five weeks after the *Associação*.²⁴

Whatever Kamba Simango's role, he was seen by Nkomo, Loze, and the *Associação* as *the* leader of the *Grémio Negrófilo*, even though he did not bear any formal title. Men such as Sixpence Simango, Maque Ngwenya, Nyumba Ngwenya, and Simon Moyane were the formal and more aggressive and more active leaders of the *Grémio*. But Simango was always in the background as the "spiritual" leader of the *Grémio*, whether he agreed with their decisions or not. In fact he never denied his interest in the organisation. When he wrote about the *Grémio*, he talked about "we." What he did deny was the formality of his leadership and responsibility for its actions. It was, though, the very vagueness of his role that led to the persistent Loze response, whenever trouble arose, that "doubtless Kamba Simango was behind it all."

²⁴ Unlike the *Associação*, no statutes were published. In Oct. 1935 the directors of the *Grémio* were listed in the *Comércio de Beira* (5 Oct. 1935) and included Nhumba da Mayena, Aheandery Zimbangu, Dequessene Damadama, Amude Panga, Mequi Luiz Nguenha, Sixpence Simango, Antonio Tancaiana Nguenha, and José Verremos. *Boletim do Governo do Território da Companhia de Moçambique*, 16 March 1935, p. 143; Moreira to Jones, recd. 1 Oct. 1934, Box 1201, Edinburgh House; and Loze to Lawrence, 15 Feb. 1935, to de Meuron, 24 March 1935, and to J. Badertscher, 19 July 1935, and Loze protest re Simango, 1 March 1935, file 3007, Swiss Mission.

Chapter Seven: The Associations: Conflict, 1935-1939

It was clear from the outset that the *Associação Evangélica* was to be the stronger of the two organisations. With the interest and involvement of Nkomo, Loze, Moreira, and Portuguese evangelicals, with access to basic financial support, mainly through Loze, and with a more clearly identifiable mission than the *Grémio Negrófilo*, the *Associação* offered a potential for coordination and growth and consolidation of Protestants in Manica and Sofala. But for the next several years threats remained, not so much from the Catholic Church or the Portuguese administration as from Kamba Simango and the *Grémio*.

The approval of the *Associação* meant, at least temporarily, that official impediments to religious activity were at an end. In Beira, then, the immediate priorities were to secure broad support among Protestants for the *Associação*, identify the needs of these Christians that could now be met openly, and provide facilities for their work, for affiliation and activity were protection. In mid-February 1935 the *Associação* rented a hall at Maquinino, the closest quarter of town to the wharves, the railway, and the compounds for commercial businesses. Nkomo held the first worship service there on the 17th. "You should know," he began with that air of conciliation that seemed to plead more than acknowledge colonial harmony,

that I will speak to you only of Jesus Christ, your and my savior. He is the savior of the whites and the blacks.... Before all let us thank God, but let us also be thankful to our government officials, who have heard the requests of our friend Pierre Loze. Just don't let any man tell me anything bad about the Portuguese. They at least know no race barrier, and they also recognize us as Portuguese. So let us then be good evangelical Portuguese Christians.

Then he prayed for Salazar, who was re-elected unopposed on that day.¹ With these Loze-style gestures, maybe there could be a reality to congenial relations after all.

It seems, certainly in theory but to a reasonable extent in practice, that Loze yielded the initiative for the development of the *Associação* to Nkomo. Loze did feel that Nkomo required the advice of a "*frère aîné*," but it was Nkomo who directed evangelical work in the African compounds in Beira and who travelled widely organising groups in the interior. In Beira he initiated two Sunday worship and prayer services. The 150 men who attended the opening of the hall were, like their peers elsewhere in Manica and Sofala, without schooling, so Nkomo began secular education programmes as well. They met four nights each week – with the aid of eight to ten lanterns, since the owner of the hall, unhappy about the presence of the school, refused them electricity. Soon Nkomo and others were making the rounds of merchants and steamship companies, seeking their permission to visit African employees in their barracks. Nkomo was, without question, at the centre of the new movement, but here and elsewhere he drew of necessity upon mutual support and mutual instruction by followers.²

This was especially true outside of Beira. Nkomo, with financial aid from Bunker and the Fairfield Association, continued to travel throughout the region. Some of his visits were with those converted under his influence in Lourenço Marques years before. Others were clearly results of efforts by workers who returned from Beira to their homes. And others were simply there, products of various religious experiences; several hundred Nkomo found meeting quietly in small groups along the Sabi, "waiting for us to help." Mambone and Mashanga, on opposite sides of the Sabi River, remained important centres. On the Buzi River the ex-soldiers and their converts – some 300 by 1937 – still resided at Machemeje, and a new group at Nhanguvo emerged. Late in 1936 two men came to Beira, asking that

¹ Loze report on Beira, 7 Nov. 1936, file 3002, Département Missionnaire des Églises Protestantes de Suisse Romande Records, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter Swiss Mission); and *Das Anliegen von Beira* (Zurich, 1937), pp. 32-33.

² Loze to de Meuron, 3 July 1935, file 3007, Swiss Mission; and *Das Anliegen von Beira*, p. 33.

their groups be permitted to join the *Associação*. Abrao Mundjui, who had been baptised by a Dutch Reformed mission in Johannesburg in 1922, had returned to Sofala in 1932 after a decade with the Swiss at their Boksburg mission in South Africa. When in 1936 Paolo Moyane, a Zionist minister, visited Sofala, Mundjui gladly accepted his offer to baptise some of his followers. But Moyane promptly returned to Pretoria, and Mundjui decided to seek affiliation with the new Beira-based association. The *Associação*, in turn, secured permission to build meeting houses there and at Chilokane island in 1937.³

Pedro Siduna, to the west around Butiro, had a similar experience to Mundjui. He was baptised in Johannesburg by a Scandinavian mission, and on his return worked, as did Mundjui, as a self-appointed evangelist. He too rejected the separatist church, and on the understanding that he would reside in Beira for a year to study at Nkomo's school, he and his group were accepted into the *Associação*. In mid-1936 Loze and an American Board missionary met with Bede Simango and arranged for him to join, in the hopes that the people at Gogoi would follow; they did so the next year.⁴ Nkomo maintained extensive correspondence with many of these groups – a nice Pauline touch. Statistics are somewhat unmanageable, but after Nkomo's first *Associação* trip out of Beira, the official register that he and Loze maintained included 250 baptised adults and 565 catechumens. Loze arranged for badges for them all.⁵

Nkomo's responsibilities during his visits were twofold. He first carried out his traditional ministerial duties – holding services, baptising or confirming adults, "dedicating" children, marrying couples, registering new converts. But he also sought to formally organise these groups as branches of

³ Loze to Gibson, 9 Nov. 1931 and 19 March 1932, Box 1204, Records of the International Missionary Council, London (hereafter Edinburgh House); and *Das Anliegen von Beira*, p. 34.

⁴ Bede Simango, in any case, had been virtually abandoned by the American Board, and even the *comandante* at Espungabera was advising him to join. Loze to Emerson, 21 March 1936, file 3008, Swiss Mission.

⁵ Loze reports on Beira, 7 Nov. 1936 and 12 Oct. 1937, file 3002, Loze to de Meuron, 23 June 1936, file 3008, and Loze to de Meuron, 19 Jan. 1937, file 3009, Swiss Mission; and Nkomo to Bunker, 19 March 1937, FRB/Corr.3/3, the Fred R. Bunker Collection, Talladega College Historical Collections, Talladega, Alabama (hereafter Bunker Papers, Talladega).

the *Associação*. He appraised potential leadership and chose from among the baptised men several whom he designated local preachers (wisely providing the colonial administration with a list). His energy and basic faith impressed these groups, and yet he recognised the crucial role of others that complemented his own. "Our brave black young people who have accepted the Gospel in Beira and who have returned to their families have worked hard," he declared after one of his trips. "They have scattered the seed, and I have had the privilege of harvesting it."⁶

Loze, meanwhile, functioned not only as an adviser but as a complement to Nkomo. He retained responsibility for the Nyasaland men working in Beira, primarily for language reasons, and they usually met at his house. But he was preoccupied with several large questions, not the least of which was the problem of literature. The printing of some basic materials in the vernacular was considered essential, but what was the vernacular in Beira? The "kitchen Portuguese" that everyone spoke was hardly an attractive option. Nor was Zulu, which the American missionaries had used at Beira, or Chindau, which they used at Mt. Silinda, despite the fact that Africans in the area around Beira were Ndau.⁷ Nor was Chisena, spoken by Beira residents from the north, nor Chinyanda, by those from Blantyre. In the end, Loze and Nkomo undertook translations into Chichanga, the language of the immediate region about Beira. Together they translated selected Bible passages, which they called "The Way of Salvation," into a bilingual Portuguese-Chichanga booklet, and the Scripture Gift Mission in London published them by the thousands. They then turned to the Gospels, the epistle of John, and Corinthians, which the Trinitarian Bible Society

⁶ Loze to de Meuron, 14 Oct. 1935, file 3007, Swiss Mission; additions to Loze report on the *Associação*, 5 Nov. 1935, to send to Mt. Silinda, 28 May 1936, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and *Was geht in Beira vor?*, p. 869 (see ch. 6, fn. 17).

⁷ Ndau at Beira argued that Chindau spoken at Mt. Silinda and Chindau spoken at Beira had numerous differences, and the fact that Mt. Silinda's "heaven" was Beira's "roof of a house" meant that there were obstacles to meaningful religious translations. Many at Beira, in fact, declared that no books were written in their language, which they called Chinyayi. Loze to Oldham, 26 Oct. 1931, Box 1204, Edinburgh House.

published. Nkomo and Andre Machava then set to work on hymn translations.⁸

Finances, too, were a major concern of Loze's. There is clear evidence of efforts at self-support; Beira men working in Lourenço Marques sent £27 in 1935, and Machemeje sent thirteen sacks of mealies with the promise of fifteen more. Men in Beira itself came up with £25, and by the end of 1935 local gifts of £150 had accumulated. But demands were substantial. When Moreira, Loze, and American Board personnel met in Beira the preceding year, they put together a proposed budget of over £2,000. Nkomo's salary was a nagging problem, and although Loze secured some support from a friend in Oporto, he relied mainly upon "scraping about where one is able" to find the necessary funds. The £6 per month rental for the hall in Beira was also a rather heavy payment, and there was the cost of a pulpit, tables, lanterns, and so on. Over the years Loze managed to tap sources in four countries,⁹ and by the 1940s he had raised nearly £3,000. But money remained Loze's persistent responsibility.¹⁰

There was, of course, the fundamental question of the direction of the *Associação* and Loze's role in it. Moreira's aspirations, which he publicised widely after his 1934 Beira visit, were not inconsistent with Loze's: an evangelical school, which Moreira grandly called the Beira Normal College and Bible School, led by Loze and a Portuguese assistant and affiliated with Portuguese evangelical schools in Mozambique; an agricultural "college" at Machemeje; the retention of Gogoi as the only place foreign missions were officially recognised, in a way, in Company territory; and village schools with Portuguese teachers, Europeans and

⁸ All of this in spite of the view that the "niceties of Ndau have to be sacrificed in the interests of a literary unification" among the Shona. Clement M. Doke, *A Comparative Study in Shona Phonetics* (Johannesburg, 1931), p. 4n. Loze report on the association, 5 Nov. 1935, and Loze to Oldham, 26 Oct. 1931, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and Loze report on Beira, 7 Nov. 1936, and Loze draft of article, "Central African News and Views," 29 May 1937, file 3002, Swiss Mission.

⁹ Probably the United States, Britain, Switzerland, and Portugal.

¹⁰ Loze report on Beira, 5 Nov. 1935, file 3002, Swiss Mission; and Loze to Dexter Taylor, n.d., FRB/Corr.10/1, and minutes of meeting of East Africa Mission with Moreira, 23 Aug. 1934, FRB/Corr.8/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

assimilados, located where converts had returned from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The recurring theme in each of these undertakings focused upon the "national" character of the *Associação*. There was the idea of a group, "Friends of Portugal," which would help evangelical churches in Portugal assume missionary tasks and, perhaps, support Portuguese personnel in Manica and Sofala. Moreira came up with several possibilities, including Edgar Ribeiro, a Portuguese evangelical doctor employed by the Swiss in Lourenço Marques, and Nascimento Freire, a Lisbon-born pastor who had formed a Portuguese congregation in Lourenço Marques and who actually visited Beira in 1936. Loze, in any case, was anxious to be replaced, for his original agreement had been to remain in Beira for only five years, which expired in 1936. But the new association was weak, its financial situation precarious, its relationship to Portuguese evangelicals unsettled, and its aspirations largely unmet. Loze, when the time came, was not about to leave, especially as tensions continued to grow between the *Associação*, Simango, the *Grémio Negrófilo*, and the American Board.¹¹

Behind so much of what was attempted was the lingering question of what to do about Kamba Simango. His very presence at Machemeje made him a conspicuous alternative to the leadership of the *Associação*, even if he had chosen, as he did not, to remain passively on the farm and among Christians in the immediate vicinity. That he was seen in such a light is demonstrated by the variety of proposals – some ludicrous – concerning his future. Loze simply found no evidence of repentance, hence no grounds for reinstatement, and in the interim was convinced that Simango was best out of the country. Mabel Emerson of the American Board agreed, and she showed no inclination, in 1935, to extend his rental terms at Machemeje. Moreira and Loze met with Simango on five occasions during the Portuguese evangelical's visit in 1934. Moreira became convinced that Simango was proof of the dangers of "denationalizing" Africans by

¹¹ *General Report of the Rev. Eduardo Moreira's Journey in the Portuguese African Colonies*, 20 Jan. to 23 Nov. 1934 (London, 1935), p. 29; Simango to Bunker, 23 Feb. 1939, FRB/Corr.8/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Loze to Gibson, 22 July 1935, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and Loze report on Beira, 7 Nov. 1936, file 3002, and Loze to Emerson, 27 Nov. 1936, file 3008, Swiss Mission.

sending them to study in Europe or in the United States. He suggested that the American Board send Simango to Angola to work again with Henry C. McDowell, the prominent African American missionary. Emerson hoped for a place at Achimota College, the elite educational initiative begun in Ghana in 1924.¹² And there was even the suggestion that, wherever he went, he might more suitably deal with temptation by placing himself under the discipline of the Roman Catholics or High Church Anglicans.¹³

Bunker and others, on the other hand, continued to show sensitivity and compassion toward Simango and his plight. For a brief time the Fairfield Association even declared that it would not support the *Associação* unless Simango was active in it – a prospect that provoked only an “*c’est extraordinaire*” from Loze. But the future really became clear when C.T. Loram, the prominent South African authority on African education and race relations, visited the Simangos at Machemeje in mid-1935. He found there an unhealthy piece of land, adjacent to hostile Buzi Company holdings, surrounded by Catholic missions, and sparsely populated. He found Christine Simango in poor health, and both parents concerned about their children’s educational future. Additionally, Loram already knew the mission climate; he had failed to convince Loze to permit Simango to work in the new association, and he saw the determination of all to see Simango out of Mozambique. The *Grémio*, Loram felt, had no immediate future, hence no place for Simango. Still, that remained one of two key alternatives: to encourage Simango to direct the *Grémio* as a kind of alternative to the *Associação*, or to support Simango at Machemeje in a work that could not be successful. Both seemed pointless, except that Loram found “something appealing in the fight of this very

¹² Oldham firmly rejected the suggestion, but Thomas Jesse Jones raised the issue again in 1937, directly with Achimota, promising American money. Nothing came of it. Emerson to Oldham, 15 Oct. 1935, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and Jones to H. Grace, at Achimota, 26 Feb. 1937, file B-3, Phelps-Stokes Fund Records, New York (hereafter Phelps-Stokes).

¹³ Emerson to Oldham, *ibid.*; Emerson to Jones, 6 July 1935, and letter to Loram, 27 July 1935, file B-3, and Loze to Jones, 2 April 1934, Box 43, 1, P.E.A. series, Phelps-Stokes; and minutes of meeting of East Africa Mission with Moreira, 23 Aug. 1934, FRB/Corr.8/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

human African. Besides, there is dear old Bunker mourning for his son Absalom." But after leaving Machemeje, Loram wrote candidly to Simango. Given the obstacles, the plans developing in Beira were more likely to be acceptable to all. "You are," he wrote, "a fine, foolish specimen of humanity," who no longer had a place in Manica and Sofala. Realistically, Loram told Thomas Jesse Jones, "Loze and the missionaries won, Bunker and I lost."¹⁴

Bunker and Simango reached a similar conclusion, although they both hoped that it would be temporary. In 1936 Bunker sent money for the Simangos to go, for at least some months, to the Mozambique highlands or to Natal, but he told Simango that it was wiser to leave Machemeje "entirely and finally." The Simangos, meanwhile, toyed first with the idea of putting the children in school at Hampton, with Christine Simango remaining in the United States for a year for her health and with Simango himself continuing work at Machemeje. They then decided upon the Gold Coast, her home, as the more suitable alternative, and in March 1936 the entire family left. Simango was confident of his own immediate return, but contrary to plans he accompanied his family all the way to Accra. He was never to return to Mozambique. "I think it is all wrong," Bunker, now inactive, wrote the following year, "but there it is."¹⁵

This preoccupation with Simango's exit was based as much upon the threat as upon the reality of Simango's activities. Suspicions had been heightened by a series of rather serious altercations early in the history of the two associations. The difficulties perhaps began in Beira, if the account is true, with Nkomo's dual role in the founding of the organisations.¹⁶ Simango claimed, at the outset, to have advised the *Grémio* to join Nkomo's association, but sharp

¹⁴ Loram to Simango, 13 June 1935, file B-3, Phelps-Stokes; Loram to Jones, 12 June 1935, Box 7:2, Fred R. Bunker Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (hereafter Bunker Papers, Cambridge); and Loze to de Meuron, 27 April and 13 May 1935, file 3007, Swiss Mission.

¹⁵ Simango died in Accra in 1966. Bunker to Simango, 9 Nov. 1937, FRB/Corr.3/1, Simango to Bunker, 10 April 1936, FRB/Corr.3/2, and Bunker to Cullens, 28 Jan. 1936, FRB/Corr.7, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Christine Simango to Jones, 13 March 1935, Box 7:4, Bunker Papers, Cambridge.

¹⁶ See above, p. 108.

words and antagonistic sermons made cooperation between the fledgling organisations difficult. The *Grémio* charged the *Associação* with being a “foreign” organisation whose schools failed to use the appropriate language. Allegedly *Grémio* leaders even sought government retraction of the *Associação*’s authorisation, and its leaders tried to detach Beira men from allegiance to Nkomo.¹⁷

If the conflict had remained limited to Beira it might conceivably have been controlled, but it soon expanded to Mashanga. According to Simango, some *Grémio* members, convinced that Beira difficulties should not be transferred to Mashanga, met with Nkomo, but to no avail. One of Nkomo’s followers had claimed on the basis of his ties with the *Associação* to be the leader of Mashanga evangelicals, despite the fact that the *Grémio* had already secured the local *comandante*’s permission to hold bi-monthly meetings. Into this setting Nkomo arrived, holding services and baptising numerous people, including some wives of *Grémio* members. This lack of sensitivity could hardly go unchallenged, and back in Beira Nkomo found a *Grémio* article in the local paper accusing him of wholesale baptisms, a criticism Nkomo himself had levelled against the independent church leader, Bishop Souza, earlier at Machejeje. Loze found “diabolical insinuations” in the article, and since the *Commercio de Beira* was read widely throughout the territory, he found the “confusion” it spread difficult to counter. Simango himself expressed regret, but things were now out of control. Sixpence Simango sent *Grémio* members – former Gogoi students – about to challenge Nkomo on his trips south. They allegedly even spurred Catholic priests to publicise the foreign character of the *Associação*. Rumours began to circulate among evangelicals along the Buzi that Nkomo, travelling among them, was holding meetings without authority. The *Associação*’s general tactic was to function as if the *Grémio Negrófilo* did not exist, but that was becoming harder and harder to do.¹⁸

¹⁷ Loze to H. Guye, 9 March 1935, file 3007, Swiss Mission; and Loze to Gibson, 22 July 1935, and additions to Loze report on the *Associação*, 5 Nov. 1935, to send to Mt. Silinda, 28 May 1936, Box 1204, Edinburgh House.

¹⁸ It is true that the *Associação* called the *Grémio* a mere “club,” and charged that its members drank, but it was clearly less aggressive than

Simango's departure for Accra, in fact, did not change the situation dramatically. It is true that he was no longer available to excite suspicions, as he did when he reasonably stopped at Mangunde on occasion to visit former Gogoi students. His trips to Beira could no longer be seen as opportunities for intrigue. But the very fact that he longed to return to Mozambique, that he engaged in extensive correspondence with African evangelicals there, and that they in turn spent much of the five years after his departure appealing for him to return, prevented this segment of the Protestant community from redirecting its loyalties. Bunker and, later, his sons championed Simango as the only man who could reconcile the associations, Loze, Nkomo, and others to one another, a development that the American Board found embarrassing. Simango and his followers, then, provided hope and the basis for divisions; and Bunker's plans assured their perpetuation. "The people," Simango declared, "are willing to follow me."¹⁹

Where, from Accra, Simango was leading them, and indeed whether he was leading them at all, no one quite knew; doubtless Loze and Nkomo were guilty of exaggeration. If the potentiality of Simango's return exacerbated tensions, it did not ensure conflict; neither Sixpence Simango nor Nkomo were obliged to act upon their frustrations, whatever the origins. In fact, by 1938 or so local considerations, which could only distantly be traced back to Simango, began to dominate the relationship between the two associations and the key actors within them. The resultant crisis, early in 1938, had two aspects. The first was the general intensification of criticism by Sixpence Simango and his followers – through letters, telegrams, notarised documents, and published articles – of the *Associação*, Loze, and Nkomo. The second was the emergence of jealousies between evangelicals at Chiloane and at Mambone and

the *Grémio*. Simango to Bunker, 10 April 1936, FRB/Corr.3/2, and 29 April 1937, FRB/Corr.3/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; additions to Loze report, *ibid.*; and Loze report on Beira, 5 Nov. 1935, file 3002, Loze to Orner, 5 Oct. 1935, and to Emerson, 13 April 1935, file 3007, and Loze to Orner, 16 March 1936, and to Emerson, 3 March 1936, file 3008, Swiss Mission.

¹⁹ Christine M. Simango, "A Letter from East Africa to Hampton Friends," *Southern Workman*, 62 (Jan. 1933), 29; and Simango to Bunker, 5 Dec. 1937, FRB/Corr.3/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

Mashanga. The juxtaposition of the two, with the one providing the physical setting for the other, produced quite a brouhaha.²⁰

Loze never took attacks upon himself kindly, and he did not permit accusations of "foreigner" and allegations before Company authorities to thwart his efforts. Confident both of his mission and his standing with the Portuguese, he simply did not consider himself vulnerable. Nkomo did. The inaccurate charge that he and his wife were both "foreigners" – she supposedly from Nyasaland – and the more accurate charge that they were supported by American money changed Nkomo's mood from one of inquietude at the beginning of 1938 to fear by March. A Goan who visited his night school and declared that it was an American school speaking against the Catholic Church, and a "Native Affairs" official who said, in effect, "so you are the foreign-supported foreigner," simply confirmed Nkomo's fear. He even wrote to Moreira in Lisbon, suggesting that the Portuguese evangelical should not be surprised to hear that Nkomo had been imprisoned. As Nkomo took these attacks more and more to heart, he attempted to lessen his ties with Loze. "Our man," Loze concluded, "lost his head."²¹

It was in this general environment that the clash between Chiloane and Mambone-Mashanga assumed ominous overtones. Part of the problem is explained simply by rivalry. The men of Mashanga and Mambone worked in Lourenço Marques and in the Transvaal (as well, but to a lesser extent, at Beira). Their contacts were thus more wide-ranging, their experience broader, than their Chiloane counterparts, who either went to Beira or made a living by fishing on the island itself, drying the fish on platforms along the shore and sending them in to Beira for sale. "One can imagine," a Swiss missionary who arrived at Beira in 1945, recalled, "that those from Mambone-Mashanga, who were very conscious of their worth, found it difficult to accept decisions [concerning the future of the *Associação*] in which they had little part."²²

²⁰ Loze report on Beira, 1 Dec. 1938, file 3002, and Loze to de Meuron, 26 Jan. 1938, file 3010, Swiss Mission.

²¹ Loze report, *ibid.*, and Loze to de Meuron, 13 Jan., 16 March, and 7 April 1938, file 3010, Swiss Mission.

²² M.E. Kaltenrieder noted a similar division between Gogoi and the

This jealousy was compounded by rival plans to construct meeting places at Chiloane and Mambone. Nkomo secured authorisation to build a meeting house at Chiloane, but because Mambone was Sixpence Simango's home, he did not obtain permission there. Chiloane evangelicals, exasperated by their neighbour's uncooperativeness, were inclined toward confrontation. Nkomo, concerned about this particular situation as well as the general attacks levelled against him, sought Sixpence Simango to sort the entire matter out.²³

Loze and Nkomo offered somewhat different interpretations of what happened next. In its essence it appears that Loze misunderstood Nkomo's motivations in seeing Sixpence Simango, suspecting instead that the meeting was to drive him from Beira. Chiloane evangelicals, as devotees of the *Associação*, also were disinclined to approve of Nkomo's efforts at rapprochement, and sided with Loze. But Nkomo was persistent. "Mr Loze must know and learn also more to love his enemies," he told Bunker. "Because he does not understand to bring back Sixpence Simango into fellowship.... If I try more to talk, and to be peace with Sixpence Simango, they [Chiloane Protestants] become angry with me. Some times trying to kick me out of the church.... My aim is to bring Sixpence with his groups to understand fully, why Jesus came down for us for?"²⁴ Nkomo became convinced that "it would be better if we were not aided by whites," and in February and March he refused his salary from Loze. His only alternative was the Mashanga and Mambone Christians, who during these two months managed to come up with about £8 for his food and rent. Nkomo had now severed his ties with Loze, and linked them with Sixpence Simango.²⁵

littoral, the former having some education and the latter, little or none. Private communication from Kaltenrieder, 28 March 1977. See also E. Dora Earchy, "The VaNdau of Sofala," *Africa*, 4 (1931), 228.

²³ Loze to de Meuron, 26 Jan. 1938, file 3010, Swiss Mission; and extracts from Nkomo to Bunker, April 1938, FRB/Corr.8/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

²⁴ Nkomo to Bunker, 17 June 1938, FRB/Corr.3/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega/

²⁵ Extracts from Nkomo to Bunker, April 1938, FRB/Corr.8/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Loze report on Beira, 1 Dec. 1938, file 3002, Swiss Mission.

What was required, Loze decided, was a good Portuguese evangelical to restore confidence in the security and hope that rested with the *Associação*, thereby demonstrating in both a practical and principled way the value of unity and cooperation, at least as narrowly defined. He turned to Nascimento Freire, the Lourenço Marques pastor who was now working full-time as a distributor of evangelical literature in Mozambique. Freire arrived early in May, visited with officials, including the director of native affairs, and then spoke to members of the *Associação*. A popular evangelist, he was persuasive, coming down on the side of humility and loyalty. Protestants at Mambone and Mashanga, in any case, were persuaded, and they agreed to discontinue their support of Nkomo. Faced with a very practical predicament, Nkomo asked Loze to pardon him. "The arrangement of peace with Mr Loze has been settled," he wrote rather unhappily. "I am sorry because some of our Christians had a good idea to show their love to work of God to be promoted the Gospel, now they are checked out, not continue. The two groups are still persisted, not willing to work together."²⁶ As for Loze, pardoning Nkomo was no problem; it was the forgetting that he found difficult.²⁷

In fact there was to be more to forget. Still fearful after the Mambone-Mashanga-Chiloane business, and distraught over the temporary closure of the Beira school that had resulted, Nkomo exercised less than good judgment. In early November he convinced himself that written permission was required for worship – although it had been granted three years before – and he wrote and asked for it. Once in the bureaucratic works it was difficult to retrieve "*cette lettre absurde*," and Nkomo refused to hold services without an affirmative reply. The arrival shortly thereafter of E. Juillerat, a French-speaking Swiss sent by the Swiss mission to work with Loze and, hopefully, to be accepted by the *Associação* as its adviser, might have served as testimony to the security of the organisation, but instead members, always sensitive to the foreign and white charges, declared that "we

²⁶ Nkomo to Bunker, 17 June 1938, FRB/Corr.3/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

²⁷ Loze to de Meuron, 4 May 1938, and to Emerson, 10 June 1938, file 3010, Swiss Mission; and Nkomo to Bunker, 24 May 1938, FRB/Corr.8/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

must not accept foreigners to work with us.”²⁸ They resented his attendance at a Beira meeting in January 1939 which sought to “arrange things which were wrong among Christians and their friends,” especially when he clashed with Abel Tivane, a key leader for some years. Nkomo, in March, went to the *comandante* to declare his opposition to Juillerat’s presence at the school. Freire, in April, attempted another reconciliation visit, but this time he was not well-received, and in May, with his position untenable, Juillerat was recalled from Beira. Clearly the *Associação* was unwilling to give the impression of dependence upon whites. But Loze and Nkomo needed each other; reconciliation followed later that same month.²⁹

After these altercations difficulties reverted to the traditional clash of associations. There were rumours of Sixpence Simango’s intentions to hold mass unauthorised meetings at Machemeje, destined to concern the administration; there were reports to Catholic priests at Mambone against Nkomo, and murmurings about Loze’s placing new property in Beira in his daughter’s name rather than in the name of the *Associação*. These problems persisted well into the 1940s. “I am not free at all,” Nkomo once wrote in exasperation, “preaching the Gospel of Jesus Christ here, on account of Sixpence Simango and his companions.... If there is any body who helps Sixpence Simango,” he continued uncharitably, “let him be *Anathema*.”³⁰

Kamba Simango, from a distance, recognised the seriousness of all of this. In 1939 he was making his last major effort to return to Manica and Sofala. He appealed desperately to Bunker, Thomas Jesse Jones, Hampton Institute,

²⁸ Juillerat was a new mission appointee, a carpenter who later undertook university and theological study, including residency in Edinburgh and Portugal. Loze to Jones, 15 Jan. 1939, Box 43, 1, Phelps-Stokes; and Loze to de Meuron, 5 April 1939, file 3020, Swiss Mission.

²⁹ Extracts from Nkomo to Bunker, 19 May 1939, FRB/Corr.4, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Loze to de Meuron, 12 and 19 Nov. 1938, file 3010, Loze to de Meuron, 9 March and 4, 25, and 31 May 1939, file 3020, and de Meuron to Emerson, 12 July 1939, file 3026, Swiss Mission.

³⁰ Nkomo to Wilfrid Bunker, 12 March 1940, FRB/Corr.3/1, and extracts from Nkomo to Bunker, April 1938, FRB/Corr.8/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Loze to A. Clerc Marchand, 16 May 1938, and to de Meuron, 10 Sept. 1938, file 3010, Swiss Mission.

and Mabel Carney for adequate funds, but without success.³¹ His last letter to Bunker – he broke off correspondence that year – was a combination of despair over the divisions and hope for reconciliation. "It is," he observed,

not only a split but it is war among the Christians. We are so few in number. The men at times do not speak to each other. Sometimes they do not even give each other the ordinary Christian sympathy whenever a member of the other group has lost a relative through death. It happens sometimes that members of the same family find themselves in different groups and when they do not speak to each other their heathen relatives sometimes ask what kind of a New Life it is that makes them enemies.... The Padres are more kind to each of these groups than the groups themselves are to each other.

But, he added, "when I go back I shall work for the advancement of cementing the gaps and cracks between us"³² – good terminology for a man blessed with industrial skills, though rather a forlorn aspiration.

³¹ Simango to Bunker, 30 Aug. 1938, FRB/Corr.3/1, and Jones to Simango, 1 June 1939, FRB/Corr.5/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Simango to Deane, 11 Jan. 1939, Simango file, Hampton Institute, Hampton, Virginia.

³² Simango to Bunker, 11 Feb. 1939, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

Chapter Eight: The Associations: Growth, 1935-1945

It would be a serious error to assume that hostility and clashes dominated the activities of Protestants in Manica and Sofala from the mid-1930s onward. The nature of these conflicts certainly need to be documented, for they obviously governed to a large extent impressions within and without of the qualities of the associations and of the evangelicals who sought to promote their faith in the region. But there was at the same time evidence of growth and success, by evangelistic standards, even though, of course, the very successes of one group might feed the conflict with the other. It is far safer, however, to see the tensions as perpetual frustrations that occasionally erupted, not as the preoccupations of Nkomo and Loze, or even of Sixpence Simango. Freire, who supposedly had a talent for music, drafted a hymn for the *Associação* during his 1938 visit:

Association, spread your light,
Many heathen have yet to be saved;
Manica, Sofala do not know Jesus,
Let us go, full of love, to call them.¹

Perhaps not an inspired expression, but its sentiments, rather than "Sixpence and Company," were the foci of *Associação* aspirations.

In Beira the energies of the *Associação* were directed toward the construction of an "evangelistic hall." The goal was not merely to extricate themselves from a rather burdensome rent or from the owner's prohibitions upon singing, but was rather to create a less tangible "spiritual center" for evangelicals in the region at a place over which they had clear control. Protestants both in and out of Beira

¹ Loze to Emerson, 10 June 1938, file 3010, Departement Missionnaire des Églises Protestantés de Suisse Romande Records, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter Swiss Mission). The entire text appears in *Was geht in Beira vor?*, p. 873 (see ch. 6, fn. 17). A second hymn, in fact the first to be translated into Chishanga, was based upon the "I stand at the door and knock" passage in Revelation 3:20. For the full text see *Das Anliegen von Beira* (Zurich, 1937), pp. 25-26.

subscribed funds for its construction² – in fact that was one of the issues in the Chiloane-Mambone affair – and it was officially opened in October 1938, complete with “God bless the President of the Republic, God bless the Salazar ministry, and God bless the authorities of Manica and Sofala.”³ Title to the hall was originally held in the Loze family’s name – another 1938 grievance – but in 1942 it was transferred to the *Associação*. As relations with the new government, succeeding Company rule, deteriorated, it seemed wiser to place the hall clearly in the hands of the Portuguese, and in 1943, at Swiss mission expense, title changed hands again to the *Aliança Evangélica Portuguesa* in Lisbon, the legal right to use the property remaining with the *Associação* as long as it remained evangelical.⁴

The *Associação* put the hall to immediate use. Sunday services, of course, continued, and the evening school enrolled some 175 men, whose diverse origins meant further dissemination of “the message.” In addition, by early 1940 Nkomo had begun a day school for children, who came from Mashanga, Mambone, and the Buzi. (The importation of children for schooling was the only alternative if there was to be a school in Beira. When Mrs Loze, in the early ‘thirties, sought to work among women and children in Beira she discovered that there were virtually none there; rather Beira was still a town of men who had come in for work.) Nkomo’s school, registered as the *Escola Evangélica*, began with eleven pupils; by 1942 there were over 250.⁵

Nkomo was joined during this later period by Aquila Ngwenya and Samuel Ernesto Simango. Both were from Mambone. Simango, in his teenage years, was slated to go

² Most of the required £800, however, was met by Loze’s friends. Neither the American Board nor the Swiss Mission contributed. Loze to Bunker, 22 July 1942, FRB/Corr.3/1, the Fred R. Bunker Collection, Talladega College Historical Collections, Talladega, Alabama (hereafter Bunker Papers, Talladega).

³ Loze to conseil de la Mission Suisse, 19 Oct. 1938, file 3010, Swiss Mission.

⁴ Loze to Harold Belcher, 12 July 1943, FRB/Corr.10/2, and Loze to Bunker, 22 July 1942, FRB/Corr.3/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

⁵ Nkomo to Wilfrid Bunker, 28 May 1940, and Loze to Bunker, *ibid.*, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Loze to Gibson, 7 May 1941, and to friends, 25 July 1942, Box 1204, Records of the International Missionary Council, London (hereafter Edinburgh House).

to Lisbon with his employer, but his parents found him on board a ship at Lourenço Marques and forced him to remain in Mozambique. Staying in Lourenço Marques, both he and Ngwenya were converted through Nkomo's work in the 1920s. In 1931 they were told of the plans for Nkomo to go to Beira, and they responded to his call for volunteers to assist him. In preparation they were sent to the school for evangelists at Rikatla. In 1939 the two arrived in Beira with their 1^o Grau certificate. Ngwenya and Simango visited employee compounds, assisted at the evangelistic hall, and corrected New Testament translations.⁶

To the south of Beira, Nkomo continued the pattern of earlier years, visiting Mashanga, Mambone, Chiloane, and newer sites such as Sofala, Donda, Mahonga, and Maropanye. In 1939 the *Associação* was authorised to construct a second meeting house at Chiloane, and in 1942 a third. A second house was finished at Sofala, too, in 1942. All were simple structures, presuming the Portuguese term *barracão* was used properly. But with or without specific places for meeting, these groups became identifiable branches of the organisation, with local leadership but ultimately dependent upon Nkomo and the *Associação* in Beira. Nkomo's tours, then, were literally circuits, assessing local needs, providing necessary guidance, resolving disputes, administering rites.⁷

Nkomo's most extensive evangelistic tour occurred in 1944, when he travelled in the southern part of the province for two months on foot — his appeal for a bicycle five years before apparently having come to nothing. Despite its length, the 1944 circuit was typical. Nkomo travelled to Sofala, remained five days, held worship services, and baptised forty adults and ten children. There he chose a companion, Tomas Tivane, for the remainder of the trip — another nice New Testament touch. From Sofala they crossed the Sabi to Donda, where Nkomo designated Filipi

⁶ Autobiographie de Samuel Ernesto Simango de Beira, 1944, file 3014, and Loze to Paul Fatten, 22 Aug. 1939, file 3020, Swiss Mission.

⁷ Loze to Jones, 15 Jan. 1939, Box 43, 1, Phelps-Stokes Fund Records, New York (hereafter Phelps-Stokes); Loze to Bunker, 22 July 1942, FRB/Corr.3/1, and extracts from Loze to Emerson, 3 Sept. 1942, FRB/Corr.10/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and acta da nona Assembleia Geral da Associação, 29 Jan. 1939, file 3013, Swiss Mission.

and Filemone Nhoni, in whose house they stayed, as leaders. They met in a small prayer house which Donda evangelicals had built, and he baptised twenty-five children and eight adults. And so it went – four days at Mahonga, on Chiloane island; then to the leaderless Maropanye, also on the island; then to Mashanga, where the administrator urged a meeting house of brick and backed it up with money; then to Mambone, awkwardly now transferred administratively to Inhambane district. By the time he returned to Beira in September, he had placed “elders” as superintendents among all of the groups, added some women to assist them, formed a new branch at Ambala, and organised three distinct groups at Mashanga, similar to the situation at Mambone. He had baptised 228 adults, 139 children, and performed 22 weddings; there were 98 conversions.⁸

Machemeje, on the Buzi some sixty miles inland from Beira, presented a rather different situation from the south. The farm itself, some 5,000 acres, was of course purchased by the American Board in their more active Mozambique days. Some thirty Christian families resided there in 1939. In 1940 the *Associação* became more interested in cultivating part of the farm, and Abel Mountinho, the Beira police commander and a friend of Loze, encouraged Loze to create a “model native village” at Machemeje similar to the one at Nyangau, outside of Beira, that Mountinho himself had established. But Machemeje was never the scene of major development. In 1942 Protestants there did build a prayer house, and Samuel Paya was generally an effective “spiritual leader,” honest and “zealous” though lacking in formal education. His assistant, Lucas Muchanga, was an agriculturalist, and in fact there was some enthusiasm for the *Associação*’s agricultural plans; cotton crops there were rather successful. They were burdened, though, by insufficient funds, a chief who sent non-Christians to reside on the land, “Zionists” and other groups who challenged their position and mixed “paganism and Christianity,” a mission society that came close to selling the farm out from under

⁸ Nkomo to Wilfrid Bunker, 29 May 1939, FRB/Corr.3/1, Nkomo to Bunker, 18 Sept. 1945, FRB/Corr.9/2, and Nkomo to Cecil Zimmerer, 18 Sept. 1945, FRB/Corr.9/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Nkomo, “Recit de mon voyage d’évangélisation au sud de la province,” 22 July to 15 Sept. 1944, file 3002, Swiss Mission.

them, and a precarious legal status that prohibited the *Associação* from dealing with the situation effectively. As late as 1947 the land had yet to be transferred to the *Associação*, the prerequisite for coping with other difficulties.⁹

Excepting Nkomo's new effort in Beira, Gogoi continued to function as the only Protestant school in Company territory. In 1938 Bede Simango had seventy-five boarders – fourteen of them girls – coming from a radius of 100 miles. He also maintained a carpentry shop, fields cultivated by students, orchards producing oranges, lemons, and grapefruits,¹⁰ and a congregation of 250. Although Bede Simango was occasionally joined by other teachers – men like Moises Siguaque, who attended the Methodist school at Inhambane and the Swiss school at Lourenço Marques – he was generally alone at Gogoi, master of the operations there, distant from the *Associação* in Beira, and oriented toward the more convenient Americans in Rhodesia. Gogoi was the last tangible evidence of the original purpose of Mt. Silinda.¹¹

Gogoi was at the centre of a number of small Christian communities in the area, and Bede Simango, John H. Marsh of the Mt. Silinda mission, and Loze himself, when he finally retired to Umtali, repeated the travelling ministry pattern of the coast. In 1942 they visited Mangunde, an evangelical settlement of some 200 people, at the centre of a number of Christian kraals located nearby at such places as Chibabava, Davira, and Nyangu. These evangelicals chose as their leader Elias Novela, who had been converted in the Dutch Reformed Church in Johannesburg a decade before and who had been recognised on the Rand as a key Protestant figure. They met, and led themselves, at their own kraals each Sunday, and once a month walked to Mangunde, where

⁹ Loze to Jones, 15 Jan. 1939, Box 43, 1, Phelps-Stokes; Loze to Emerson, 6 Sept. 1940 and 3 Sept. 1942, FRB/Corr.10/1, Loze to Emerson, 17 July 1943, FRB/Corr.10/2, and John Reuling to Wilfrid Bunker, 22 May 1947, FRB/Corr.9/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Loze to Emerson, 8 May and 15 July 1942, and S.E. Simango to Loze, 15 Aug. 1942, file 3039, and report of evangelistic trip of N. Freire, Aug. 1945, file 3002, Swiss Mission.

¹⁰ Sale of which had been forbidden late in the 1930s.

¹¹ Loze to de Meuron, 24 June 1938, file 3010, Swiss Mission; Loze memo, 5 April 1941, and Loze to friends, 25 July 1942, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and Gertrude Merrill, circular, 19 Oct. 1943, FRB/Corr.11, and Loze to Emerson, 17 July 1943, FRB/Corr.10/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

Novela took charge of services. Recognising his need for training, they decided to support Novela for one or two years of study at Gogoi, especially to learn Portuguese. Loze and Marsh found a unity among the evangelicals in the area, despite their varied conversions – most of the men converted in South Africa but by the Swiss, the American Board, the Nazarenes, and the Dutch Reformed. On the 1942 visit they examined twenty-six who sought baptism, accepted six as full members, and baptised the other twenty with the admonition to study, their “ignorance of fundamental truths” being readily apparent.¹²

Loze, Marsh, and Bede Simango also visited Chief Gezane’s kraal in 1942. Daniel Sitole, the area’s evangelist who like Novela had been converted in Johannesburg in the 1930s, had built a small chapel and chosen elders. There were many young men in the area, mostly converted while at work in towns; wives who sought to adopt their husbands’ new faith; and a handful of women baptised by a separatist church evangelist several years before and now trying to sort out their relationship to other Christians in the area. Affiliation with the *Associação* in Beira, which the elders said they wanted, was one way to deal with their isolation and their lack of trained leaders; Gogoi was another. In a second visit in 1943, with Dexter Taylor of the American Board in Johannesburg along, the missionaries advised the evangelicals at Gezane to send three men for several months’ schooling at Gogoi. These men were then to gather the women and children together once or twice a week, teaching them to memorise the Ten Commandments, the Lord’s Prayer, the creed, and the words concerning communion. Here too, Loze discovered, “most are still very ignorant.”¹³

These two major tours were, in a sense, tours of discovery. Bede Simango was certainly well aware of the major groups, but he had never been able to visit them as regularly as Nkomo had on the coast. Nor could he, in any case, minister to them as did Nkomo, for it was not until 1943, at the request of the Gogoi congregation, that Bede Simango

¹² John Marsh extracts from “A Missionary Journey,” typescript, FRB/Corr. 3/1, and Loze, “A Visit to Mangunde,” 5 Oct. 1942, FRB/Corr. 10/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

¹³ Loze to friends, 16 Sept. 1943, Box 1204, Edinburgh House; and Dorothy Marsh, “A Missionary Journey,” and Loze, “A Visit to Mangunde,” *ibid*.

was permitted to administer the sacraments. But as awareness grew about the extensiveness of evangelical communities in the region, contact grew as well. Nascimento Freire travelled to Gogoi in August 1945, met with over 300 there, another 60 at Butiro, and 120 at Chibabava and Dombe. For nearly six weeks the following year Bede Simango toured the region, assessing the practical needs of the groups and providing spiritual guidance. By the time he returned to Gogoi in April he had baptised 146 infants and 30 adults. He had also pulled 45 teeth.¹⁴

There were other mission "discoveries" in the western regions of Mozambique Company territory. The South African General Mission at Rusitu, across the border in Southern Rhodesia, became more conscious of the presence of Protestant communities in Mozambique in 1943 (why 1943 is unclear, as Mozambicans had sought medical aid and other assistance from Rusitu for some years). For whatever reason, Rusitu raised the issue of a ministry across the border with the organisation in Cape Town, and in 1940 two missionaries were sent into the region to investigate. African evangelists, not European missionaries, seemed to them to mark the wisest direction; it was certainly consistent with the experience of others. These evangelists, they speculated, might "go quietly" from British territory, or someone like Mica Sengwayo, associated with the mission at Rusitu but now living in the Dombe area, could lead these groups from within. "Their zeal and love of the Lord puts to shame the very horribly respectable propriety of this 'established' church," a leader of the South African General Mission pointedly declared, so perhaps a white missionary was not so crucial after all.¹⁵

American Methodists at Mutarewere faced a similar issue, where across the border in Company territory several small

¹⁴ Loze to friends, *ibid.*; report of evangelistic trip of N. Freire, Aug. 1945, file 3002, and report of evangelistic trip of Bede Simango, 30 May 1946, file 3016, Swiss Mission.

¹⁵ Minutes of district conference, Rusitu, 19 April 1943, *supt.*, S.A.G.M., Cape Town, to British, American, and Canadian councils, 23 Jan. 1945, Arthur Brown to *supt.*, Cape Town, 25 Aug. 1943, and Herbert Pirouet to executive, Cape Town, 18 Aug. 1943, official letters to and from South Africa, Records of the South Africa General Mission, London (hereafter S.A.G.M.).

Christian communities had been formed by men converted while at work in Umtali in the mid-1920s. They were led by Gibson Bapete, a chief, and Chadraque Chitereka,¹⁶ both of whom had crossed into Rhodesia seeking education in 1913. They attended school at Umtali for four years, and Chitereka was certified as an evangelist (Bapete refusing as unsuitable for a chief). They returned, undertook evangelistic work, and organised a church council. Evangelicals in the Nyamasasi area supported Chitereka with ten shillings per month. In the late 1930s these groups appealed for missionary guidance, but the Methodists were unprepared to assume responsibility. Loze, now in Umtali, was, and he advised affiliation with the *Associação* in Beira. That seemed, too, the answer for the Rusitu situation, though the timing was unfortunate, for soon the *Associação* was to be preoccupied not with unity and ministry but with its own survival.¹⁷

In the meantime, prospects for survival were brighter due not to a European but to an African missionary impulse. That, of course, had been Bunker's original vision — an expression in Manica and Sofala of the evangelical commitment of related Africans in the Zulu church in South Africa. Loze had encouraged it at Lourenço Marques, and two pastors, Alfredo Moiane and Pilato Sibane, visited Manica and Sofala. They induced their congregations to send £25 to Gogoi as evidence of their mission responsibility. Similarly, Marsh's message to Africans at Mt. Silinda after his 1943 tour convinced the Ndau — especially the women, which was not without its European missionary parallels — to initiate a programme to send evangelists into Manica and Sofala. But most of the Christian men around Gogoi — some 700 by 1943 — still worked on the Rand, and it was there, not at Lourenço Marques or Mt. Silinda, that the need was felt to demonstrate both Christian responsibility within Manica and Sofala toward its men in South Africa, and within South Africa toward its fellow Christians to the north.¹⁸

¹⁶ Also referred to as Gibson Dziwa and Shadrac Shitereca.

¹⁷ Loze, "L'Évangile à Beira et dans la Province de Manica et Sofala, 1937 à 1943," 10 June 1943, file 3002, Swiss Mission; supt., S.A.G.M., Cape Town, to British, American, and Canadian councils, 23 Jan. 1945, S.A.G.M.; and Loze to friends, 2 June 1944, FRB/Corr.10/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

¹⁸ Loze to Thompson, 27 Dec. 1941, FRB/Corr.10/1, and Evelyn Lyman to

To that end Bede Simango went to Johannesburg in 1943. He spent a month in the Transvaal, speaking of the obligation of men from Manica and Sofala to further the evangelisation of that region, of "the greatness of the work" of the *Associação*, and of their responsibility, regardless of their denominational affiliation in South Africa, to cooperate with the *Associação* upon their return. He stressed as well the obligation to respond to the needs of men while on the Rand. Bede Simango thus sought to advance the principle of a broadening Christian responsibility; he also confronted the very practical issues of tangible support for the *Associação* and restriction of sectarian differences in Manica and Sofala.¹⁹

Tapera Nkomo had conveyed the same message, by letter, in 1942. It was a charming combination of pragmatism and inspiration, of admonition and encouragement. It was Nkomo's own version of the epistles:

Dear friends who are in Johannesburg. Greetings, I am saluting you all who are in the town of Johannesburg, friends believers in the Lord. Now, I your brother, let you know and make you acquainted that, in the town of Beira in the country of Manica and Sofala, there is a house of prayer to the Lord Jesus Christ. Dear friends, the door which had been shut many years is now opened. I say: Rejoice in the Lord because the gospel is now spread and preached in your country. There are Baptisms of adults and children and marriages of which we were deprived in the past years, many years during which we were busy finding the sheep which were lost that they might enter the fold of God in believing in the Lord.

To-day though there are still many unbelievers, the Lord Jesus Christ has conquered, He who opens no one shall shut, who shuts and no one shall open. Now, dear friends, we must see that our house will not be shut, help us with the blessings you have from the Lord. The fish and the "ngorokoro"²⁰ live in the water. In the

Bunker, 13 May 1945, FRB/Corr.5/3, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Bede Simango, "Relatório Sobre a Obra de Deus em Gogoi em 1943," file 3002, Swiss Mission; and *Bulletin de la Mission Suisse dans l'Afrique du Sud*, 45 (Dec. 1942), 156-57.

¹⁹ Bede Simango, "Relatório," *ibid.*; Loze, "L'Évangile;" and Loze to de Meuron, 11 Jan. 1943, file 3015, Swiss Mission.

²⁰ Hook.

same way the Gospel of the Lord cannot reach from one beach to the other without a bridge. The bridge of the Gospel is money:

Do help the missionaries who are with you, who take care of your souls; obey what they tell you. Look and give thanks to my missionaries, who have troubled themselves to teach me the way of the Lord. They did not leave me alone. I am thankful for their help to this day. They did not teach me so that I might go and preach the Gospel in Europe, but here in the Colony of Mozambique which is your country. Therefore do help the Lord Jesus and your own country which is in the darkness of Satan.

Get up young men. The sun is up, the day has come. Let us walk faithfully dropping the deeds of darkness. Love avoids doing any wrong to those who are staying with him, to one's fellow man.

Is this not true? Look at the Word of the Lord Jesus Christ, my brethren, he says: "I was naked and you clothed me." Math. 25.36.

I am asking for your prayers. I am also recommending you to the Lord our Saviour. Amen.

Good bye, dear friends.

I am your brother who loves you.²¹

Much less can be said about the *Grémio Negrófilo*. Its support was never as extensive within Manica and Sofala as that of the *Associação*, and although it even had its loyalists on the Rand, its impact there was negligible. But the caveat must be given that the *Grémio* should not be viewed merely as a negative expression, a reaction against its competitor, a defiant allegiance to Kamba Simango. From the outset some officials, including the *comandante* at Espungabera, were firm supporters of the *Grémio*, and by 1937 the *Grémio* had, with officials present, opened houses for worship at Mashanga, Chilokane, and Mambone. By 1939 the organisation was operating a day school in Beira and a night school at Mambone. It boasted some 300 active members and seemed to have congenial relations with many Portuguese officials; it was in fact the government that suggested a name change from the club-like notion implicit in the term

²¹ Nkomo to "friends who are in Johannesburg," 30 April 1942, file 3039, Swiss Mission.

grémio to the more solid organisational term *núcleo*. But it never solved its leadership problems. Ribeiro Roderigues Machazi, the secretary of the *Grémio*, was among many who called for Simango's return, and his call was an admission of the difficulty of direction: "If you cannot come to help us, then tell us what to do."²²

That, in its essence, was the internal crisis for Protestants in Manica and Sofala. Isolation had permitted them to confront, by and large alone, what was clearly a difficult situation, and in the process to become, perhaps, a stronger Christian agency. It had also perpetuated an imperfect grasp of the tenets of Christianity, even allowing for the value of healthy contextualisation. Mrs Marsh viewed developments resignedly: "It will just have to be an entirely indigenous work so far as we can see," she wrote after the 1940s tours, "and perhaps that is for the best. But they do need shepherding."²³

Simango ended up at the same point, but he saw the situation more positively:

It [Christian work in P.E.A.] has been growing all these years, until now it draws nourishment from the Native Soil. These men in Beira, and other places, are ready to face anything for the Ideals and the Religion which they have embraced. Now it is not the missionary who has to speak for them to the authorities asking that the advancements of education and religion be given them. Now they go up themselves and face the authorities, and lay before them what they want. Surely men who have a spirit like this cannot be left unaided in their struggle to come out from Darkness to Light, and in their efforts to bring their fellowmen to see that Light. They have shown in a modest way what they can do. But, alas, there are certain things which they cannot do by themselves. They cannot fully support the work. Self-help does reach a limit.²⁴

²² Simango listed Shovane Simango, Maque Ngwenya, Eduardo Ngwenya, Frank Makule, and Mariano Rufu as *Grémio* leaders requiring "encouragement." Simango to Kenneth Bunker, 5 May 1939, and to Jones, 23 Dec. 1939, FRB/Corr.8/1, and Simango to Bunker, 26 Nov. 1937 and 11 Jan. 1939, FRB/Corr.8/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

²³ Marsh, "A Missionary Journey."

²⁴ Simango to Bunker, 11 Jan. 1939, FRB/Corr.8/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

The question of where this limit rested was the great *internal* issue before evangelicals in Company territory; the great *external* crisis, arriving in full force in the 1940s, was their standing before the Portuguese colonial administration.

Chapter Nine: Dissolution, 1940-1945

The lack of interest that had characterised official Portuguese attitudes toward the Catholic Church following the separation of church and state in 1910 began to change, as has been shown, in the 1920s and 1930s.¹ This more serious attitude toward the work of the Catholic missions in Mozambique culminated in the *Concordata* and Missionary Agreement of 1940, seeking as they did to restore Portugal to "the religious peace" that had been "destroyed" in 1910. In 1944 the first Bishop of Beira arrived in Manica and Sofala. Late that year, the government dissolved the *Associação Crista Evangélica* and the *Grémio Negrófilo*.²

Catholic priests and Protestant leaders in Company territory had never shown great fondness for one another, although there were some signs of charity; priests, for example, sewed the *Associação's* flag. But hostility became far more apparent in the early 1940s. From Lausanne de Meuron saw "a beginning of real persecution" in the colony, with schools closed and pastors and evangelists beaten. In Company territory the head of native affairs told Loze that although schools at Beira and Gogoi could remain open, students could not complete their studies with the necessary governor's exam. Two years later, in 1943, priests were still demanding, still unsuccessfully, that Bede Simango's school at Gogoi be closed. Chadraque Chitereka, across the border from Umtali, was treated to the curious phenomena of arrest because it was illegal for him to operate his non-existent school; his appeal to Beira was refused on the grounds that his "school" was too close to Catholic facilities.³

¹ See above, pp. 75ff.

² A. da Silva Rego, *Lições de Missionologia* (Lisbon, 1961), pp. 242-45; and Loze to Bunker, 1 June 1944, FRB/Corr.10/1, the Fred R. Bunker Collection, Talladega College Historical Collections, Talladega, Alabama (hereafter Bunker Papers, Talladega).

³ Loze to Emerson, 17 July 1943, and to friends, 2 June 1944, FRB/Corr.10/2, and Loze to Thompson, 27 Dec. 1941, FRB/Corr.10/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and de Meuron to Emerson, 8 July 1941, file 3026, Département Missionnaire des Églises Protestantés de Suisse

It would, however, be simplistic to explain the revival of a more energetic and antagonistic priesthood by traditional Catholic-Protestant animosity. Both the Portuguese government and the Catholic Church now viewed the Church ever more strongly as an agency for the "nationalization" of Africans. The revival was thus not so much an expression of theological or historic religious differences as it was a response to Portuguese sensitivities and a Catholic willingness to be used against threatening foreign influences. In fact it is possible to argue that the "national" nature of evangelicals in Company territory largely explains why the immediate impact of the *Concordata* was far more severe to the south of the colony than in Manica and Sofala. As late as mid-1944, Loze was only reporting the possibility of new difficulties, not the fact.⁴

Paradoxically, at the very time that the Catholic posture appeared more antagonistic, there were dual reasons for evangelical optimism about their official standing. The first had to do with the Mozambique Company itself, whose fifty-year charter was due to expire in July 1942. Their record had been less than stellar. An official of the Company in 1930 had admitted that African education – one of the Company's obligations under its charter – had been "badly neglected," and the new governor of Manica and Sofala in the 1940s looked back retrospectively and commented that the Company "did nothing to develop the potential wealth of this entire region, preferring to plunder it and alienate the natives."⁵ Given that the attitude of the rest of P.E.A. toward foreign Protestant missions had compared favourably with the intolerance of Company rule, the new *Território de Manica e Sofala* seemed to reopen opportunities for direct mission support.

The second factor had to do with evidence that local political officers accepted the legitimacy of the associations and their followers and were prepared, to a probably limited extent, to protect them. Some real significance can be

Romande Records, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter Swiss Mission).

⁴ Loze to Bunker, 1 June 1944, FRB/Corr.10/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Loze to Gibson, 7 May 1941, Box 1204, Records of the International Missionary Council, London (hereafter Edinburgh House).

⁵ Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982* (Boulder, 1983), pp. 37, 50.

attached, for example, to the 1940 decision of the Beira government simply to publish statistics of an "evangelical school," which it had scrupulously ignored for years. When the Company territory became a province of the colony, Abel Mountinho, now the inspector of circumscriptions, assured Bede Simango that the Gogoi school would not be closed. The Mambone administrator, meanwhile, met Nkomo and declared, "I will be the protector of the Association at Mambone," and the new governor, meeting Aquila Ngwenya, one of Nkomo's principal assistants, gave fifty escudos to the *Associação*. It was not a prognosis for suppression.⁶

There were other factors that complicated the movement toward dissolution. However impressed a governor might be with a letter of welcome and a goat and the singing of the *Associação* hymn in Portuguese – the actions of the Mashanga evangelicals in 1944 – he could not help but know of the continuing dissension between the *Associação* and the *Grémio*, both clearly part of the evangelical community. Their tactic of bringing their differences before the authorities was certainly not well-received; nor of course was the evidence they continually provided of a potential threat to the order and peace of the territory. With Loze's departure for Umtali in 1939 it was easy for the administration to gain the impression of unsupervised bickering groups who might prove neither controllable nor under control.⁷

There remained, too, some doubt as to just how "national" evangelicals in Manica and Sofala really were. Loze's search for an assistant and a replacement was of course largely motivated by his own age and, later, by illness – he was virtually deaf in the 1940s – and by the need of his wife to be located in the more satisfying climate of Umtali. The resultant 1939 move made periodic trips to Beira something of a strain, and in any case supervision from a distance was hardly effective. Moreover, the Swiss mission made it clear in 1940 that it would not provide a missionary replacement at Beira. Loze's concern that a Portuguese evangelical be attached to the *Associação* was

⁶ Loze to Emerson, 6 Sept. 1940, file 3038, Loze to Paul Fatten, 13 Nov. 1944, file 3015, and Aquila Goenha to Loze, 6 Dec. 1944, file 3002, Swiss Mission; and Loze to Emerson, 17 July 1943, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

⁷ Personal communication from E. Kaltenrieder, 28 March 1977.

certainly a product of his aspirations for a church in Manica and Sofala both "indigenous and national." It was definitely indigenous, but as none of the African leadership were technically Portuguese nationals, and as the ties with Portuguese evangelicals were tenuous at best, it was arguably not firmly "national."⁸

Loze's first choice, which he pursued for years, was Dr Edgar Ribeiro. An "enthusiastic" evangelical Portuguese, Ribeiro had hoped to move from Lourenço Marques to Beira to join Loze as early as 1937. But he became attached to the Swiss mission and proved himself "indispensable" to the Chamanculo hospital. Six years later he spent a week with Loze at Beira, and even the Swiss at Lourenço Marques agreed that he was "the man for the job." In the end, however, the mission proved unwilling to permit the transfer. Loze's alternative became Tomas Ferreira, a telegraph employee for the Mozambique Company and supposedly the only Portuguese Protestant in Beira. He had taken an interest in the work of the *Associação*, assisted in Portuguese translations, superintended Beira property after Loze's departure, and generally tried to maintain congenial relations between officials and evangelicals. Loze became convinced that Ferreira should abandon his telegraphic work and become a "missionary" representing Portuguese evangelicals, and despite his transfer to Angola in 1943 Ferreira was prepared to do just that. But the call – the earthly call from evangelicals in Portugal – did not come.⁹

On November 18, 1944, the *Associação Crista Evangélica* and the *Grémio Negrófilo* were proscribed, having been found by the governor-general of the colony, Paulo Augusto do Rego, to operate under statutes contrary to the provisions of the infamous legislative diploma 167 of 1929. It was a verdict apparently reached not in Beira but in Lourenço Marques, which largely explains the ineffectiveness of any local official sympathies. Nkomo and Loze both suspected

⁸ Emerson to Jones, 27 March 1940, file 4, American Board series, Phelps-Stokes Fund Records, New York (hereafter Phelps-Stokes).

⁹ Commission de Gérance de Beira, 17 Aug. and 9 Sept. 1943, and Loze to Dysart, 13 Aug. 1943, file 3015, and Loze, "L'Évangile à Beira et dans la Province de Manica et Sofala, 1937 à 1943," 10 June 1943, file 3002, Swiss Mission; and Loze to Bunker, 28 Sept. 1943, FRB/Corr.10/1, and Loze to Belcher, 12 July 1943, FRB/Corr.10/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

the new Catholic Bishop of Beira, who allegedly protested the cordial words Manica and Sofala's governor had for the *Associação* at Mashanga. The bishop would surely, in any case, not have hesitated to charge that the organisations were insufficiently national, which appears to have been the general grounds for dissolution.¹⁰ Most likely the decision was directed toward the more active *Associação*, but according to Nkomo the Gogoi leaders of the *Grémio* were arrested and Sixpence Simango was sent to jail.¹¹ In any case the animosity between the two groups was surely influential, and in the interest of consistency one could not easily dissolve the one without the other. On top of all of this Loze was inconveniently ill during these developments, and thus could not draw upon his own access to official circles to avoid drastic acts. The matter of a Portuguese replacement was of course still pending.¹²

¹⁰ Insufficiently national, yes, but it was more than that, for we are also entering a period in which some Protestants – and a few Catholics – were finding their voice in protest against colonial policies and colonialism itself. Some in the Council of Churches were working on strategies to do so as early as the late 1940s; by the time of the liberation struggle, there were massive detentions of Protestants, both leaders and followers. Efforts to “Africanize” church leadership – which of course is one of the themes of this study – were seen as especially threatening. Some Catholics also faced the wrath of Portugal when they made clear their opposition to the Church's commitment to the state; the White Fathers, e.g., were expelled in 1971 for that very reason. Teresa Cruz e Silva, “Evangelicals and Democracy in Mozambique,” in Terence O. Ranger, ed., *Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa* (New York, 2008), pp. 162-63. The role of the new Bishop of Beira is very speculative. Protestant evidence at the time suggests the role outlined in the text. But Adrian Hastings, in 1974, characterised Bishop Dom Sebastian Scares de Resende as the “outstanding ecclesiastic in Mozambique” from his consecration to his death in 1967. He was, according to Hastings, not concerned with “Portugalization,” he criticised administrative injustice, and he ran the only “reasonably free” paper, the *Diário de Mozambique*, in the colony. Adrian Hastings, *Wiriya* (London, 1974), p. 25; and Loze to Emerson, 7 Dec. 1944, FRB/Corr.10/2, and Nkomo to Edith Bunker Davis, 28 May 1945, FRB/Corr.9/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

¹¹ Sixpence Simango's health was seriously impaired by imprisonment. Nkomo was unaware of his fate; it was reported that “he had gone to ‘Ethiopia,’” perhaps a euphemism for death.

¹² Rennie interview with Nkomo, 1970, quoted in John Keith Rennie, *Christianity, Colonialism and the Origins of Nationalism among the Ndau of Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935*, diss. Northwestern Univ. 1973, p. 418; *Boletim Oficial da Colónia de Moçambique*, portaria nos. 5:791 and 5:792,

The *Associação* pursued several avenues of protest. Nkomo immediately met with the *Associação's* solicitor and filed a demand to annul the decree – an appeal that was promptly rejected, though strangely no one knew. Ribeiro, who now represented the Lisbon-based *Aliança Evangélica Portuguesa* in Lourenço Marques, saw the governor-general himself late in December, but he secured only the promise to look further into the matter. In Lisbon Eduardo Moreira, in charge of the *Aliança*, protested to the minister of colonies, arguing that the *Aliança* was a legal Portuguese organisation which owned the grounds and buildings of the *Associação* in Beira. Moreover, he maintained that the *Associação* was independent of all foreign missions – especially the Americans – and therefore, as a national, indigenous, and legal organisation, deserved to be reopened. When the appeal was repeated in 1946, the minister, Marcelo Caetano, merely recited the original legal basis for dissolution. Meanwhile Nascimento Freire, the Lourenço Marques pastor, travelled to Beira to meet with the governor. He offered a compromise. Dissolution was, he suggested, a violation of liberties protected in the Portuguese constitution and in the Colonial Act. But if the *Associação* could not be reinstated, he sought authorisation for himself, Nkomo, and Bede Simango to provide an evangelical ministry in Beira, Gogoi, Machemeje and elsewhere under his, Freire's, responsibility. He called the proposed new organisation the *Igreja Evangélica Portuguesa Africana de Moçambique*.¹³

Freire's proved to be the wisest tactic to take. "It is certain that there is great opposition somewhere," Loze mused, and it was that opposition, variously located, that guaranteed continuing proscription of the *Associação*. But Freire's proposal was more favourably, if gradually, received. In January 1946 the government permitted him to serve as

18 Nov. 1944; and *Bulletin de la Mission Suisse dans l'Afrique du Sud*, 46 (March-April 1945), 201-2.

¹³ Loze to members of Committee of Christian Work, 18 May 1945, file 3002, Freire handed to governor of Beira, 21 May 1945, file 3013, and H. Guye to Emerson, 23 July 1946, file 3037, Swiss Mission; Nkomo to Edith Bunker Davis, 28 May 1945, FRB/Corr.9/1, and Loze to Emerson, 25 Jan. 1945, FRB/Corr.10/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and Moreira to min. of colonies, 10 June 1945, and min. of colonies to Moreira, 30 April 1946, Box 1201, Edinburgh House.

an evangelist and counsellor to evangelicals in Manica and Sofala. The following month Nkomo was told that he could resume worship services, and soon he was allowed to reopen the hall in Beira.¹⁴ There were continuing frustrations: periodically some meetings were prohibited and churches closed; Bede Simango was prevented from cutting trees, a serious handicap for someone engaged in carpentry; and despite Freire's 1947 efforts schools were not to be reopened. But Freire and Nkomo, Nkomo's close assistants Aquinas Ngwenya and Samuel Simango, and Bede Simango were all permitted to minister to groups of Christians in Beira and throughout Manica and Sofala; the very fact of Freire's extensive tours is testimony to some degree of tolerance. That tolerance was simply conditional: "The Association has never been authorised to function as before," a Swiss missionary who assisted evangelicals in the region for eighteen years after dissolution maintained; "it has rather been tolerated tacitly on the condition that it be supervised by a European possessing the relative confidence of the authorities."¹⁵ The government had thus eliminated legal standing as the criteria for activity; confidence surely permitted greater flexibility in control.¹⁶

To ensure a setting that would preserve administrative confidence was the concern of various mission groups with historic interests in Manica and Sofala. Certainly Moreira, whom Loze credited for the limited resumption of evangelical activity, and Freire provided the continuing "national" ingredients so essential for survival. But there remained the need for support. On Loze's initiative representatives of the American Board, the American Methodists, and the South African General Mission joined him in Umtali in April 1945 to form an advisory committee for Christian work in Manica and Sofala. They agreed to contribute toward Freire's salary and to encourage the various Christian communities to fully support local African evangelists. Three years later this group formed the basis for a new Beira Committee of the

¹⁴ Groups had been meeting quietly in houses in the interim. Nkomo to Edith Bunker Davis, *ibid.*; and *Bulletin de la Mission Suisse dans l'Afrique du Sud*, 47 (March-April 1946), 43.

¹⁵ Personal communication from Kaltenrieder.

¹⁶ Loze to Emerson, 21 Sept. 1945, file 3014, and Freire to governor-general, n.d. but 1948, file 3028, Swiss Mission.

Christian Council of Mozambique to administer the work in Manica and Sofala until it was feasible for a committee within the region to handle its tasks itself.¹⁷

However crucial these efforts at support may have been, the primary responsibility for the evangelical church in Manica and Sofala remained in the hands of its African leadership. Indeed, as non-Africans explored the possibility of a new missionary role it became apparent how deeply attached African evangelicals in the territory were to the old *Associação* and what it had represented in terms of independence and control.¹⁸ In any case, extensive outside support was not feasible, either financially or politically. After it transferred its P.E.A. responsibilities to the Swiss in 1937, for example, the American Board merely professed its interest in a token way with a partial salary for Loze. And the enormous difficulty foreign missions faced at the end of the war in gaining re-entry into Portuguese Africa, especially Angola, affirmed again their dependence upon African and Portuguese evangelical initiatives. Moreover, the most zealous advocates outside the territory were disappearing. Bunker died in 1946; Loze, in 1947. And Simango remained in his exile in Accra. One finds, then, in the decade following dissolution isolated groups of evangelicals (perhaps not yet aware of the meaning of the larger Christian community beyond Manica and Sofala), an aging leadership (the absence of educational institutions preventing transition to younger trained leaders), yet groups in control of their own affairs. In 1954 key sites were not administered by missionaries but by Nkomo at Machemeje, Ngwenya at Gogoi, Samuel Simango at Beira, and Bede Simango at Mt. Silinda.¹⁹

¹⁷ The Council had been created in 1944. Loze report on Committee for Joint Work in Manica and Sofala, n.d. but 1946, Box 43, 1, Phelps-Stokes; H. Guye, "Que se passe-t-il à Beira?" *Bulletin de la Mission Suisse dans l'Afrique du Sud*, 46 (Sept.-Oct. 1945), 307; C.J. Dotson to supt., S.A.G.M., Cape Town, 5 May 1945, official letters to and from South Africa, Records of the South Africa General Mission, London; minutes of meeting of Beira Committee, 2 Nov. 1948, file 3028, Swiss Mission.

¹⁸ Yet to this day many still call themselves "American Board."

¹⁹ J.S. Rea report to Christian Council re Beira, 2 Aug. 1948, file 3028, Swiss Mission; minutes, 27 July 1937 and 25 Oct. 1945, of the Prudential Committee of the American Board, United Church Board for World Ministries, Boston; newsletter from E. Kaltenrieder, 20 Sept. 1952, and

Bunker had despaired toward the end of his life; "I have worked for forty-eight years," he wrote in 1939, "and have failed."²⁰ But his aim had been to support rather than lead African Christians with a small number of American missionary personnel. "Let us not plan to put in our full fledged American Christian methods and standards," he had advocated in 1925, "but let an indigenous African Christianity grow up there under our fostering care and guidance, and unless I am greatly mistaken we will have much more to show for it in thirty years than the Rhodesia Mission has now – not in its forty fine buildings, residences, sawmills, shops, etc., fine for American reports – but in a living church of God made up of his people."²¹ Maybe so, even without the fostering care.

minutes of meeting of Beira Committee, 10-11 Sept. 1954, FRB/Corr.17/1, and John Reuling to Wilfrid Bunker, 22 May 1947, FRB/Corr.9/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

²⁰ Bunker to Simango, 6 May 1939, FRB/Corr.8/2, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

²¹ Bunker to Whitehead, 16 March 1925, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

Chapter Ten: The Nature of the African Church

What must be said at the outset is that it is very difficult to characterise the religious practices and beliefs of African evangelicals in Manica and Sofala. This is partly due to the inadequacy of available information, partly due to the diversity of the groups, and partly due to their isolation. Description remains, however, a necessary if somewhat speculative effort. The issues of traditional values, of new religious beliefs and past customs, of the expressions of worship, and of the sense of community give the historical narrative meaning.

It is noteworthy that both Kamba Simango and Bede Simango had familial ties with traditional religious practitioners, for it is a reminder that that environment remained a very real factor, however subconscious, in the behaviour of new Protestant groups throughout the territory. They knew their past experience, even if they did not see clearly where they were going. In fact fuzziness about new religious concepts, which characterised so many evangelicals in Manica and Sofala, enhanced the importance of the traditional, for there was no one towering above them pontificating about practices good and evil. It was Paul, the Corinthians, and circumcision all over again, but without a Paul.¹

It remains something of a paradox that the American Board ended up working – or rather trying to work – among the Ndaus, a Shona-speaking people, the victims of the *mfecane*, not the evangelistically-convenient products of it. Given the myriad of external influences upon them, one might have expected the Ndaus to offer a confused amalgam of religious customs. There had, historically, been some stability within Ndaus society. Some centuries before they had moved eastward from what became Southern Rhodesia, and for at least 300 years the basic Ndaus clans had been established in the region north of the Sabi, south of Beira, and west of Sofala. But the coastal Ndaus were continually

¹ And, for that matter, without circumcision, for few Ndaus practiced the custom. The point, of course, remains.

exposed to new influences. Newer Ndaou clans, for example, moved into Mozambique; Nkomo was one. The coastal Ndaou had contact with Arabs and other foreigners, and they were in the path of the Zimba invaders. They were, of course, hit by the Ngoni and Zulu in the nineteenth century; a goodly number, accompanying their conquerors on expeditions, relocated to the south among the Thonga. It is therefore remarkable that, despite their distance from the Shona center and their substantial exposure to strong influences, the Ndaou managed to retain their basic religious beliefs; they even exported them both to the Thonga and the Chopi.²

Shona religion – at least its Rhodesian version – has been studied extensively,³ and its Mozambique expression “largely corresponds” to it.⁴ Certainly belief in a benevolent being that created and controls all, and its sacerdotal oracle, is well-known. The Shona God, *Mwari*, was not, as is sometimes argued, remote; rather he was both “transcendental” and “immanent.” Still, he did not involve himself directly in family and individual affairs, and the Ndaou in turn did not worship him directly; rather they recognised his existence by indirect appeals. The concept of a supreme being was, in fact, overshadowed by ancestral spirits.⁵

If there was only one world, as the Ndaou held, then the dead must remain in it, whether visible or not. A father who

² Henri Philippe Junod, “A Contribution to the Study of Ndaou Demography, Totemism, and History,” *Bantu Studies*, 8 (1934), 32-37; E. Dora Eathly, “On Some Ritual Objects of the VaNdaou in S. Chopiland Gaza, Portuguese East Africa,” *Annals of the Transvaal Museum*, 11 (1925), 125; Henri-Ph. Junod, “Les VaNdaou de l’Afrique Orientale Portugaise,” *Bulletin de la Société Neuchateloise de Géographie*, 44 (1935), 22-23.

³ One has only to become submerged in Michael Gelfand’s *Medicine and Magic* (Cape Town, 1956), *Shona Ritual* (Cape Town, 1959), *Shona Religion* (Cape Town, 1962), *African Background: the Traditional Culture of the Shona-speaking People* (Cape Town, 1965), and *The Genuine Shona: Survival Values of an African Culture* (Salisbury, 1973), to see that.

⁴ M.L. Daneel, *Old and New in Southern Shona Independent Churches*, 1 (The Hague, 1971), p. 5.

⁵ António Rita-Ferreira, *Agrupamento e Caracterização Étnica dos Indígenas de Mozambique* (Lisbon, 1958), p. 44; “Estatística em Países Não Civilizados: Território de Manica e Sofala,” *Boletim da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa*, 24 (1906), 116; E.W. Smith, “The Idea of God among South African Tribes,” in Smith, ed., *African Ideas of God* (London, 1950), pp. 126-33; Natalie Curtis, *Songs and Tales from the Dark Continent* (New York, 1920), p. 15; and *ibid.*, p. 177.

held absolute authority while living could thus still protect his household after death. Whether he did so or not, and whether harmful spirits were defused, depended upon communication to identify what was required, and actions to propitiate the unhappy spirits. This necessitated intermediaries. One might make his own offerings to ancestral spirits, but since adversity usually had a cause, then assistance was required to identify it. Diviners, both men and women, identified the spirit creating the troubles and communed with it, hopefully inducing it to leave. Illness, however, might not be caused by spirits, and there were thus healers who used roots and other natural materials to cure. Ornaments might be produced to protect, instructions for offerings might be given, and predictions for the future might be made. Still, religious practices were not merely placed in the hands of the professionals and left there. Group participation was "one of the most prominent features of Shona traditional religion," implying a "shared responsibility."⁶

The Ndau were a totemic people. Each clan accepted that its origin was uniquely related to a particular animal – never a plant or an element – and that its totem provided an unbreachable bond between its members. The totem, moreover, had power to protect the clan. Taboos, and the religious sanctions enforcing them, were attached to the totems, and there were offerings, dances, and an "extraordinarily rich" folklore in recognition of the importance of the totem in clan life. Totems, of course, identified the origins of each individual. Tapera Nkomo came from the clan of that name, a clan of chiefs, whose taboo was the ox. Simango's was, though a clan of subjects, also of some prominence, especially along the coast; its taboo was the ape. It was the clan and its totem, not age classes, initiation schools, or circumcision, nor a sense of communal ownership, which was the focus of individual identity.⁷

⁶ Curtis, *Songs and Tales*, pp. 15-17; "Estatística em Paizes Não Civilizados," p. 116; Earthy, "On Some Ritual Objects," p. 125; and Daneel, *Old and New*, vol. 1, pp. 180-81.

⁷ Junod, "A Contribution to the Study of Ndau Demography," pp. 21-22, 26; E. Dora Earthy, "The VaNdau of Sofala," *Africa*, 4 (1931), 225-28; Earthy, "Sundry Notes on the VaNdau of Sofala, P.E.A.," *Bantu Studies*, 4 (1930), 103; Rita-Ferreira, *Agrupamento e Caracterização Étnica*, pp. 43, 47-48; Melville J. Herskovits, "Some Property Concepts and Marriage

How much difference these various aspects of Ndaу religious expression actually made to Ndaу Christian communities is difficult to gauge. Certainly one could seize upon the belief in a supreme being as evidence of a monotheistic faith that could be translated into Christian theology. And speaking in tongues and visions and healing had their New Testament parallels. The adaptability of African religions to Christianity was everywhere an abiding mission issue, however rigidly it was treated by some missionaries. Experiments by an African pastor at Mt. Silinda, aiming at responding to the psychic as well as physical needs of hospital patients, was a gesture at adaptation, and though missionary direction across the border was inconsequential, one might well expect pragmatic attempts by African leaders and European transients to adjust traditional values to new religious beliefs. But the thrust was not, after all, initially toward those tied to tradition.⁸

Instead conversions came first to men labouring in urban areas. Unlike the idyllic missionary visions of rural scenes and quiet villages where a missionary might slowly but contentedly make his mark among "unspoiled" Africans, missionaries met Africans from Manica and Sofala on the docks and in the hotels of Beira, or in the European businesses of Lourenço Marques, or in the mines of South Africa. These men might well retain a respect for traditional institutions – or they might not – but the breadth of their experience was such that traditional restraints were inconsequential during their urban exposure to Christianity. The new faith provided an emotional grounding in intimidating surroundings; it also provided tools with which to cope.

Potentially these tools provided a less threatening entrance into Ndaу society. It was not missionaries but sons and husbands who returned home with a commitment to

Customs of the Vandau," *American Anthropologist*, 25 n.s. (1923), 379; A. Rita-Ferreira, *Povos de Moçambique: História e Cultura* (Oporto, 1975), pp. 130-32; Charles Bullock, *The Mashona* (Cape Town, 1928), pp. 77-115; and John Keith Rennie, *Christianity, Colonialism and the Origins of Nationalism among the Ndaу of Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935*, diss. Northwestern Univ. 1973, pp. 93-102.

⁸ Smith, "The Idea of God," p. 133; and M.L. Daneel, *Zionism and Faith-Healing in Rhodesia: Aspects of African Independent Churches* (The Hague, 1970), p. 58.

explain their new beliefs, and although they might not evidence major material advancement, they still came with skills guaranteed to impress. A young man's writings on the origin of his Ronga village, Mutini, would have equal applicability to the Ndau. He told of Mudondjisa who, while living in a Johannesburg compound early in the century, was converted to Christianity and was awed by the power of literacy:

When he returned to Mutini he told the children to gather firewood and at night he called near to him his parents and people of the family, and he began to teach them to write on the ground around the large fire. Thus was given the first step of education in that village, and the people were enchanted and attributed witchcraft to the art of writing, and said Mudondjisa was the biggest witch who, with a piece of paper, succeeded in speaking with a person who was far away. The reputation of this witch spread throughout the region and people came so that Mudondjisa could read to them the letters that their husbands and sons sent them from Jone [Johannesburg].⁹

Of course there was some hostility towards tradition. In the early years African evangelists would offer "unsophisticated" sermons and then admonish followers to avoid beer, bride wealth, and offerings to ancestors. Bede Simango, examining candidates for baptism, would ask penetrating questions regarding customs, especially those concerning witchcraft;¹⁰ returned labourers were especially anxious about the latter. Some considered dancing an "excess," and new converts would bring protective amulets and similar items to Nkomo to be destroyed. Attitudes toward customs clearly figured into the acceptability, or otherwise, of a new convert.¹¹ Bunker witnessed intensive questioning of proselytes by African church elders. He even provided a way out:

⁹ Martha Butler Binford, *Stalemate: a Study of Cultural Dynamics*, diss. Michigan State Univ. 1971, p. 169.

¹⁰ *Associação* members made a point of contrasting their marriage practices with those of independent churches and *Grémio* members. Loze to de Meuron, 24 June 1937, file 3009, and report of evangelistic trip of N. Freire, Aug. 1945, file 3002, Departement Missionnaire des Églises Protestantés de Suisse Romande Records, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter Swiss Mission).

¹¹ Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 433; *Was geht in Beira vor?*, p. 869 (see ch.

The deacons were interviewing people who wanted to take communion and there was a little old woman who had come, but she carried beer for her husband. Because in African society, you have to remember that the wife makes beer for her husband; that's one thing that you have to do. But the rule that had been made was that you couldn't take communion if you carried beer for your husband. And they said to her, the deacons were going after her pretty strongly, and they said, "Did you carry beer?" And she was struggling and father [Bunker] was sitting in on it, and he said, "Annie [?], do you love the Lord Jesus Christ?" And her face lit up like this, and she said, "Oh, I love the Lord Jesus Christ!" And nothing that they could say afterward mattered; anything that they asked her she would say, "I love the Lord Jesus Christ." Father felt that that idea was as important as the rules.¹²

Whatever the "rules" might be, evangelical Christians were intent to establish their uniqueness. It is true that they might on occasion become chiefs, and they might not establish themselves in separate villages. There was some flexibility in inter-faith relationships. But behind it all was the clear assumption that their new faith marked a departure from the traditional. Their rejection of alcohol and tobacco, seemingly without European provocation, suggested identification in their own minds with a behaviour that they were now rejecting. Labourers in particular sensed hostility to their new religious status. There were new standards. Both Christians and non-Christians, for example, considered the "fall from grace" of a Christian to be far more serious than a similar failing by a non-Christian (a disturbing commentary on Simango's "fall" and future). Evangelicals not only intended, by varying means, to display their uniqueness; perceptions had already established it.¹³

Intriguingly, their more solid links with the traditional also tended to provide them with ties with the early New Testament church. An historian should, of course, show

6, fn. 17); and *Das Anliegen von Beira* (Zurich, 1937), p. 9. It is unclear as to whether or not Nkomo solicited the amulets.

¹² Interview with Edith Bunker Davis, at Royalston, Mass., 28 Feb. 1975.

¹³ Personal communication from E. Kaltenrieder, 28 March 1977; Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 488; and Binford, *Stalemate*, p. 166. See M.L. Daneel, *Old and New in Southern Shona Independent Churches*, 2 (Mouton, 1974), pp. 170-76, for parallels with independent churches.

great caution in offering parallels across time and across cultures; the variables can easily make the exercise meaningless. The discovery of similarities between the New Testament churches and recent church history is, moreover, a popular pastime more deserving of hagiography than serious history. But New Testament parallels require attention when they were perceived by the later practitioners of Christianity at the time, and this was the case in Manica and Sofala.

Nkomo sensed it repeatedly; his selecting leaders of small groups and appointing women to aid them, for example, emulated Paul in Philippians. The appeal to Nkomo to "cross the Buzi and come to help us" emulated Paul and the Macedonians.¹⁴ From Chiloane he wrote in 1937: "We arrived at the isle of Chypre and at Paphos (Acts 13) and we have found a 'proconsul' who has received us very amiably...."¹⁵ Kamba Simango succumbed to the temptation of parallels as well, but he saw it more politically: "The white Portuguese citizen in a black skin," he wrote, "is an asset in these days. St. Paul found it useful in his day."¹⁶ When a Swiss visitor told the story of Philip and the Ethiopian – in a three-way translation from French to Tonga to Chichanga – there appeared to be a sense among his Beira audience that the story was about them, and that through it they were linked with Christ.¹⁷ Loze doubtless helped to communicate this notion to the African leadership. When he observed that groups were dependent upon "volunteer workers who teach the little they know," he added that "this is really what was done in the primitive Church."¹⁸

¹⁴ Philippians 4:2-3 and Acts 16:9; Nkomo, "Recit de mon voyage d'évangélisation au sud de la province," 22 July to 15 Sept. 1944, file 3002, and Nkomo to Loze, 5 Oct. 1942, file 3039, Swiss Mission.

¹⁵ Loze to de Meuron, 19 April 1937, file 3009, Swiss Mission.

¹⁶ Simango to Bunker, 11 Feb. 1939, FRB/Corr.8/1, the Fred R. Bunker Collection, Talladega College Historical Collections, Talladega, Alabama (hereafter Bunker Papers, Talladega).

¹⁷ It is of interest to note that these African men in 1933 were apparently hearing this story for the first time, even though references to Ethiopians in the New Testament were especially popular in separatist churches. *Das Anliegen von Beira*, p. 28.

¹⁸ Loze to Zimmerer, 16 April 1943, FRB/Corr.10/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

And what was done in the primitive church condoned some traditional Ndaou practices; it was here that the connection became most apparent. In many groups there were those who spoke in tongues and had visions, and some women at Dombe claimed to be possessed by demons.¹⁹ All were variations on traditional possession, the former also characteristic of early church practices and the latter representative of early church opportunities to demonstrate religious power. Faith-healing, that was such an important ingredient in Shona independent churches in Rhodesia,²⁰ doubtless found its proponents in Mozambique as well; it too was a variation on traditional healing practices. In these terms the transition in beliefs might not prove to have been all that traumatic.

There was, of course, more to the evangelical church in Manica and Sofala than this. All candidates were examined – most more rigorously than Bunker required – and though the infrequency of visits encouraged flexibility, some were refused and others were only admitted into the church conditionally, with admonitions to study basic beliefs. Once they were in, their perceptions of their responsibilities seemingly grew through time. “At the beginning,” Kamba Simango wrote,

the Christians in Beira used their money in making feasts on Christmas Day and New Years, for they had no higher vision. The Light they had then did not make them see that they could use their money for something else. Out of these beginnings we have a missionary motive being worked out among them. Think of boys getting an average salary of £1-5-0 deciding among themselves that for one month each man ought to give one pound so that they may form an Association, the purpose of which is not to make feasts but to teach others.... I do not believe that there is a white missionary who could have succeeded in making

¹⁹ Possession was an especially prominent Ndaou characteristic. Junod, “Un Voyage d’Études;” and report of evangelistic trip of N. Freire, Aug. 1945, file 3002, Swiss Mission. Loze referred on occasion to groups of Protestants who, left to themselves, had “taken strange habits.” *Was geht in Beira vor?*, p. 869 (see ch. 6, fn. 17).

²⁰ See Daneel, *Zionism and Faith-Healing*.

these men give that much money for the mission work.²¹

Evangelicals at Sofala and elsewhere took the initiative in the construction of houses of worship, and others agreed to cultivate the farm at Machemeje. Simango's aspirations – agricultural classes, hygiene classes, child care for employed mothers, training in sewing, carpentry, and masonry – were testimony to a broad vision of the responsibility of the church. Some of these hopes, of course, were never realised, the explanation resting largely with the perennial problem of leadership and active supervision.²²

Everyone seemed to recognise the difficulty. Ribeiro felt the absence of leaders to "exhort and guide." The administration was sensitive to those leaders, often from separatist churches, who allegedly baptised indiscriminately and then left the new converts without guidance. There is the suggestion that interest traditionally did not lie with rationalised explanations of beliefs but rather with active participation in ritual procedure. In the Christian context Simango put it another way; he argued that there were "men and women who have the right spirit. What they need now is a little leadership." And the groups themselves called persistently for guidance.²³

In the absence of trained leaders, communities depended upon themselves, upon materials provided them from outside, and upon periodic visitations by men such as Bede Simango, Tapera Nkomo, Samuel Simango, and Aquilas Ngwenya. The groups worshipped regularly, either in their

²¹ Simango to Bunker, 11 Feb. 1939, FRB/Corr.8/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

²² John Marsh extracts from "A Missionary Journey," typescript, FRB/Corr.3/1, and Loze to Emerson, 6 Sept. 1940, FRB/Corr.10/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; and outline of mission program sent by Simango to director of native affairs, n.d., Box 43, 2, P.E.A. series, Phelps-Stokes Fund Records, New York.

²³ One might, however, question some of this commitment to guidance, for Simango was considered by many to be too educated and too European, and preferences were shown for less qualified leadership. Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 419; Warnshuis to Riggs, 12 Dec. 1923, ABC:14.2, v. 8, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge; Daneel, *Old and New*, 1, p. 181; and Simango to Bunker, 3 Sept. 1938, FRB/Corr.3/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega.

newly-constructed houses of worship or at each other's homes, with prayer and singing, though there is the suggestion that they needed to be taught "good" hymns. In fact Europeans in Beira found the singing so unsatisfactory – "we howl to the Lord," Loze once remarked – that it was prohibited at the rented hall, and only after Mrs Loze began singing classes and Loze and others drafted hymns in Chichanga did singing meet their standards.²⁴

The groups attempted to teach one another. Certainly Nkomo's organised classes – secular education four nights a week and Bible study on Wednesdays and Saturdays – were a key source of training, as was Gogoi, and Loze took advantage of a captive audience at the Association's annual general assembly to further daily Bible readings. But it was self-help that was the norm. Workers returning to Manica and Sofala taught their families what they had memorised – the Ten Commandments and the creed – and each evening in the Beira compounds one would find "five or six men who had finished their work, seated, a small petrol lamp, and mutual instruction." They secured books from Mt. Silinda; one might find a copy of the New Testament, the Psalms, a manual of Bible history, a catechism, and a primer. Old Testament stories were narrated.²⁵

In the emerging groups women were not relegated to silence. Nkomo's wife was considered a good evangelist, and some women spoke in tongues. Although women were a tiny minority in Beira – the Beira register Loze and Nkomo kept included the names of 164 men and only six women in 1932 – they dominated groups in the interior. Meetings at Mambone and Mashanga especially consisted almost entirely of women. Yet their position was always secondary to men. They were the ones who brought food for men praying at Chaviari's village. They were segregated from men when the Freires visited Gogoi (although this does not appear to have been the usual procedure). Even when women were

²⁴ Report of visit to Manica and Sofala by N. Freire, 4 July to 6 Aug. 1946, file 3002, Swiss Mission; and *Das Anliegen von Beira*, pp. 20, 33.

²⁵ Statistique de association, 19 March 1937, file 3009, Loze to de Meuron, 22 Feb. 1936, file 3008, and Loze report on Beira, 5 Nov. 1935, file 3002, Swiss Mission; and Loze, "Beira, un vaste champ missionnaire," *Bulletin de la Mission Suisse dans l'Afrique du Sud*, 40 (July-Aug. 1932), 103.

integrated into the Christian community, as they normally were, given the pattern of evangelisation, they were appointed as "assistants" to the male leadership.²⁶ "I feel that little will be accomplished in Africa until the status of the African woman is raised to a much higher plane," Christine Simango declared in 1931:

She [Africa] needs her own daughters trained in the best possible way so that with sympathy and understanding they may live amongst their less fortunate sisters and give them the helping hand. A guiding hand which will show the people what a beautiful thing womanhood can be. At present life is very hard for women as a whole. The men need to be taught to respect women and treat them more like human beings rather than bought goods. The women need to be shown to have more respect for themselves. Fear and superstition need to be banished from just ordinary domestic happenings, family life needs to be happier and more sympathetic. I believe that much can be done by Christian families (African especially) living a normal family life amongst the people.²⁷

In general, "the women do what their husbands say."²⁸

These evangelical communities tried to respond to local needs. They collected funds, sometimes for church construction, sometimes to help one another, sometimes to pay their leader or to send him to Gogoi for further training. Men at Beira organised a collection for the building at Sofala, and the *Associação* made plans to visit lepers on the island of Nhanguaia. At one instance they displayed even a broader sense of responsibility, sending nearly £10 to aid victims of a cyclone in Portugal early in 1941. It impressed the Portuguese in Mozambique, though not quite enough.²⁹

²⁶ Reports of evangelistic trip by N. Freire, Aug. 1945 and 30 Sept. 1945, file 3002, Swiss Mission; Loze to Bunker, 5 Nov. 1932, FRB/Corr.10/1, Bunker Papers, Talladega; Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 475; and Loze, "Beira, the Company of Mozambique, and the Gospel," 8 July 1932, Box 1204, Records of the International Missionary Council, London.

²⁷ Quoted in Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 392.

²⁸ Report of visit to Manica and Sofala by N. Freire, 4 July to 6 Aug. 1946, file 3002, Swiss Mission.

²⁹ Loze to Emerson, 6 Sept. 1940, file 3038, Loze to Emerson, 12 Aug. 1942, file 3039, and "acta da nona Assembleia Geral da Associação," 29 Jan. 1939, file 3013, Swiss Mission.

The visits of Nkomo and others were viewed as major events that would attract hundreds from considerable distances. These were "nurturing" and "shepherding" exercises. The lengthy worship services included adult and infant baptisms and communion, the sacraments having been absent from local services since the last visitation. Nkomo, no doubt, would provide a major, though simple, sermon, and there would be hymns.³⁰ But these circuits, the organisational efforts from Beira, and the gestures of outside support need always to be juxtaposed with the continuing daily regimen of small groups, in rural isolation, largely untrained, seeking with varying degrees of "spiritual discipline"³¹ to identify and respond to their own needs in a manner consistent with their own environment and with Christian theology. There is a glimpse, here, of what it was like; the full story of the nature of this African Christian community remains to be told.

³⁰ Loze, "L'Évangile à Beira et dans la Province de Manica et Sofala, 1937 à 1943," 10 June 1943, file 3002, Swiss Mission; and Rennie, *Christianity...*, p. 430.

³¹ *Das Anliegen von Beira*, p. 18.

CONCLUSION

In June 1942 A.L. Warnshuis, still with the International Missionary Council, appeared at a mission conference in Ohio, in the United States. He spoke of the dangers of "spiritual imperialism" when instead the real task was "to implant the germ of the Christian life and to let that grow. The true indigenous church," he continued, "uses the things that are natural and familiar in its own environment." He echoed earlier sentiments that missionaries showed their greatest talent in training followers. "We do not train leaders, for there is no room for them. We are the leaders."¹

This helps to identify the essence of the African church in Manica and Sofala, though of course it was never the intention. It was indigenous, but only by accident. It coped with its environment largely on its own terms, but not by design. Its leaders led, though they were trained to follow. If there was no spiritual imperialism, it was not for want of trying.

And what did these evangelicals do when their environment forced them to lead themselves, forced them to be indigenous, forced them to identify priorities in their own beliefs? They named their leadership and arranged for training and guidance; they organised themselves in a manner that drew upon indigenous qualities for protection; they ministered to one another. They also bickered and criticised and clashed. They espoused loyalty to an oppressive colonial regime. They lacked depth of understanding. Paul might have written paternalistically:

For my part, my brothers, I could not speak to you as I should speak to people who have the Spirit. I had to deal with you on the merely natural plane, as infants in Christ. And so I gave you milk to drink, instead of solid food, for which you were not yet ready. Indeed, you are still not ready for it, for you are still on the merely natural plane. Can you not see that while there is jealousy and strife among you, you are living on the purely human level of your lower nature? When one

¹ Records of the International Missionary Council, London.

says, "I am Nkomo's man", and another, "I am for Simango", are you not all too human?²

And human they were. And vulnerable. But the infancy was not on European terms; it was not mandated, nor was it imposed. There could be growth, and there was, largely because the European religious presence was not there. Without mission apparatus Paul could still say that "you possess full knowledge and you can give full expression to it."³ With mission apparatus, it is not clear that anyone would have been saying that at all.

² Paraphrase of 1 Corinthians 3:1-4.

³ 1 Corinthians 1:5.

Appendix

Statistical Information on the Associação Crista Evangélica Portuguesa de Culto, Ensino e Beneficencia nos Território de Manica e Sofala

	1935	1936	1937	1940	1941	1942	1943
Total members	-	-	1010	1500	-	2000	2500
Communicants	356	324	406	-	-	-	1300
Beira and south	187	-	352	-	-	-	-
Lourenzo Marques and Johannesburg	169	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gogoi	-	-	54	-	-	-	776
Catechists	418	-	412	-	-	-	185
Baptised infants	140	188	192	-	-	-	257
Total students	-	-	254	-	-	-	-
Beira	-	-	177	-	-	425	-
Day	-	-	-	-	141	250	-
Night	-	-	-	-	-	175	-
Gogoi	-	-	77	-	-	-	-
Male	-	-	42	-	-	-	-
Female	-	-	35	-	-	-	-

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For the past half-century the Rev. Dr. Leon Spencer has been engaged in African affairs. He earned a doctorate in African history from Syracuse University and an M.Div. from Virginia Theological Seminary. He taught African history in university and in Kenya administered an Anglican African theological education network, Anitepam. He served as executive director of the ecumenical Washington Office on Africa. Retired, he is sometime

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Literature about Christianity in Africa disproportionately directs attention to the important work of Western missionaries, but to a great extent Africans were the agents of their own conversion. This is true of the key figure in this book, Kamba Simango. Encouraged from a distance by an American Congregationalist missionary, Fred R. Bunker, who shared his commitment to an African-led work, Simango, Tapera Nkomo and others struggled against difficult odds in the Mozambique Company region of Manica and Sofala in Central Mozambique. This study reveals the humanity of its characters as well as their deep devotion to their task.

ISBN 978-99960-27-06-2



9 789996 027062



Mzuni Books no. 7

This book is part of Mzuni Press which offers a range of books on religion, culture and society from Malawi